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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
Exploring the relationship between the rise of China and the existing international order and 
global governance, this PhD thesis provides a China-based interpretive perspective and 
contributes to constructing a framework of “international leadership with Chinese 
characteristics” (ILCC) as a complementary analytical and explanatory structure. The thesis 
argues that the conceptual framework of the ILCC is co-shaped by a variety of components, 
such as Chinese cultural legacies and philosophical thought, China’s involvement in and 
contribution to the process and architecture of global governance, and China’s understanding 
and perception of international relations as well as other countries’ role expectations. 
Methodologically, the thesis applies relational theory, based on Chinese cultural and political 
thought, to redefining the key components (power, interest, vision) of international leadership 
through the logic of relationality/guanxi, leading to the construction of the ILCC with the 
inclusion of facilitative leadership, constructive leadership, and exemplary leadership. Role 
theory, using a combination of national role conceptions (NRCs) and national role performance 
(NRP), is applied to provide empirical analysis (verifying or falsifying) of the proposed ILCC 
framework. Empirically, the ILCC is applied by analyzing the interplay between a number of 
variables, such as Chinese leaders’ and decision-makers’ speeches and statements, China’s 
policy making and external behavior. The major contribution of the thesis is that it provides a 
holistic analytical and explanatory framework for understanding the rise of China and 
identifying China’s role in the transformation of global governance. 
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DANSK RESUMÉ  
Ved at undersøge forholdet mellem Kinas opstigning, den eksisterende internationale orden og 
den globale styreform bidrager denne ph.d.-afhandling med et fortolkende perspektiv baseret 
på kinesiske forhold og giver sit bud på, hvordan ”international ledelse med kinesiske 
karakteristika” (ILCC) kan konstrueres som en komplementær analytisk og forklarende struktur. 
Afhandlingen fremfører, at ILCC’s konceptuelle ramme er opbygget af en række forskellige 
komponenter, herunder Kinas kulturarv og filosofiske tankegods, Kinas involvering i og bidrag 
til opbygningen af den globale styreform og Kinas forståelse og opfattelse af internationale 
forhold, samt forventningerne til den rolle, andre lande spiller. Som metode anvender 
afhandlingen relationsteori baseret på kinesisk kulturel og politisk tænkemåde i sin 
omdefinering af nøglekomponenterne (magt, interesse, vision) i international ledelse set i lyset 
af logikken i relationalitet/guanxi, der førte til dannelsen af ILCC med inddragelse af 
befordrende lederskab, konstruktiv lederskab og eksemplarisk lederskab. Rolleteori, dvs. en 
kombination af nationale rolleopfattelser (NRC’s) og national rolleudførelse (NRP), inddrages 
i en empirisk analyse (til verificering eller afvisning) af den foreslåede ILCC ramme. Den 
anvendte empiri bygger på ILCC, idet samspillet mellem en række variabler analyseres, fx taler 
og udtalelser fra kinesiske ledere og beslutningstagere, kinesiske politiske beslutningsprocesser 
og kinesisk adfærd udadtil. Afhandlingens betydeligste bidrag er, at den opstiller en holistisk 
analyse- og forklaringsramme for forståelsen af Kinas opstigning og for defineringen af Kinas 
rolle i transformeringen af globalt lederskab.   
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CHAPTER 1. PROBLEM FROMULATION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1.1. THE MULTIFACETED RISE OF CHINA 
During the last two decades, there have been a huge number of excellent academic publications 
on the topic of “the rise of China”. To be more specific, “the rise of China” has been interpreted 
according to the three major dimensions of economic development, diplomatic transition, and 
global governance. 
First and foremost, since the “Opening-up and Reform Project” launched in 1978, China’s rise 
has been most clearly manifested in its dramatic economic growth and its continued integration 
into the global economy. In 2009, according to statistics from the International Energy Agency 
(IEA), China became the world’s biggest energy user by consuming 2.252 billion tons of oil 
equivalent, which exceeded the United States’ 2.170 billion tons (Swartz and Oster, 2010). In 
2010, China replaced the United States as the largest manufacturing power (with a 18.9% share 
of the world’s manufacturing activities) and continued to widen its lead in the consecutive years 
(Mechstroth, 2015). In 2013, with its trade surplus rising by 12.8% to almost $260 billion, 
China became the world’s largest trading nation by overtaking the United States (Monaghan, 
2014). In 2014, according to IMF estimates using purchasing power parity (PPP), China became 
the world’s largest economy, worth $17.6 trillion compared to the United States’ $17.4 trillion 
(Duncan and David, 2014). In 2015, the IMF added Chinese Yuan to its Special Drawing Rights 
(SDR) basket, with the Yuan having a 10.9% weighting in the basket, which ranks the third 
position after the US dollar’s 41.73% and the Euro’s 30.93% (Mayeda, 2015).  
Second, China is gradually transforming its diplomatic focus from bilateralism to a combination 
of bilateralism and multilateralism. In 1996, a positive transition was observed in China’s 
diplomatic strategy, signaled by its first embrace of multilateralism through membership of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Christensen, 2015: 22). Since then, China 
has actively participated in the building of a number of regional multilateral groups and 
organizations. For example, in the area of security, China, Russia, and four other Central Asian 
countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) co-founded the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, aimed at “fighting terrorism and separatism and 
reducing mistrust and building confidence among the members” (Christensen, 2015: 23). 
During the SCO Astana Summit of 2017, India and Pakistan became full members of the 
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organization, “expediting the start of the organization’s historic expansion” (Hantke, 2016). 
Diplomatic multilateralism is considered by Beijing as a critical means of reassuring its 
neighbors that they will benefit from China’s rise.  
Last but not least, further evidence of China’s rise can be observed through China’s increasing 
interest and participation in the making of global governance. Due to the 2008 global financial 
crisis (GFC), the existing Western-dominated global governance system is seriously under 
question and stands at a crossroads. Specifically, Western-based global governance has 
experienced four major crises (see 1.1.2 below) and is undergoing a process of transformation 
(Wolfgram, 2011; Pang, 2013; Tolarová, 2016). During this process of transformation, there 
are clear signs of “China’s aspiration to play a greater role in global governance as evidenced 
by its proactive participation in global institutions and its endeavors to make its voice heard by 
the existing powers in the West” (M. Li, 2012: 6). 
1.1.2. THE WEAKENING WESTERN-BASED GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, especially after the 2008 financial crisis, the above-
mentioned US-led international order, underpinned by its combined political, economic, 
security, and normative powers, has faced some rigorous challenges. According to Trine 
Flockhart and Xing Li (2010), as shown in Figure 1.1 below, these challenges can be abstracted 
into “four crises” faced by the liberal world order, as follows:  
First, multilateral cooperation seems harder to achieve and sustain than liberals had anticipated, 
suggesting that the liberal world order is in a “crisis of functionality”. Second, whilst 
multilateral cooperation is difficult, there is a growing need for multilateralism to meet an ever-
expanding set of new challenges in an increasingly globalized world, suggesting that the liberal 
world order is experiencing a “crisis of scope”. Third, the uneven record of liberal foreign 
policies in delivering a more secure and just world order has challenged key liberal values and 
prevented the liberal world order from living up to expectations. As a result, it is experiencing 
a “crisis of legitimacy”. Fourth, major shifts are taking place in the global power balance, 
shifting power from the United States and Europe to emerging new powers such as Brazil, 
Russia, India and China (BRIC). As a result, the liberal world order is experiencing a “crisis of 
authority” (Flockhart and Li, 2010). 
Inspired by the “four crises” argument, the thesis intends to draw on Flockhart and Li’s analysis 
of international order to interpret the current crisis/deficit in the existing sphere of global 
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governance, since the Post-Cold War architecture and process of global governance is largely 
built on the established US-led international order. Moreover, it witnesses that the weakening 
of Western-based global governance has been accompanied by the opportunities/challenges and 
new injections of energy and ideas brought about by the rise of China. In other words, a rising 
China is playing a complementary role to the existing Western-dominated global governance 
from the perspectives of function, scope, legitimacy, and authority. 
 
Figure 1.1 The four crises of the US-led international order/global governance 
(source: the author’s compilation) 
In the first place, the “crisis of functionality” of the existing global governance implies that the 
major Western-based multilateral international institutions are failing to achieve the expected 
outcomes. This crisis is mainly manifested in the three economic pillars (the IMF, World Bank 
and WTO) of the US-dominated global governance. For instance, multilateral cooperation has 
seemed harder to achieve under the US-led WTO over the last two decades. The 1999 Seattle 
Ministerial Conference collapsed against the backdrop of fierce protests in Cancun in 2003, 
where the participants were unable to reach any agreement because of their huge disagreement 
over Singapore Issues and Agricultural Trade Policy. Further, in 2017, the 11th WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires ended in failure due to divergence over the issue of 
subsidies in the fisheries sector. Against this background, China’s rise has injected fresh 
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impetus into addressing the “crisis of functionality” of the existing global governance. For 
instance, the China-proposed “Belt and Road Initiative” aims to revitalize multilateral 
cooperation and shape a new and open regional or inter-regional economy 
In the second place, the “crisis of scope” of the existing global governance indicates that the 
established institutional arrangements are insufficient to address the increasing number of 
global issues. This situation calls for new institutions to be established to deal with these urgent 
concerns. For example, the major development aid agencies, the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), have failed to fill the massive Asian infrastructure gap. According 
to ADB, “a substantial infrastructure gap remains (in Asia), with over 400 million people still 
lacking electricity, 300 million without access to safe drinking water, and about 1.5 billion 
lacking access to basic sanitation” (Asian Development Bank, 2017). Under these 
circumstances, China led the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 
and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), aiming to address the huge funding shortfall 
in Asian infrastructure construction and to play a complementary role to the World Bank and 
the ADB. 
In the third place, the “crisis of legitimacy” of the existing global governance denotes that the 
established countries (especially the United States) failed in their policy-making attempts or to 
shoulder their responsibility to address the post-crisis development issues and to promote the 
world economy. Given the growing influence of populism and anti-globalization movements, 
the established countries are inclining to protect their domestic interests rather than to preserve 
the outcomes of globalization. For instance, since Donald Trump was elected as US president 
in 2016, his administration has unilaterally withdrawn from a number of critical treaties and 
organizations. Between January 2017 and June 2018, the Trump Administration withdrew from 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Paris Agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, and the United 
Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). However, in the meantime, as the largest 
beneficiary of the existing international order, China has remained committed to upholding the 
existing international order. For instance, in 2017, at the Davos World Economic Forum, 
President Xi Jinping argued that China is committed to becoming the guardian of global 
governance and the open trading system. In addition, against the backdrop of the United States’ 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, China reaffirmed its commitment to this hard-won 
achievement. 
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Last but not least, the thesis rgues that the previous three crises led to the “crisis of authority” 
of the existing global governance. The “crisis of authority” mainly arose for two reasons: (1) 
the distribution of power between the developed and the developing countries is dramatically 
shifting in favor of the latter. This situation endows the developing countries and emerging 
powers (especially China) with more material capabilities and ambitions to transform 
themselves from the rule-followers to the rule-makers, which objectively challenges the 
Western-based rule-making process and architecture of global governance; (2) the above-
mentioned three crises have exposed the lack of effectiveness and representativeness of the 
existing US-led global governance. Specifically, the “crisis of authority” stems from its failure 
to achieve effective multilateral cooperation, to address the emerging global issues, and to 
commit to shouldering due responsibility. 
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As the introduction shows, China’s multifaceted rise and the nexus between China and the 
relatively weakening US-led global governance are becoming the most eye-catching 
contemporary IR themes in political and academic circles across the globe. Being closely 
related to these themes, the China-US relationship is the most complicated and influential 
component of world politics and economics today, given that the debate over the relationship 
between the largest established power (the USA, as the largest economy) and the largest 
emerging power (China, as the second largest economy) has never ended. As Graham Allison, 
recently drawing on Thucydides’ Trap,  argues “when a rising power threatens to displace a 
ruling one, the most likely outcome is war” (Allison, 2017: vii). Admittedly, Allison’s 
interpretation or prediction is just one of the possible scenarios. 
Consequently, with the purpose of sustaining its global hegemony and dealing with the rise of 
China at regional and global levels, all sectors of American society, from government to 
universities and from transnational corporations to think tanks, have devoted themselves to 
studying the implications brought about by the rise of China and the United States’ feasible 
response and strategy. Moreover, by virtue of its superior hard power, the United States 
cultivates its soft power in the field of IR research, and it has dominated the development of the 
IR discipline for over half a century. Stanley Hoffman even claimed that “the discipline of IR 
is American social science” (Hoffman, 1977: 41). Therefore, it is argued that US IR research is 
at the cutting edge of this discipline, having given birth to the mainstream IR theories – 
structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism and structural constructivism – that have largely 
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influenced global scholars’ and elites’ perceptions, interpretations, and even their decision-
making. Thus, the thesis intends to review the literatures/research on the striking theme of “the 
nexus between the rise of China and the existing international system/global governance” 
based on the three following mainstream IR theories. 
1.2.1. STRUCTURAL REALISM 
On the basis of Edward Carr’s historical realism (Carr, 1939) and Hans Morgenthau’s classical 
realism (Morgenthau, 1964), Kenneth Waltz developed the theory of structural realism or 
neorealism (Waltz, 1979). Compared to classical realism, according to Qin Yaqing, structural 
realism is a highly scientific and contracted IR theory (Qin, 2005c: 143). The scientificity of 
structural realism is manifested in its three major assumptions: (1) the international system is 
an anarchic structure; (2) the state is the basic unit/actor of international system; and (3) the 
structure of the international system determines actors’ behavior. Waltz highlights the 
significance of structure and defines structure as the distribution of power among the nation-
states (Waltz, 2010: 131). Thus, as structural realism indicates, the distribution of material 
capabilities is the core independent variable and the nation-state’s behavior is set as the core 
dependent variable of the theory. In this respect, as Qin argues, structural realism is 
characterized by the logic of “structural selection” (Qin, 2005b: 39). It is a highly concise and 
falsifiable proposition, and it makes structural realism highly scientific.  
Broadly speaking, structural realists see China as a revisionist power in the existing 
international system/global governance. A revisionist power is “a state primarily concerned 
with its own power and prestige above all other considerations, seeking to remodel the 
international system and order for its own benefit and in its own interest. This makes a 
revisionist power a staunchly realist one” (Combes, 2011: 5). This perception is mainly built 
upon the core assumption of structural realism: the international system is anarchic, and there 
is no higher power authority (world government) over the nation-state. Anarchy indicates that 
there is no guarantee of a state’s survival and inter-state cooperation, and the international 
system is a sort of self-help system. Thus, in an anarchic system, a state emphasizes its own 
survival and security, and it tends to adopt competitive and conflictual policies (Grieco, 1988). 
Seen from this perspective, as the competitive power maximizer, a state always strives to 
exceed others’ material capability, and it focuses more on relative gains than absolute gains. 
Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in a self-help system is to be as powerful 
as possible compared to their potential rivals. In the light of this idea, states “often fail to 
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cooperate even in the face of common interests” (J. M. Grieco, 1988: 488). In this respect, 
structural realism holds a fundamentally pessimistic attitude towards the achievement of 
international cooperation and questions the utility of international organizations. In the same 
vein, through the lens of structural realism, a state is uncooperative and unwilling to comply 
with the norms of the regime, since “it has little interest in achieving mutual gains through 
cooperation and more in advancing its own interests in relative term” (Combes, 2011: 5). 
More specifically, in the context of the above-mentioned striking theme of “the nexus between 
the rise of China and the existing international system/global governance”, structural realists 
mainly focus on the China-US relationship, since the existing international system and global 
governance are established and sustained by the United States’ hegemony. Nevertheless, the 
thesis contends that the existing structural realism literatures on the US-China relationship can 
be further categorized into two major types. On the one hand, some neorealism scholars tend 
to investigate the striking theme through the lens of “the relationship between established and 
rising power” (Art, 2010; Bush, 2011; S. Zhao, 2016; Allison, 2017) in a general sense. In their 
eyes, the “structure” is mainly constituted and shaped by established and rising powers in terms 
of their dynamic distribution of power; on the other hand, other scholars are inclined to place 
the US-China relationship within a regional context, especially the regions of East/Southeast 
Asia. From their viewpoint, the “structure” primarily refers to the (East/Southeast Asian) 
regional order (Christensen, 2006; Kang, 2007; Ross, 2013) in which the United States and 
China constantly compete with each other for regional hegemony. It is clearly observed that 
these two types of research commonly emphasize the implications of “structure” on states’ 
policy and behavior. 
From the perspective of the “structure” constituted by established and rising powers after the 
Cold War, China has come into the spotlight in virtue of its growing comprehensive national 
strength, leading to a controversial claim that China will inevitably play the role of a revisionist 
power because of its largest rising power status (Feng, 2009). The most representative of 
structural realists, Mearsheimer, argues that it is doomed to be a clash between the existing 
hegemon (the United States) and China, as the latter’s material capability is becoming 
prominent in terms of its astonishing economic development, increasing military modernization, 
and assertive diplomatic behavior (Mearsheimer, 2014). Other structural realists insist that the 
dynamic distribution of power between China and the United States is one of the best 
manifestations of power transition theory. Power transition theory (Lemke and Tammen, 2003; 
Chan, 2007) basically depicts a situation where China, with its increasing power, tries to use its 
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growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve 
its interests, and other states in the system – especially the declining hegemon – see China as a 
growing security threat. This situation inevitably leads to tension, distrust, and conflict. In this 
respect, a rising China and a relatively weakening United States are “locked in an epic battle 
over the rules and leadership of the international system” (Ikenberry, 2008: 24). As the largest 
emerging power with unprecedented economic growth, China’s grand ascendance will lead to 
a shift in the regional and global power structure and the onset of an Asian-based international 
order. 
From the perspective of the “structure” manifested in the regional order, since the end of the 
Second World War, the United States has invested a lot in East Asia in terms of shaping Japan, 
South Korea, and other Southeast Asian countries as the bridgehead against the socialist camp 
dominated by the former USSR. By doing so, it has woven extensive political, economic, and 
security networks throughout the regional countries over the last decades. However, China’s 
dramatic rise extensively changes the “structure” of East Asian order. Specifically, seen from 
the zero-sum perspective, China’s economic rise has brought about negative security 
implications. Since China is becoming the regional economic center in terms of its trade and 
investment with its major neighboring countries, analysts have become “nervous about whether 
these countries can be considered a reliable U.S. ally, particularly in conflicts that might directly 
affect U.S. strategic interests, but not their own”  (T. J. Christensen, 2006: 97). Moreover, from 
the zero-sum perspective, with its strengthening economic and diplomatic ties with regional 
countries, China’s regional strategy aims to push the United States out of East Asia and 
establish its own regional hegemony. This perception is based on a historical policy – the 
“Monroe Doctrine” – according to which America’s leaders in the 19th century were 
“determined to push the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere” (Measheimer, 
2010). According to Thomas Christensen, China’s regional strategy will lead the regional 
countries to “bandwagon with and accommodate a rising China, rather than balance against it 
by drawing closer to the United States” (T. J. Christensen, 2006: 98). 
In sum, this thesis argues that structural realists overemphasize the conflictual aspect of the 
relationship between the rise of China and the existing world order/global governance system. 
They consciously or unconsciously place the US-China relationship within the context of a 
zero-sum game, and they tend to focus on the “structural contradiction” between the two great 
powers at the regional and global levels. They predict that the ascendency of China will 
inevitably lead to the decline of the United States in a linear and direct causal manner. However, 
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the interdependent nature of the existing international system is often neglected by this school. 
It ignores the reality that China’s economic success resulted from its integration with the US-
led international order. In this respect, it is irrational for China to overthrow the established 
world order, and it cannot be in China’s best interest. Given the interdependence of the 
international system, it is reasonable for China to take into account both its own interests and 
other countries’ interests in order to achieve its peaceful rise and maintain its sustainable 
development. In an era of globalization and interdependence, there are no real winners in 
military or trade wars between countries – especially between great powers.  
1.2.2. NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
Compared to structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism emphasizes the significant influence 
of international institutions in resolving contentious interstate issues and promoting interstate 
cooperative behavior (Barnett, 2009: 64; J. M. Grieco, 1990: 27; Mitchell, 2006). Neoliberal 
institutionalists suppose that international institutions can promote nation-states to cooperate 
by providing reliable information so as to reduce the side effects of political market failure 
(Cogan, Hurd, & Johnstone, 2016: 39; Rittberger, Zangl, & Kruck, 2012: 2). Like structural 
realism, neoliberal institutionalism is also a systematic theory, it insists on the basic proposition 
of rationalism and establishes a concise theoretical system characterized by the logic of 
“institutional selection” (Qin, 2005b: 87). 
Neoliberal institutionalists generally contend that China is a status quo power in the existing 
international system/global governance. As Randall Schweller argues, the status quo power 
tends to “preserve the essential characteristics of the existing international order” (Schweller 
1998: 24). This perception is primarily based on the core assumption of neoliberal 
institutionalism: “the world has become interdependent in economics, in communications, in 
human aspirations” (Keohane & Nye, 1989: 3). With the increasing economic interactions 
between nation-states, the very nature of world politics changes. In other words, 
interdependence or complex interdependence “has changed the way states interact with one 
another” (Keohane & Nye, 1989: 24). Thus, although the anarchic international system inhibits 
the willingness of states to achieve cooperation, “states nevertheless can work together and can 
do so especially with the assistance of international institutions” (Grieco, 1988: 486). In this 
respect, in the eyes of neoliberal institutionalists, international institutions constitute “an 
important response to conditions of complex interdependence” (Karns, Mingst, & Stiles, 2010: 
38). 
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More precisely, with respect to the above-mentioned striking theme of “the nexus between the 
rise of China and the existing international system/global governance”, neoliberal 
institutionalism, as a systematic theory, interprets China as a status quo power from two 
“structural” perspectives. On the one hand, neoliberal institutionalists contend that the 
international institutions constitute the “structure” that “provides a guaranteed framework for 
interactions and a context for bargaining” (Karns et al., 2010: 39). Specifically, this “structure” 
is characterized by the rules of international organizations/institutions and the principle of 
multilateral cooperation. On the other hand, neoliberal institutionalists do not deny the role of 
power in international institutions and contend that post-war US hegemony shapes the 
“structure” in which a small number of established countries, by virtue of the existing 
institutional arrangements, enjoy asymmetric benefits over a vast number of developing ones. 
More important, the established “structure” keeps functioning even though the hegemon 
declines. 
From the perspective of the “structure” built upon international organizations/institutions, since 
adopting its reform and opening-up policy, China’s involvement in international cooperation 
has been initially driven by “the calculations of China’s domestic interests to create a peaceful 
peripheral environment for its economic growth and political stability” (Zhao, 2011: 53). 
However, since it has progressively benefitted from the existing system, China has shown 
increasing willingness and motivation to participate in the existing international 
organizations/institutions, and China has been gradually integrated into this “structure”, i.e., 
China has voluntarily accepted the “structure” and is largely shaped by it. More precisely, 
China’s compliance with the rules of international organizations, its diplomatic transition from 
bilateralism to multilateralism, and its increasing passive behavior in the United Nations are 
prominent instances of China’s desire to maintain and follow the international order of 
cooperation (Taylor, 2007). In the viewpoint of neoliberal institutionalists, integration is the 
core theme in the era of interdependence, and containment is out of date. According to Haass, 
“our goal should be to make China a pillar of a globalized world, too deeply invested to disrupt 
its smooth functioning. The aim is ambitious, even optimistic, but not unrealistic” (Haass, 2008: 
n/a). According to this viewpoint, China would play the role of status quo power and 
strengthening the existing “structure” built upon Western-based international 
organizations/institutions. 
From the perspective of the “structure” built upon US hegemony, China’s role as status quo 
power is determined by the post-war U.S. project characterized by its institutional hegemony. 
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Over the last decade, China has become the largest rising power and the economic center of 
East Asia. However, this does not fundamentally change the rules of game in this region, since 
the United States has plenty of experience and motivations for “relying on multilateral 
institutions to bind and constrain challengers or using institutions to countervail potential 
threats” (He, 2009: 145). Moreover, as a rising power, China is confronted with a distinctive 
“structure” that profoundly differs from the previous ones. Specifically, rather than merely 
opposing the United States, China is faced with an open, integrated, and rule-based system that 
is embedded in deep political, economic, and social foundations. According to Ikenberry, with 
the purpose of maintaining its leadership of the Western order, the United States strives to 
“strengthen the rules and institutions that underpin that order – making it even easier to join 
and harder to overturn” (Ikenberry, 2008: 24-25). In this respect, the “structure” built on the 
US-led Western historical bloc will continuously sustain China as a rule follower rather than a 
rule-maker. The open and integrative nature of the Western order shapes China as a satisfied 
status quo power that “accepts the existing ordering principles of the international system” (S. 
Chan, 2004: 216). 
Beyond the revisionist perspective, the neoliberal institutionalists emphasize in particular the 
interdependence and cooperative aspect of the nexus between the rise of China and the existing 
international system. Thus, they argue that although an authoritative China has become the 
second largest economy with strong military capabilities, international institutions and U.S. 
hegemony constitute the “structure” that shapes China as the vindicator or a rule-follower of 
the liberal world order. As the status quo power, it is natural for China to uphold the existing 
rules and institutions of the Western-dominated international system, and it would be too high 
a cost for China to make changes to this system. However, the thesis draws on Brantly 
Womack’s viewpoint on neoliberal institutionalism. Womack makes a conceptual distinction 
between the “status quo” and the “status ad quem”. The former literally indicates “the situation 
at which” (we are at present), and the latter refers to “the situation to which” (we are moving 
in the future). According to Womack, “if the status quo itself is moving and will not return then 
current concerns about whether China is a status quo power or a revisionist power are misplaced” 
(Womack, 2015: 135). In line with his conceptual clarification, Womack interprets China as a 
status ad quem power in terms of shaping a conducive neighboring environment at the regional 
level and preventing a comprehensive confrontation with the United States at the global level. 
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1.2.3. STRUCTURAL CONSTRUCTIVISM  
The most important development in international relations theory (IRT) in the 1990s was the 
emergence of constructivism. Among a myriad of constructivist theories, Wendt’s structural 
constructivism is relatively moderate when compared to the other variations, and it is also 
commonly regarded as the mainstream approach within the scope of constructivism. Wendt’s 
constructivism adopts the ontology of idealism, emphasizing the significant role of ideational 
and cultural structure (Wendt, 1999). In this respect, Wendt’s constructivism is coined as the 
logic of “cultural selection” (Qin, 2005b) 
Generally speaking, similar to the neoliberal institutionalists, structural constructivists see 
China as a “status quo power”. Both of them highlight the capability of the existing international 
system of accommodating the rising power (China), and they insist upon the cooperative nature 
of the relationship between China and other states. However, a major divergence between the 
two schools is that the former emphasizes the role of international organizations/institutions, 
while the latter focuses on the significance of cultural and normative structure. In other words, 
unlike neoliberal institutionalists, structural constructivists are confident that China can be 
socialized to conform to the existing  Western-based culture and norm system, and they believe 
in “the strength of international norms as sufficient constraints on rising powers such as China” 
(Johnston, 2007; Ikenberry, 2012). 
More specifically, regarding the striking theme of “the nexus between the rise of China and the 
existing international system/global governance”, as with the previous two mainstream IR 
theories, structural constructivism construes China as a status quo power from two “structural” 
perspectives. On the one hand, Wendt highlights the top-down socialization function of the 
international cultural system (Hobbesian culture, Locke’s culture, Kantian culture) on nation-
state (Wendt, 1999). This perspective emphasizes the role of ideas in shaping national identity 
and interests and stresses the importance of ideational “structure” in socializing nation-states’ 
behavior. This branch of structural constructivism research is mainly based on the study of the 
socialization impact of international institutions. On the other hand, structural constructivists 
underline the significance of normative “structure” in the existing Western-based order. Within 
the normative “structure”, norm diffusion plays a vital role in influencing states’ choices and 
behavior. According to the prevailing understanding, an international norm has “a tripartite 
structure, consisting of a problem, a value and a behavior” (Winston, 2018: 638). Normally, the 
process of norm diffusion is divided into three stages – norm emergence, norm cascade, and 
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internalization (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This perspective insists that the existing 
normative structure, built on the established norms, is shaped and sustained by the existing 
powers and exerts implications on international relations. Divergence between these two 
perspectives is manifested in Yang Xiangfeng’s argument that “while the transnational 
approach relies on social pressure to engender norm compliance, the institutional approach 
instead understands socialization as a top-down process wherein social learning by state elites 
is the key” (X. Yang, 2017: 81). 
From the perspective of a top-down socialization process, China’s role of status quo power is 
primarily socialized by the ideational “structure” that is embedded in the existing international 
institutions. Alastair Iain Johnston’s Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-
2000 (2007) is one of the most representative works to focus on research into China’s top-down 
social learning in international relations. Drawing on sociology, Johnston investigates the 
motivations and consequences of China’s active participation in the existing international 
institutions through the examination of three microprocesses of socialization – mimicking, 
social influence, and persuasion. By virtue of his extensive research, Johnston illustrates the 
major argument of this book: without any material impetus and external coercive pressure, 
Chinese elites were proactively involved in international security cooperation and global 
governance in a cooperative and self-constraining manner, owing to their increasing social 
interactions in international security institutions (Johnston, 2007: 197). 
From the perspective of norm diffusion, China’s role of status quo power is manifested in its 
acceptance and strengthening of the existing norm. According to Jochen Prantl and Ryoko 
Nakano, although the socialization literature has extensively investigated the relationship 
between global ideational/normative structure and its influence on nation-state behavior, “it 
misses out key parts that are essential for explaining norm diffusion” (Prantl & Nakano, 2011: 
218). As a result, Prantl and Nakano proposed a framework of norm diffusion loops, and applied 
it to an empirical analysis of the norm diffusion of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) from global 
level to regional and domestic levels. R2P, defined as a transnational soft norm, is seen as one 
of the core norms in the Western-based normative structure. In doing so, the research discloses 
that norm diffusion of R2P has “softened the rigid Chinese understanding of state sovereignty 
and non-intervention, which has facilitated R2P acceptance” (Prantl & Nakano, 2011: 218). 
In sum, although structural constructivism provides insights that allow us to understand China’s 
role of status quo power in the international system from the perspective of socialization and 
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norm diffusion, it attracted a number of critiques, as follows. First, Chinese Professor Qin 
Yaqing criticized structural constructivism theory in terms of its top-down unilateral and 
unidirectional socialization process, rather than paying due attention to the mutual and 
reciprocal constitution between China and the existing Western-based ideational structure (Qin, 
2018). Second, by questioning the existing literatures on the emergence and diffusion of single 
norms, Carla Winston emphasized the importance of norm components and clusters, and thus, 
she developed a new concept, known as “norm cluster” that “allows for multiple combinations 
of conceptually interlinked but distinct values and behaviors, offering multiple acceptable 
solutions to similar and interlocking problems” (Winston, 2018: 638). Winston’s research 
opens a door for the co-existence of diversified norms in regulating international politics and 
global governance. 
1.3. GAP IN THE EXISTING LITERATURE 
By reviewing the above literature on the theoretical connotations of structural realism, 
neoliberal institutionalism, and structural constructivism and their interpretations of the striking 
theme of “the relationship between the rise of China and the existing international order/global 
governance”, it can be argued that there are a number of substantive differences between the 
three mainstream systematic theories. However, they still share several common aspects. For 
instance, the three mainstream systematic theories adhere to the epistemology of positivism, 
and they generally adopt the empirical study as their major research method. For a long time, 
under the influence of behaviorism, mainstream scholars have put a lot of effort into developing 
IR theory into a grand scientific theory, and they believe that the construction of systematic 
theory can effectively achieve this target. In this respect, Morten Kaplan and Kenneth Waltz 
have made groundbreaking attempts in this area (Kaplan, 1957; Waltz, 2001).  
Moreover, it is also apparent that neoliberal institutionalism and social constructivism have 
been largely influenced by Waltz’s structural realism, as articulated in his Theory of 
International Politics (1979). To be more specific, neoliberal institutionalism, which was 
developed on the basis of its criticism of structural realism (Keohane, 1986), has gradually 
moved towards a “neo-neo synthesis” with structural realism in terms of their common 
emphasis of systematic factors. The development of social constructivism is seen as another 
achievement of systematic theory in international politics, since Alexander Wendt has explicit 
acknowledged that he has been extensively inspired by the structural realism’s “systematic 
orientation” (Wendt, 1999). As Amitav Acharya argues, mainstream IR theories commonly 
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have a system bias that refers to “the tendency to privilege systematic forces at the expense of 
regional and local or sub-systematic ones. Waltzian structural realism, liberal theory in general 
and the moral cosmopolitanism flavor in constructivist norm diffusion theory are examples of 
this bias” (Acharya, 2004: 242). 
According to Qin Yaqing’s analysis, the reason why systematic theory has a higher possibility 
(than other theories) of providing the necessary conditions for scientific research (Qin, 2002) 
is mainly based on the following three features. First is the synchronicity of systematic theory. 
The three mainstream systematic theories focus more on synchronicity than diachronicity. The 
synchronicity indicates that the major objective of analysis is seen as a system which surpasses 
time and space rather than a historical product which evolves over time. For example, in the 
context of systematic IR theory, a system is made up of states, and these states are considered 
as rational and stable units that are not affected spatiotemporally. In this respect, system and 
state are studied from a non-historical perspective, which promotes the study of international 
politics theory as a sort of “hard science” research within the natural sciences. Second is the 
objectivity of systematic theory. One of the basic conditions of scientific research is to treat the 
objective of analysis as an objective reality. By doing so, (social or natural) scientists can 
objectively observe, test, and verify the objective of analysis. Specifically, from the perspective 
of structural realism, a system is shaped by the distribution of material capability, and material 
capability can easily be observed and measured through objective indicators and criteria. From 
the perspective of neoliberal institutionalism, a system is established on and characterized by 
institution. Although institution does not belong to the material category, the existence and 
implementation of institution and the degree of institutionalization are regarded as facts that 
can be observed and measured objectively. From the perspective of social constructivism, 
Alexander Wendt adopts Durkheim's sociological approach of defining social facts as social 
reality. This emphasizes that “sociologists can study in a way similar to how other scientists, 
such as physicists, study the physical world” (Durkheim, 2014). Third is the simplicity of 
systematic theory. Normally, scientific theory has the feature of simplicity. In this respect, 
systematic theory, as a sort of scientific theory, has a higher possibility of providing a simple 
theoretical system. Systematic theory mainly focuses on the influence of systematic factors on 
individuals. Therefore, systematic theory generally sets system and individual as two basic 
variables and makes hypothetical statements regarding the relationship between these two 
variables. As a result, by focusing on the two variables, systematic IR theory is able to meet the 
requirement of simplicity, as other natural scientific theory does. 
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Although systematic IR theories, by virtue of their above-mentioned defining features, interpret 
international relations and world affairs in a more “scientific” manner, they are also faced with 
several limitations because of these very features. 
In the first place, although synchronicity is a major precondition for constructing systematic IR 
theory as a scientific theory, it cannot ignore the significance of diachronicity in understanding 
international politics. In fact, it is inadvisable to merely emphasize the synchronicity of 
systematic IR theory and to neglect the historical origins and evolution of international politics. 
The contemporary international system and nation-state are products of historical development. 
Thus, the thesis argues that although the international system before the Peace of Westphalia 
and the pre-20th century Chinese Tributary system was not an inter-state system in 
contemporary terms, their significance are valuable for understanding and interpreting 
contemporary international relations. Specifically, as with the synchronicity of systematic 
theories, it neglects the role of history in interpreting the rise of China. This “neglect” is 
manifested in two aspects. First, mainstream systematic theories neglect the crucial role of 
China’s long history. It is widely-acknowledged that China has one of the oldest ancient 
civilizations in the world. This means that China has rich historical and cultural legacies that 
extensively influence the Chinese way of thinking. To be more precise, in the field of 
international relations, China possesses a great number of heuristic ideas and political 
philosophies for dealing with the relationships between states1. For instance, during the pre-Qin 
period, a large number of strategists, diplomats, and philosophers contributed their wisdom to 
the then governers/zhuhou wang (诸侯王) in terms of identifying their inter-state’s/zhuhou guo 
(诸侯国) strategy and making appropriate decisions depending on various situations. Second, 
mainstream systematic theories also neglect the history of interactivity between China and the 
                                                             
1 In Chinese history, there are several manifestations and interpretations of “state”. Before the Qin Dynasty (221-
207 BC), China was in the feudalistic (封建) political system. In the context of feudalism, “state” refers to 
“zhouhou guo” (诸侯国). Zhuhou (诸侯) were the feudal lords, and their estates or states were named as “feudal 
states”/ “zhuhou guo”. For instance, during the Warring States Period (475-221 BC), the term “states” represents 
the “zhuhou guo”. However, since Qin Shi Huang (秦始皇) established a unified China, the Chinese political 
system transformed from feudalism to a “unified and power-centralized state”. In this context, “state” refers to 
a powerful central government and is governed by a supreme monarch without the existence of “zhouhou wang” 
(诸侯王). From the Qin Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty, China witnessed division and unification. During the period 
of division, such as the Three Kingdoms Period (220-280 AD), there were several power-centralized states 
competing with each other for the reunification of China. The 1911 Xinhai Revolution ended the last monarch-
governed centralized state in Chinese history. Since then, China has become a combination of modern nation-
state and civilization-state. The former implies that China accepts the Westphalian nation-state system 
characterized by state sovereignty and international law, while the latter indicates that durable Chinese ancient 
political thoughts and cultural legacies largely influence its way of thinking and practices in contemporary 
international relations. 
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rest of the world. The long-standing interaction between China and the world, from “tributary 
system” to “hundred years of humiliation” to “reforming and opening-up”, contribute a great 
deal to Chinese unique perception and understanding of international relations. Thus, the 
neglect of China’s historical experience is not conducive to the complete and holistic 
interpretation of China’s policies and practices in the existing international system.  
In the second place, systematic theory’s overemphasis of objectivity inevitably leads to the 
neglect of the mutual constitution between structure and agent. Systematic IR theory sees the 
international system and nation-state as two separate objective realities. From this point of 
departure, systematic IR theory focuses on investigating the impact of the international system 
on nation-state. Specifically, in order to simplify their theoretical assumptions, structural 
realism and neoliberal institutionalism deliberately avoid discussions of the role of nation-state 
and respectively emphasize “structural selection” and “institutional selection”. In its initial 
stage, as Alexander Wendt illustrated in The Agent-Structure Problem in International 
Relations Theory (1987), social constructivism placed emphasis on the mutual constitution 
between the international system and nation-state. However, since Wendt draws on the 
systematic model (of structural realism) when reinterpreting social constructivism, it 
undoubtedly weakens the bidirectional constitution between structure and agent, and it 
highlights instead unidirectional constitution from the international system to nation-state. With 
regard to China, defining it as a “constrained emerging power” verifies this unidirectional 
constitution process. In other words, social constructivism overemphasizes the role of the 
existing norm and cultural structure in shaping China unidirectionally rather than paying due 
attention to China’s agency in shaping the norm structure. However, in the era of global 
governance, according to Matthew Hoffmann and Alice Ba, “actors have always had the ability 
and wherewithal to affect their own conditions” (Hoffmann & Ba, 2005a: 254). Moreover, the 
dynamic era continuously creates opportunities for agency. Although global governance 
consists of a set of hegemonic ideas and institutions that sustain the power structure and the 
privilege of the established powers, it does not imply that “those ideas and structures are not 
constantly undergoing contestation; nor is it to say that non-core actors see themselves without 
agency” (Ba, 2005: 195). In particular, globalization and regionalism offer the nation-state a 
platform and opportunity to assert various ideas, solutions, and visions, etc. 
In the third place, the simplicity of systematic theory normally leads to an oversimplified 
interpretation of complex international politics. When undertaking analyses of foreign policy, 
systematic IR theories assume that the nation-state is a rational and unitary actor. By doing so, 
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systematic theories aim to avoid interference from domestic factors and processes. However, at 
this point, systematic theories encounter an unavoidable dilemma. On the one hand, domestic 
political and social processes clearly play a crucial role in defining national identity, 
formulating national interest, and shaping a country’s external behavior; on the other hand, if 
domestic factors are considered, a universally valid systematic factor for conducting analysis 
cannot be identified. Although systematic theories’ complete elimination of domestic factors 
helps to achieve a scientific simplicity of analysis, they overlook a great number of problems 
and phenomena that should not be ignored. In terms of China, systematic theories usually treat 
China as a rational and unitary actor without seriously taking into account Chinese domestic 
political and social conditions. For example, John Mearsheimer believes that Chinese leaders, 
given the dramatic rise of China, will inevitably strive to establish regional hegemony and seek 
to push the United States out of East Asia. This indicates that China, as a rational actor, will 
mirror he United States’ logic of “pushing the European great powers out of the Western 
Hemisphere” (Measheimer, 2010). However, it is misleading to argue that one country’s policy 
and behavior is solely determined by the objective environment shaped by the distribution of 
power, institutional, and norm structure. In other words, a kind of mathematic or physical 
formula cannot simply be applied to interpret a nation-state’s motivations and the calculations 
that lie behind its foreign policy and practice. In this regard, for the purpose of understanding 
Chinese policy and behavior, it is essential to explore domestic factors. In this thesis, China’s 
domestic factors are manifested in China’s national role conception (NRC) and national role 
performance (NRP). 
Last but not least, in addition to the three major deficiencies outlined above that are embedded 
in US-based mainstream IR theories with respect to research into the rise of China, this thesis 
acknowledges that there are also a number of different Western-based IR approaches that place 
emphasis on the role of history and domestic issues in interpreting international affairs, such as 
the English School and the Copenhagen School. However, according to Amitav Acharya, 
Western-dominant IR approaches have four major tendencies when theorizing international 
relations, as follows: 
(1) Auto-centrism refers to the tendency of theorizing about key principles of mechanisms of 
international order from mainly Western ideas, culture, politics, historical experiences and 
contemporary praxis, and disregarding non-Western ideas, culture, politics, historical 
experiences and contemporary praxis; (2) universalism refers to the tendency to view or present 
Western ideas and practices as the universal standard, while non-Western principles and 
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practices are viewed as particularisms, aberrations or inferiorities; (3) disjuncture refers to the 
lack of fit between what passes for IR theory and the experience of the non-Western world, 
although Western scholars seldom see this as an obstacle to theory-building; (4) agency denial 
refers to the lack of acknowledgment of the agency of non-western states, regional institutions, 
civil society actors in contributing to world order. (Acharya, 2007) 
In sum, this thesis argues that the existing US mainstream systematic IR theories and other 
Western-dominant IR approaches possess the power to define the rise of China (Huntington, 
1996) and have limitations in interpreting its implications for global governance. In other words, 
due to their lack of Chinese characteristics, these mainstream IR theoretical approaches cannot 
provide a holistic and dialectic picture that understands the nexus between the rise of China and 
the existing international order/global governance. 
1.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1.4.1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
“INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP WITH CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS”  
The deficiencies of systematic IR theories – synchronicity, objectivity, simplicity – have led to 
misperceptions and incomplete interpretations of the rise of China. The author supposes that 
these misunderstandings are mainly derived from the Western discursive monopoly. This 
discursive monopoly is manifested in Western-dominated IR paradigms that interpret 
international affairs, judge the appropriateness of other countries’ behavior, and even influence 
other countries’ policy making, etc. This makes the contribution of this PhD thesis of an 
applicable concept that would be more useful to interpret the rise of China in a more holistic 
manner. However, is necessary to point out that the critique of mainstream IR paradigms does 
not aim to de-legitimize the applicability of these paradigms, but to point out their limitations 
in terms of incompleteness and one-sidedness. 
Therefore, with the purpose of producing a more comprehensive interpretation of China’s rise 
and its implications for the existing international system, the main objective of this PhD project 
is to make a contribution that is based on a conceptual framework of “international leadership 
with Chinese characteristics”, embedded in “Chineseness”, to supplement mainstream 
Western IR paradigms and to interpret China’s foreign policy and external practice in global 
governance.  
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Before constructing a framework that I have called “international leadership with Chinese 
characteristics” (ILCC), it is essential to clarify the concept of leadership as presented in this 
thesis. In Chinese, the concept “leadership” (领导) has a number of different connotations, such 
as leader (领导者), hegemony (领导权), the leading class (领导阶层), and leadership ability 
(领导能力), etc. According to Chinese historical and contemporary experience, the legitimacy 
of leadership is mainly derived from and based on the ability of leadership that is mainly 
manifested in the Chinese idea of meritocracy (精英治国). As Daniel Bell argued, over the last 
decades, the legitimacy of China’s government has been sustained due to the successful 
implementation of China’s centuries-old meritocratic model (Bell, 2015).  Furthermore, Bell 
interpreted the basic idea of meritocracy as “everybody should have an equal opportunity to be 
educated and to contribute to politics, but not everybody will emerge from this process with an 
equal capacity to make morally informed political judgements. Hence, the task of politics is to 
identify those with above-average ability and to make them serve the political community. If 
the leaders perform well, the people will basically go along” (Bell, 2015: 32). In this regard, 
meritocracy is rooted in performance legitimacy that suggests that “the government has an 
obligation to improve the people’s material well-being and intellectual/moral development is a 
central part of the Confucian tradition” (Coicaud, 2017: 26).  
Being influenced by these ideas of meritocracy and performance legitimacy, the thesis intends 
to adopt ability-based leadership, rather than status-based leadership, in conceptualizing and 
interpreting the ILCC. 
First, the application of ability-based leadership, derived from the idea of Chinese meritocracy 
and performance legitimacy, to the construction of the ILCC is a culture-based 
conceptualization and interpretation. In this regard, it indicates that the ILCC is closely 
associated with Chinese traditional culture and political philosophies and with China’s 
ontological assumption of IR, which is based on them. In other words, Chinese decision-makers’ 
worldview, built on Chinese history and culture, has a strong impact on the construction and 
implementation of the ILCC. In addition, the ILCC is also undeniably influenced by China’s 
perception of the international situation and its involvement in the process and architecture of 
global governance. As a consequence, the conceptualization and interpretation of the ILCC 
contributes, to some extent, to remedying the three above-mentioned deficiencies 
(synchronicity, objectivity, simplicity) of the systematic theories on the rise of China, and it 
provides more heuristic insights into an understanding and forecast of China’s role in 
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international relations and global governance in the coming decades. It should also be noted 
that the culture-based approach adopted in the thesis aims to explore “Chinese characteristics” 
rather than to address the “China Exceptionalism” that isolates China from global politics and 
academia. 
Second, ability-based leadership helps the author to conceptualize the ILCC outside of the 
traditional logic of the hegemonic transition that is characterized by the status-based concept of 
hegemony/leadership. The analytical paradigm of power transition habitually asserts that, with 
its ongoing rise and accumulating capacities, China will inevitably replicate the hegemonic 
transition that has occurred in the last several centuries and seek to achieve its hegemonic status 
regionally and globally. However, the construction of the ILCC, by virtue of its focus on ability-
based leadership, is a robust response to mainstream American-based IR theories on discussing 
the repeated hackneyed topics of “China Threat” (Roy, 1996; Gertz, 2000; Chang, 2018; Peña, 
2018), “China Collapse” (Chang, 2010; Mattis, 2018),  and “Is China a revisionist power or a 
status quo” (Johnston, 2003; Taylor, 2007; Kastner and Saunders, 2012). In other words, the 
conceptualization and interpretation of the ILCC do not set out to claim that China is becoming 
a new hegemon, rather it aims to interpret China’s facilitative, constructive, and exemplary role 
in improving and promoting international cooperation and global governance. From this 
perspective, it creates more opportunities for discussing the positive implications brought about 
by the rise of China. 
1.4.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In line with the proposed research objective, the thesis raises the main research question as: 
How to conceptualize and interpret the rise of China and global governance through 
constructing and analyzing the conceptual notion of “international leadership with Chinese 
characteristics”? 
With the purpose of better answering this main research question, the project decomposes it 
into several sub-research questions by considering the relevant ontological, epistemological, 
methodological, theoretical, and empirical issues. Since the thesis aims to interpret the impact 
of “Chinese characteristics”/ “Chineseness” on the understanding and implementation of 
international leadership, and it adopts a culture-based perspective, a number of sub-research 
questions are proposed as follows, and they constitute the interpretive logic of this PhD project 
as shown in Figure 1.2 below: 
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(1) How do Chinese IR-related political thoughts and cultural heritage impact Chinese 
(decision-makers’ and elites’) ontological assumptions/worldview of contemporary 
international relations? 
(2) How do Chinese decision-makers and elites, on the basis of their worldview, conceptionally 
construct and practically implement “international leadership with Chinese characteristics” 
(ILCC) through China’s involvement in a myriad of issue-areas/mechanisms in global 
governance? 
(3) What are the implications of “international leadership with Chinese characteristics” (ILCC) 
for world politics and global governance, and what opportunities and challenges are faced in 
the construction and implementation of the ILCC? 
 
Figure 1.2 The interpretive logic of the PhD dissertation 
(source: the author’s compilation) 
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CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This second chapter intends to provide a research design in order to fill the defined knowledge 
gap and answer the proposed research questions. The research design is mainly constructed on 
the basis of the conceptualization of “international leadership with Chinese characteristics” 
(ILCC) – the ILCC is identified as the core concept of the PhD thesis. In this respect, the 
ultimate goal of this thesis is to verify or falsify this conceptualization through the combination 
of theory application and empirical case analysis. 
2.1. ONTOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION 
The first and most step in conceptualizing the ILCC is to provide a detailed interpretation of 
“Chinese characteristics”. Specifically, the interpretation of “Chinese characteristics” is 
embodied in a clarification of the “Chinese ontological assumption of IR” 2 , since the 
ontological assumption is identified as “the source of paradigmatic divergence in political 
science” (Hay, 2006: 79). 
As Colin Hay argues, unlike research in the natural sciences, “no political analysis has ever 
been ontologically neutral” (Hay, 2006: 78). This rule also applies to the study of international 
relations. For instance, since the end of the Second World War, on the basis of its hegemonic 
(structural) power, the United States has dominated the IR community, endowing the discipline 
of IR as “an American social science” (Hoffman, 1977: 41). In this respect, American values 
and standards, as manifested in American ontological assumptions of IR, have clearly exerted 
a great deal of influence on the establishment and development of the mainstream IR research 
paradigms. According to Qin Yaqing, the core theme of the American IR research paradigm is 
“the preservation of US hegemony” (Qin, 2005a). This means that the major concern of US IR 
theories is to figure out ways of maintaining the United States’ hegemonic status in international 
relations and to ensure the stability of the US-based international system. In this regard, the 
American ontological assumption of IR emphasizes the struggle for material power and 
institutional domination among the individual states, especially the struggle between 
established powers and rising ones. Thus, in line with the American ontological assumption of 
                                                             
2 “Chinese ontological assumption of IR” refers to Chinese ontological assumption/worldview of the relationship 
between itself, the nearby regions, and the extended world. 
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IR, the rise of China is inevitably considered as a serious challenge both to the United States’ 
hegemonic position at regional and global levels and the US-based international system. 
Moreover, international relations, as a discipline and a research agenda, was originally created 
by Western academia. The theoretical constructions and practical experience of this discipline 
are deeply embedded into Western history, culture, and discourse. For instance, the frequently 
cited “Thucydides Trap” in relation to the US-China relationship is mainly derived from the 
historical experience of the Peloponnesian War, i.e., “the rise of Athens, and the fear that this 
inspired in Sparta, that made war inevitable” (Thucydides & Crawley, 2004: 11). Historically, 
following the first Opium War, China was “reluctantly dragged into new international 
involvements” (Stearns, 2008: 243). Over the last more than hundred decades, China has had 
to unconditionally follow and comply with Western-based concepts and norms in exchange for 
being accepted and recognized by the existing international system. In this respect, as Zhao 
Tingyang argues, no matter how strong its economic capacity is, China remains a “small state” 
if it cannot become a “knowledge producer” (T. Zhao, 2011). The lack of an IR paradigm with 
“Chinese characteristics” impedes the development of China’s discursive power in terms of 
explaining its external behavior and producing knowledge. Hence, the ability of knowledge 
production is critical for the rise of China and each emerging power because it provides 
opportunities for other countries to pay due attention to certain hidden perspectives when 
interpreting the rise of China (and the emerging powers in general) in a more objective manner. 
It further makes a contribution to the increase of legitimacy of China’s policies and practices, 
which ultimately helps China to construct a favorable environment for its future development 
and prevents the “tragedy of great power politics” (Measheimer, 2014) between established 
powers and emerging ones (the United States and China being an outstanding example). 
In sum, it is essential to interpret Chinese ontological assumptions of IR on the basis of Chinese 
political culture and philosophies when conceptualizing and undertaking an empirical analysis 
of the ILCC. In this respect, a number of questions need to be answered, such as which and 
how Chinese traditional culture and political philosophies shape Chinese ontological 
assumptions of IR. What understanding do Chinese people have of the nature of international 
relations (IR)? According to Chinese understanding, what is does IR consist of? In Chinese 
eyes, what are the general principles governing the functioning and development of IR? What 
ontological assumptions regarding IR do Chinese people hold? The thesis argues that an 
understanding of these questions lays an ontological foundation for conceptualizing and 
interpreting the ILCC. 
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It is significant to note that the identification of the major features of Chinese ontological 
assumptions of IR, on the basis of major Chinese IR-related ancient concepts and political 
thoughts, has largely been influenced by Jyrki Kallio’s clarification of three approaches to the 
impact of Confucianism on Chinese IR or Chinese IR theory. According to Jyrki, the first 
approach lists certain relevant key Confucian concepts and virtues and then discusses their 
applicability to international relations. The second approach looks at those Confucian texts that 
explicitly talk of state-to-state relations, and analyzes the behavioral modes expressed in them. 
The third approach sketches the Chinese world view based on a variety of Confucian texts and 
then projects this idealized world view into the practicalities of the modern world (Kallio, 2015: 
80). 
Jyrki questioned the first approach, as “the real meaning of the concept is far from clear” (Kallio, 
2015: 81) because “the concepts have undergone numerous sematic shifts” (Kallio, 2015: 80) 
and “rival schools of rival philosophers have used the same concepts to advance very different 
ideas” (Raphals, 1992: 7). Thus, Jyrki argued that “it is meaningless to directly extrapolate 
ideals, such as harmony or zhongyong, into state-to-state relations” (Kallio, 2015: 81). 
Although Jyrki acknowledges that the second approach may “be more fruitful in the quest of 
finding the roots of a Chinese IR theory” as it helps limit researchers to those texts and excerpts 
that explicitly discuss state-to-state relations, he also suggests that it would be ahistorical “to 
extrapolate those remarks which are predominantly related to the state’s internal affairs into the 
realm of international relations” (Kallio, 2015: 81-82). Therefore, Jyrki appreciated the aims of 
the third approach “to overcome the obstacles described above and discover whether there is 
something permanent which they could all agree upon” (Kallio, 2015: 82). 
The thesis recognizes the legitimacy and applicability of Jyrki’s third approach. Thus, this 
section consists of two parts: the first part (2.1.1) discusses the original connotations and 
extracts the contemporary significance of selected Chinese cultural heritage and ancient 
political thought as the major sources for understanding Chinese ontological assumptions of IR; 
and the second part (2.1.2) interprets the major features of Chinese ontological assumptions of 
IR on the basis of the discussion in the first part. 
2.1.1. THE MAJOR SOURCES FOR UNDERSTANDING CHINESE 
ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF IR 
According to the Western standard, China is not considered as a Westphalian type of modern 
nation-state. In other words, China has no Western inter-state cultural and historical legacies. 
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As a result, China is generally defined as a civilization-state rather than a nation-state, and the 
civilization-state China has unique cultural and philosophical sources for shaping its 
ontological assumptions of IR. According to Martin Jacques, “the most fundamental defining 
features of China today, and which give the Chinese their sense of identity, emanate not from 
the last century when China has called itself a nation-state but from the previous two millennia 
when it can be best described as a civilization-state characterized by its history, culture, and 
way of thinking” (Jacques, 2011, online). As a well-known Sinologist, Lucian Pye argues that 
“China is a civilization pretending to be a state…The fact that the Chinese state was founded 
on one of the world’s great civilizations as given inordinate strength and durability to its 
political culture” (Pye, 1990: 58).  In a similar vein, Zhang Weiwei contends that the most 
outstanding characteristics of the civilization-state China is manifested in its unique centuries-
old historical legacy and profound cultural heritage (Zhang, 2011). 
However, defining China as a civilization-state does not impede China from making 
contributions to knowledge accumulation and innovation regarding contemporary IR. In recent 
years, pluralism has become a hotly-debated topic in international relations. According to 
Yong-Soo Eun, pluralism maintains that “there are many legitimate ‘ways of knowing’ and thus 
endorses a wide range of epistemological, theoretical, methodological, and empirical 
perspectives” (Eun, 2016: 1). The increasing calls for (ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological) pluralism (Eun, 2016) in the field of IR and the growing popularity of the 
“Global IR” debate (Acharya, 2014) help China to provide dynamics for the development of  
the IR discipline from both conceptual and practical perspectives. As Emilian Kavalski 
articulates, “the inquiries into how China thinks and in what way its history and traditions 
inform the idiosyncrasies of China’s international outlook have grown into a cottage industry 
both in IR and across the full spectrum of the humanities and social sciences” (Kavalski, 2016: 
551).  
Consequently, the thesis argues that both the definition of civilization-state China and the 
ongoing advocacy for ontological pluralism in IR help to provide the necessary background 
knowledge for the introduction of several relevant concepts to underpin the project’s core 
conceptual framework of “international leadership with Chinese characteristics”. In this respect, 
although China, as a civilization-state, has a splendid history characterized by a rich cultural 
heritage and concepts such as the Five Elements (五行), Eight Trigrams (八卦), and Feng Shui 
(风水), the project applies just three major Chinese cultural and philosophical concepts – the 
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Tianxia (天下), the Humane Authority (王道), and the State of Equilibrium and Harmony (中
庸) – to the interpretation of Chinese ontological assumptions of IR. The following paragraphs 
contain an interpretation of the conceptual connotation of these three concepts and reveal their 
contemporary significance in relation to existing research. 
2.1.1.1 Tianxia (天下) 
In 2005, by publishing the book Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun (The Tianxia System: 
An Introduction to the Philosophy of a World Institution), Chinese philosophical scholar Zhao 
Tingyang resurrected the concept of Tianxia. According to Zhao Tingyang, Tianxia is an order 
of coexistence that is established based on the idea of an entire world (Zhao, 2005). In this 
respect, Tianxia defines “the world as a categorical rethinking unit of viewing and interpreting 
issues” (T. Zhao, 2006: 30) and develops a perspective of envisaging a political order 
compatible with the ongoing globalization. In other words, according to Zhao’s research, 
Tianxia provides a lens for understanding world politics and defining the legitimacy of a 
political order based on the idea of “worldness” rather than the individual state. Since then, the 
concept of Tianxia has attracted a great deal of excitement and controversy in both Chinese and 
international IR academia, as we will see below. 
Since Zhao’s revival and interpretation of the Tianxia concept, a large number of Chinese and 
international scholars have contributed arguments and criticisms to the discussion of this 
concept. As a representative international scholar who has conducted extensive research on the 
concept of Tianxia, William A. Callahan criticized Zhao Tingyang’s interpretation of this 
concept from philosophical and social perspectives. Specifically, Callahan pointed out that 
Zhao’s Tianxia utopia “has serious theoretical problems both in terms of its cavalier reading of 
classical Chinese texts and its odd use of contemporary social theory’s vocabulary of ethical 
relations in a way that promotes ‘conversion’ rather than ‘conquest’” (Callahan, 2008: 756). 
From the practical perspective, by disclosing the serious flaws of the Tianxia and Westphalian 
systems and investigating China’s foreign policies, June Teufel Dreyer argued that “in the 
absence of compelling incentives for major players in the current international system to adopt 
the Tianxia system, Westphalian sovereignty appears likely to remain the organizing principle 
of international relations for the foreseeable future” (Dreyer, 2015: 1015). In a similar vein, by 
mentioning China’s pragmatic emphasis on sovereignty, Allen Carlson contended that China 
has not carried out any actual strategy or policy to revitalize the ancient Tianxia system in Asia. 
However, he did not deny the positive implications of the Tianxia system and argued that “a 
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Tianxia order might pave the way for the novel solution of disputes and controversies, and as 
such lead to greater stability within the region (Asia)” (Carlson, 2011: 102). 
Moreover, from the perspective of strategic rationality, Zhou Fangyin applied an instrumental 
approach to interpreting the concept of Tianxia and argued that the Tianxia system represents 
“a spontaneous order, an endogenous and self-enforcing institutional arrangement of East Asia 
which appeared and reproduced as an outcome of continuous strategic interaction among actors 
within the region” (Zhou, 2011: 150). In Zhou’s definition, Tianxia system is composed of 
rational states/actors that seek material interest during the process of their strategic interaction. 
Zhou contended that the Tianxia system should not simply be characterized by China’s 
conciliatory policy of “giving more and getting less” in exchange for the pheriphery’s 
(surrounding states) submission, rather it is “the result of rational choice and strategic 
interaction among China and its neighboring states” (Zhou, 2011: 176). 
Unlike Zhou’s strategic rationality, Zhang Yongjin and Barry Buzan recognized the 
significance of institutional rationality and adopted a constructivist approach to interpreting the 
Tianxia system by an emphasis on cultural elements and social constitution (Zhang and Buzan, 
2012). From this perspective of institutional rationality, Zhang and Buzan argued that “the 
Tianxia system, as a bundle of shared and common institutional practices, is the articulation of 
international society in East Asia, as it is constitutive of deep rules of the game in the relations 
between Imperial China and other constituent states” (Y. Zhang & Buzan, 2012: 34). In this 
respect, according to Zhang and Buzan, it is beneficial to conceptualize the Tianxia system as 
an international social structure, providing more opportunities and inspiration for understanding 
this ancient Chinese world order in both cultural and structural terms. The structural perspective 
is conducive to the interpretation of the Tianxia system “from power-political and co-existence 
in the outer circles, to cooperation and convergence in the inner circles” (Y. Zhang & Buzan, 
2012: 34). 
The above-mentioned literatures respond to Zhao Tingyang’s study of the concept of Tianxia 
in both a supportive and critical manner to different extents, and they have played a crucial role 
in developing the concept and improving understanding of the concept. However, in terms of 
Chinese ontological assumptions of IR, the thesis recognizes that Zhao’s proposition and 
analysis of relational rationality offers the most useful interpretation of Tianxia. In other words, 
for this thesis, the Tianxia concept provides an alternative perspective on relational rationality, 
supplementing the individual rationality perspective, for understanding international affairs and 
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global governance (T. Zhao, 2016: 31-44). Individual rationality defines the maximization of 
individual interest as the ultimate goal of behavior; it is logically embedded in the calculation 
of individual gains and losses. In an era of interdependence, one actor’s individual rationality 
cannot guarantee its own interests in the long term. Individual rationality is insufficient to 
ensure peace and security and enhance mutual trust; on the contrary, it often increases levels of 
hostility and risk and leads to mutual suspicion. Therefore, it is essential to explore a more 
effective and valid form of rationality in the interactive relationship. 
Against this backdrop, Zhao argues that relational rationality is a necessary supplement to 
individual rationality and is crucial to the realization of cooperation and peace (T. Zhao, 2016). 
Relational rationality and individual rationality do not oppose each other in nature; instead, they 
are in a complementary relationship and are considered as two sides of one coin – the coin 
refers to the complete/sufficient rationality. Relational rationality places the consciousness of 
coexistence in the central position and it is understood as a self-restraining means of individual 
rationality. In this respect, relational rationality is conducive to the construction of a stable and 
credible coexistence. 
The distinction between individual rationality and relational rationality is also reflected in their 
different interpretations of “universal value” (T. Zhao, 2016). On the one hand, individual 
rationality interprets universal value by taking the individual as the unit of analysis. In this 
respect, universal value indicates the universalization of a specific value around the globe. 
However, the deficiencies of individual rationality, in defining universal value, are observed in 
its inability to balance the diverse and multiple demands between individuals and its inability 
to guarantee universal benefits. The universalization of value does not necessarily lead to 
universal benefits, rather it sometimes leads to a collective decline (for example, the failure of 
the Washington Consensus). On the other hand, relational rationality interprets universal value 
by taking relations as the unit of analysis. In this regard, it interprets universal value as the 
foundation of acceptable relationship between individuals.  
Specifically, according to relational rationality, universal value contains two major principles. 
One is the principle of being “universally beneficial”. It indicates that all parties will accept a 
sort of relationship if it is universally beneficial. This principle prevents the worst-case scenario 
caused by irrational common consent. Although a universally beneficial relationship must be 
built upon common consent, common consent does not necessarily lead to universal benefits. 
In this regard, compared to common consent, the principle of being “universally beneficial” is 
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much closer to sufficient rationality. The other principle is that of being “universally 
compatible”. It means that all parties agree with a sort of relationship if it could guarantee 
mutually compatible cooperation. This principle does not aim to interfere with any lifestyle or 
grant privileges of any particular group. In other words, the universally compatible relationship 
benefits all parties symmetrically rather than prioritizing one specific party over others. In this 
respect, the principle of “universally compatible” is a more effective way of solving conflicts 
and coordinating relationships among multiple appeals. 
2.1.1.2 Humane Authority (王道) 
The Humane Authority is an ideal political system of Confucianism, and it is also known as the 
Confucian rule of virtue and benevolent governance. In this regard, the Humane Authority is 
usually regarded as a pattern of governance. It contains a set of ideas and institutions relating 
to political life. Generally speaking, there are two major interpretations of the Humane 
Authority: Mencius’ idealistic type and Xunzi’s realistic type (Ren, 2012). Specifically, 
Mencius’ interpretation focuses on the norm dimension (合规则); and Xunzi’s interpretation 
emphasizes the rule dimension (合法则). These two interpretations of the Humane Authority 
are not opposed, but rather they are two interdependent sides of one coin. In other words, they 
have together constituted the connotations and extensions of the Humane Authority. According 
to Liu Zhiqing, either Mencius’ “kind-heartedness” or Xunzi’s “The Rule of a True King” are 
merely one side of the Humane Authority. The Humane Authority can only be achieved through 
the combination of “benevolent governance” (仁政) and “good law” (善法), based on the spirits 
of “kind-heartedness” (Liu, 2017: 56). 
On the basis of the above interpretations, several Chinese scholars have studied the 
contemporary implications of the Humane Authority for the field of IR. One of the pioneering 
Chinese IR scholars on the study of Humane Authority is Professor Yan Xuetong from 
Tsinghua University. In his work Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power (2011), 
Yan reviewed a number of intellectual contributions made by the Pre-Qin thinkers – Guanzi, 
Mencius, Xunzi – in terms of their discussions of two types of leadership: Hegemonic Authority 
(霸道) and Humane Authority (王道) (Yan, 2011a: 47). First, Guanzi insists that moral ability 
is the decisive factor in distinguishing the Humane Authority from Hegemonic Authority. In 
this respect, if the moral prestige of one leading state was high, that state is seen as the Humane 
Authority, with a large number of followers; otherwise, it is regarded as the Hegemonic 
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Authority, with a lower level of moral prestige. Second, Mencius believes that the fundamental 
variance between the Hegemonic Authority and the Humane Authority is determined by their 
different ways of upholding international order. Specifically, Mencius argues that “the 
Hegemonic Authority relies on power whereas the Humane Authority relies on a stronger 
morality for its maintenance and can survive without a particularly large material force” (Yan, 
2011a: 49). Third, being different from Mencius, Xunzi deems that both Hegemonic Authority 
and Humane Authority rely on the combination of morality and power. The disparity between 
the two is that the Hegemonic Authority places more emphasis on the role of power and the 
Humane Authority stresses the role of morality. In Xunzi’s context, one state’s morality is 
largely presented as its political credibility. 
Inspired by these Pre-Qin thinkers, Yan argues for moral realism by emphasizing the 
significance of international authority and strategic credibility for a state to establish and 
maintain its leadership and establish a new international order (Yan, 2016). According to the 
level of morality and strategic credibility, Yan categorizes international leadership into three 
types: tyranny, hegemony, and Humane Authority. First and more precisely, tyranny indicates 
that a dominant power only focuses on the significance of material power without paying due 
attention to the role of morality. In this respect, tyranny’s ignorance of moral principles 
inevitably leads to the undermining of international norms. This ultimately results in instability 
and turmoil in the international order. Second, hegemony means that a leading state adopts 
double standard in international affairs, i.e., “keeping strategic credits within its alliance while 
adopting a policy to deal with non-allies according to jungle law” (Yan, 2016). In this respect, 
on the one hand, hegemony can effectively maintain the stability and solidarity of its alliance; 
however, on the other hand, it may lose its strategic credibility in the entire international system. 
Third, Humane Authority refers to a leading state that “practices moral principles and maintains 
high international strategic credibility” (Yan, 2016). It usually sustains the established 
international order through (1) being a good example to other states; (2) rewarding the states 
that obey international norms; (3) punishing the states that violate international norms (Yan, 
2011b). 
2.1.1.3 The State of Equilibrium and Harmony (中庸) 
The State of Equilibrium and Harmony comes from both Taoism and Confucianism (Pang, 
1980). It implies that “neither have/do too much nor too little, but follow the middle way to 
have/do the appropriate amount” (Jiang, 2013: 444). This thought helps the Chinese to have a 
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more tolerant attitude toward different opinions and beliefs. Practically, being directed by the 
State of Equilibrium and Harmony, Chinese people are usually reluctant to do anything to 
extremes, and they are more willing to look for common ground among various opinions and 
to try to reconcile conflicting stances.  
According to Liu Tonghui, the State of Equilibrium and Harmony is naturally a sort of Yin-
Yang thinking and practical thinking (Liu, 2015). Originally, the Yin-Yang model of 
thinking/Yin-Yang dialectics derive from Chinese observations of nature in the era of 
agricultural civilization, and it played a dominant role in Chinese society and culture from the 
Spring and Autumn period (春秋时期，722-481 B.C.) and the Warring State period (战国时
期，480-222 B.C.). As Jiang Xinyan argues, “Chinese naturalistic, dialectical, and optimistic 
attitudes toward the world and life are all based on the yin yang model of thinking” (Jiang, 2013: 
438). Specifically, over thousands of years, it has intensely influenced the development of 
ancient China in all aspects of astronomy, meteorology, chemistry, arithmetic, music, and 
medicine, etc. In addition, it profoundly shapes Chinese correlative logic through which 
Chinese people interpret various issues or the diverse aspects of one issue in a dynamic and 
dialectic manner. Hence, it is argued that the Yin-Yang dialectic is not only a philosophical 
issue in terms of ontology and world outlook, but also it has practical significance in terms of 
guiding ordinary people’s daily life and shaping the way decisions are made by political elites. 
The core connotation of the Yin-Yang dialectics is “everything is the unity of yin and yang 
opposites, everything implies its opposite, and everything will change to its opposite” (Jiang, 
2013: 444). In this respect, the State of Equilibrium and Harmony can be understood in the 
following three aspects. First, yin and yang are mutually contained, i.e., yin contains yang and 
yang contains yin. In other words, yin and yang are two sides of one coin. On the one hand, yin 
and yang are considered, respectively, as the ego and the alter, they are two separate individuals; 
on the other hand, yin and yang together constitute a perfect whole and they are continuously 
revitalizing each other. For instance, as shown in the fish eye of Tai Chi, the ego exists within 
the other and the other exists within the ego. Thus, in line with this thinking, the two poles of 
one thing are not thesis and anti-thesis, rather they form the co-thesis. Second, yin and yang are 
mutually complementary, and they constitute a complementary relationship. In this relationship, 
the strength of yin complements the weakness of yang, and vice versa. However, the interaction 
between yin and yang does not lead in a particular linear direction, rather they are in a dynamic 
and circular process of continuously supporting and even transforming each other. This circular 
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process maintains the dynamic balance of life and promotes the evolution of cooperation and 
coordination. 
Finally, in the context of the State of Equilibrium and Harmony, the relationship between yin 
and yang is harmonious. Harmony between yin and yang is the basic precondition of generating 
dynamics and sustaining prosperity. Chinese culture sees harmony as the natural state of the 
world. More significantly, harmony is dynamic and open rather than static and closed. Harmony 
is realized through constant coordination and mutual tolerance amidst diversity. The 
harmonious way of thinking does not deny the existence of conflict, rather it believes that 
conflict is the precondition for the birth of harmony, as exemplified by, “an appropriate 
combination of different musical notes so that a beautiful melody is made” (Qin, 2016: 41). 
Hence, it is argued that the State of Equilibrium and Harmony has huge potential for containing 
contradictions and great capabilities for reconciling conflicts, given the “neutralization” 
characteristics of the State of Equilibrium and Harmony. Thus, yin and yang, as two poles, have 
the tendency to transform one another. This transformation ultimately leads to a harmonious 
state in both the natural world and human society. 
Furthermore, in virtue of the above understanding and discussion of the historical implications 
and connotations of the State of Equilibrium and Harmony, it is useful to draw a comparison 
between the Yin-Yang dialectics (harmonious dialectics) and Hegelian dialectics (conflictual 
dialectics) in further exploring the Chinese way of thinking and behaving.  
Hegelian conflictual dialectics contend that two poles of one thing should be seen as thesis and 
anti-thesis, and that the natural state of the world is conflictual and contradictory. In this respect, 
a stable and harmonious state can only be achieved if one pole is fully overturned or eliminated 
by the other. As Brincat argues, Hegelian (conflictual) dialectics hold that “change results from 
the internal dynamism of society, from the interactions between human beings that leads to 
inter-societal tension and the potential sublation of these contradictions to different forms” 
(Brincat, 2010: 681). Hegelian dialectics, characterized by “either or” thinking, emphasize that 
social change and development is achieved through a classical three-step pattern: (1) the 
highlighting of contradictions and conflicts; (2) the emphasis of struggle; and (3) the generation 
of social upheaval. 
On the other hand, the Yin-Yang dialectics stress the mutual existence, the complementary 
interaction, and the harmonious symbiosis of the two poles of one thing. In other words, they 
focus on seeking commonalities among contradictions and transforming conflicts into harmony. 
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With respect to the change and evolution of social relations, the Yin-Yang dialectics, embedded 
in the State of Equilibrium and Harmony, consider the development of society as a moderate 
evolutionary way of softening contradictions and avoiding extremes, i.e., seeking common 
ground while preserving differences. In sum, the “either or” way of thinking is not regarded as 
rational and smart in Chinese culture. Instead, the State of Equilibrium and Harmony provides 
an alternative “both and” way of thinking to observe and interpret a natural phenomenon, social 
transformation, and world politics in a moderate and processual manner. 
2.1.2. THE MAJOR FEATURES OF CHINESE ONTOLOGICAL 
ASSUMPTIONS OF IR 
First of all, it is essential to note that the above review of Chinese political thought and cultural 
legacies (the Tianxia, the Humane Authority and the State of Equilibrium and Harmony) is (1) 
neither a mere cultural and historical study of these concepts, (2) nor is it intended to claim that 
contemporary China will rejuvenate its imperial glory and re-establish a hierarchical order 
based on these concepts’ original ideas. Instead, as Qing Jiang argues, Chinese ancient political 
philosophies are able to “transcend concrete history and have everlasting value” (Qing, 2013). 
In the same vein, Jyrki also emphasizes the contemporary value of Chinese ancient political 
thought by discovering “whether there is something permanent which they could all agree upon” 
(Kallio, 2015: 82). As a result, the major function of the above review is to explore the 
contemporary significance of these concepts and interpret the major features of Chinese 
ontological assumptions of contemporary international relations that are identified as 
relationality, inclusiveness, and processuality.   
2.1.2.1 Relationality 
In this thesis, relationality is seen as the most fundamental feature of Chinese ontological 
assumptions of IR, since the central role of relationality is well manifested in all of the three 
selected streams of Chinese political thought and philosophical ideas, such as (1) the relational 
rationality contained in the Tianxia concept, (2) the close relationship between power and 
morality emphasized by the Humane Authority, and (3) the mutual complementarity of Yin-
Yang presented in the State of Equilibrium and Harmony. All of these philosophies argely 
highlight the significance of relationality in Chinese culture and politics. However, given the 
recent emergence of a ‘relational turn’ in social science and IR, it is necessary to note that the 
study of relationality in IR is not the exclusive privilege of Chinese community; a number of 
Western IR scholars have also begun to emphasize the necessity of studying 
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relations/relationality. Hence, in order to interpret and understand relationality with Chinese 
characteristics more accurately, this thesis includes a comparative study between Chinese and 
Western research on relationality, as follows. 
Western scholars studying the relationality of IR mainly focus on the distinction between 
“substantialism” and “relationalism” at the ontological and methodological level (Emirbayer, 
1997; Jackson and Nexon, 1999). For instance, substantialism and relationalism respectively 
take “things” and “relations” as their basic unit of analysis (Kavalski, 2016). In the same vein, 
Qin Yaqing, a representative Chinese IR scholar carrying out research into relationality, has 
also endowed relationality with ontological significance. Qin criticizes the lack of “relations” 
in mainstream Western IR theories and emphasizes the critical role of relationalism in defining 
the concepts of power, identity, and governance (Qin, 2016). In this respect, it is argued that 
the major convergence between Western and Chinese research on relationality is observed in 
their shared ontological assumption. Unlike most dominant Western mainstream IR approaches, 
the emphasis on “relations” is a proactive attempt to achieve ontological pluralism in the IR 
field. Emilian Kavalski borrowed the idea from Zhang Feng (2015) and argued, “a relational 
IR acts simultaneously as a reminder about the multiverse world we inhabit and the composite 
nature of IR’s episteme……what makes post-Western IR ‘post-Western’ is its responsiveness 
and receptivity of other perspectives” (Kavalski, 2016). 
In addition to recognizing the convergence between Western and Chinese research on 
relationality, the project aims to identify “relationality with Chinese characteristics” by pointing 
out the divergence between the two approaches. Being different from the Western approach of 
merely defining relationality from a methodological perspective, it is argued that “relationality 
with Chinese characteristics” is mainly manifested in its conceptual connotation and practical 
extension. In other words, in virtue of the unique guanxi culture found in China, relationality is 
not only an ontological issue, but it also profoundly shapes Chinese decision-makers’ world 
outlook and is reflected in China’s foreign policy and strategy. More precisely, the conceptual 
connotations and practical implications of Chinese relationality are manifested in the facts that 
(1) the Chinese government attaches great importance to its reputational profile in the 
international community and (2) China has established various types of strategic partnerships 
across the globe. 
On the one hand, guanxi, as an exclusive component of Chinese culture, plays a critical role in 
understanding the conceptual connotation of relationality. In most cases, guanxi and “relations” 
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are seen as a pair of synonyms. However, when compared to “relations” in the Western context, 
Chinese guanxi has richer and more encompassing connotations, as observed in a number of 
related concepts: obligation, reputation, face, and recognition, etc. According to Luo Yadong, 
from the perspective of business, guanxi refers to “the cultivation of personal relationships and 
networks of mutual dependence, and the manufacturing of reciprocal obligation and 
indebtedness” (Luo, 2007: 4). As Zhang Feng argues, guanxi “stresses the reputational profile 
as the main currency of relationality” (Zhang, 2015). The heavy emphasis on obligation and 
reputation in Chinese society mainly results from Chinese face (mianzi) culture. Furthermore, 
in Chinese culture, face is normally understood as “public image”, representing one person’s 
or one country’s recognition by others in (international) society. The cultivation of reputation 
or face by one country in international community is interpreted as the country’s pursuit of 
international recognition. In this respect, China’s proposal of the “right approach to justice and 
interests” (正确的义利观) is a clear sign that China seeks a balance between the pursuit of its 
own interest and the preservation of its international reputation and recognition, key to the 
maintenance of China’s favorable relationships with other countries. 
On the other hand, the practical extension of Chinese relationality is mainly observed in China’s 
strategic partnership policy in the field of diplomacy. China’s emphasis on partnership “is 
consistent with the Chinese face culture, namely, people often arbitrarily define themselves as 
an acquaintance and then include anyone they wish to bring into their circle” (Nguyen, 2015: 
245). Unlike the traditional logic of strategic alliances, the Chinese government consistently 
upholds a non-alignment policy and identifies the strategic partnership as the central element 
of its diplomatic relationship with other actors (nation-states and international organizations). 
From Chinese official elites’ point of view, alliances derive from a ‘Cold War’ mentality and 
are an outdated security concept; they increase the possibility of military conflict and go against 
comprehensive peace and security. Examining the narrative of China’s top leaders and China’s 
foreign policies, China has, for a long time, pursued partnerships rather than alliances. 
According to Nguyen’s summary, partnership with China means that “neither party should view 
the other one as an enemy; the parties need to treat each other with respect and equality; the 
parties should not intervene in each other’s internal affairs; the parties need to coordinate with 
each other to advance their common political and economic interest and they need to support 
each other in international affairs” (Nguyen, 2015: 57). This interpretation clearly echoes the 
nature of the State of Equilibrium and Harmony and Yin-Yang harmonious dialectics. 
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In sum, the above conceptual connotations and practical extensions of Chinese guanxi 
demonstrate how the feature of relationality of Chinese ontological assumptions of IR shapes 
Chinese decision-makers’ policies in (a) seeking China’s international reputation and 
recognition, (b) managing complex relations in order to maintain social and political stability 
in the international community, and (c) constructing a favorable relational network for both 
China’s and global sustainable development. 
2.1.2.2 Inclusiveness 
By reviewing the concepts of the Tianxia, the Humane Authority, and the State of Equilibrium 
and Harmony, this thesis considers inclusiveness as another significant feature of Chinese 
ontological assumptions of IR. Generally speaking, the logic of inclusiveness in Chinese culture 
does not seek for absolute and extreme homogenization, rather it respects differences and 
strives to achieve “harmony with diversity”. In this respect, the author obtained critical 
inspiration from Jyrki Kallio, a well-established sinologist from the Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs (FIIA), through a semi-structured interview regarding the implications of 
Chinese culture and worldview on Chinese foreign policy. According to Dr. Jyrki, being 
influenced by the State of Equilibrium and Harmony, the logic of inclusiveness guides people 
or a state to (a) accept differences while opposing absolute conformity, (b) seek for stability of 
the society, and (c) keep within the bounds of propriety.3 In order to support his argument, Dr. 
Jyrki further quoted an ancient Chinese saying as “I follow my heart’s desires but do not 
transgress the bounds” (从心所欲，不逾矩). 
The logic of inclusiveness has its domestic roots in … and has been verified by Chinese 
historical experience over thousands of years. One prominent example is the long-lasting 
harmonious and coexistent relationship between three Chinese domestic beliefs: Confucianism, 
Buddhism, and Daoism. According to Ren Jiyu, a famous master of Chinese culture, although 
the three beliefs take different viewpoints and have certain divergences from each other, they 
generally maintain a harmonious relationship and none of them has the radical aspiration to 
thoroughly eliminate the others (J. Ren, 2016). In addition, as Lin Anwu argues, Chinese culture 
is the best manifestation of a harmonious culture, and the logic of inclusiveness also reflects 
the spirits of symbiosis and common prosperity of the Humane Authority (Lin, 2017). The logic 
of inclusiveness has become an indispensable component of Chinese culture. 
                                                             
3 Interview with Dr. Jyrki Kallio from Finnish Institution of International Affairs. Date: 11th September, 2018. 
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In the history of Chinese foreign relations, the logic of inclusiveness is manifested in several 
ways. One is the proposition of the idea of ‘seeking common ground while reserving differences’ 
(求同存异) by former Premier Zhou Enlai during the Bandung Conference in 1955. The idea 
successively resolved the differences and promoted consensus between the then participants 
and laid a solid foundation for the Ten Principles of Bandung. In addition, this idea is seen as 
one of the most significant pillars of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (和平共处五
项原则). The latter has played a dominant role in guiding Chinese international strategy and 
shaping Chinese diplomatic policy over the last decades. Another example is the idea of 
‘shelving differences and seeking joint development’ (搁置争议，共同开发), first proposed 
by Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s in the context of the China-Japan territorial issue. The idea 
effectively prevented the escalation of the dispute and created conditions for strengthening 
mutual understanding and trust between China and Japan. Moreover, this idea has also played 
a positive role in the relationship between China and ASEAN in terms of the South China Sea. 
These Chinese foreign accomplishments adequately verify the effectiveness of the logic of 
inclusiveness and reflect Paltiel’s argument of “a Confucian commitment to harmony without 
sameness may accommodate difference better than the messianic idealism of American 
exceptionalism” (Paltiel, 2011: 403). 
2.1.2.3 Processuality 
In addition to relationality and inclusiveness, this thesis sees processuality as another critical 
feature of Chinese ontological assumptions of IR. It is argued that processuality mainly derives 
from the State of Equilibrium and Harmony and the Yin-Yang harmonious dialectics embedded 
in the former. Being influenced by these two streams of Chinese philosophical thought, 
processuality indicates that (a) the nature of the world is dynamic rather than static, (b) the 
dynamics of the world is understood as the Shi (grand tendency) of international situations that 
should be allowed for and followed, and (c) change and transformation should be guided by a 
manageable and balanced process rather than in a radical manner. By placing international 
society within the “entity–process” IR ontological disputes, Qin Yaqing made a great 
contribution to the interpretation of Chinese processuality by undertaking a comparative study 
of international society between the English School pattern and the Chinese way of thinking. 
According to Qin, there are two approaches to understanding international society. The English 
School sees international society as an entity and the Chinese way of thinking considers 
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international society as a process (Qin, 2010). The differences between the two approaches 
(entity approach and process approach) result from their divergent ways of thinking, i.e., the 
category-oriented, taxonomical thinking of the English School and Chinese relation-oriented 
processual thinking. The entity approach is deeply rooted in the Hegelian dialectic or conflictual 
dialectic. It insists that “each category is independent, and a synthesis can be achieved only 
when one of the opposites is either eliminated or absorbed” (Qin, 2010: 137). In this respect, 
homogenization is naturally defined as absorption of non-Western categories into the Western-
centric category (e.g. international society is seen as an evolving ego-category by English 
School scholars). Otherwise, the conflict between the Western ego-category and non-Western 
alter-categories is irreconcilable. Thus, based on the “either-or” thought pattern, Barry Buzan 
defines China as a “reformist revisionist” (Buzan, 2010) of the existing international society 
and argues that the Westphalian view of non-democratic China’s peaceful rise and its further 
integration into post-Westphalian international society seems much more difficult compared to 
its success over the last three decades. 
On the other hand, the process approach derives from the traditional Chinese Yin-Yang 
dialectics. In contrast to the entity approach, the process approach attaches great significance 
to change and inclusiveness. It focuses “more on the context than on the independent individual, 
and the synthesis is always the combination and inclusion of the two rather than the elimination 
or destruction of one by the other” (Qin, 2010: 139). Context, in this quote, refers to interactive 
processes and complex relations. Process plays a central role in maintaining continuous 
interaction, promoting the fluid of relations, and transforming the self and the other through 
inter-subjective practices toward a new synthesis. Unlike the above-mentioned homogenization, 
the Chinese way of integration stresses “change through complementation and unity in 
heterogeneity” (Qin, 2010: 146). Consequently, on the basis of the “both-and” thought pattern, 
Qin defines three elements of the process approach as major sources for understanding the 
possibility and desirability of China’s peaceful rise: they are he/和 (the essential harmony or 
non-conflict assumption), shi/势  (the general tendency of the process), and bian/变 
(transformation in the process). Broadly speaking, these three elements reflect the Chinese 
relational, inclusive, and processual ontological assumptions of IR, and they together constitute 
the fundamental logic and major concerns of China’s foreign policy and international strategy. 
More precisely, the divergence between the two approaches is also manifested in their 
interpretations of identity and institution, the key concepts of international society. First of all, 
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the entity approach sees identity and institution as being independent and objective. However, 
the process approach treats identity and institution as being intersubjective. Second, in line with 
the conflictual dialectics, the change of identity and institution refers to homogenization 
through the absorption of the alter-category into the ego-category, or elimination of the alter-
category. Thus, identity has a definite and homogenous feature. However, according to the non-
conflictual dialectics, the change of identity and institution is understood as an inclusive 
coexistence and a complementary, ongoing interaction between the ego-category and alter-
category. In this respect, identity is “constructed and reconstructed by processual forces which 
come from relations in motion” (Qin, 2010: 149).  
 
Figure 2.1 The major features of Chinese ontological assumptions/worldview of IR 
(source: the author’s compilation) 
In sum, as Figure 2.1 above shows, it is argued that three major Chinese IR-related cultural 
legacies and streams of political thought (the Tianxia, the Humane Authority, and the State of 
Equilibrium and Harmony) have shaped the major features of Chinese ontological assumptions 
of IR, which are relationality, inclusiveness, and processuality. Furthermore, the project argues 
that these features have largely influenced the course of China’s participation and involvement 
in international affairs and global governance. 
To be precise, the Tianxia, characterized by oneness and worldness, provides wisdom for 
establishing an inclusive governance pattern. This pattern emphasizes the principle of 
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“inclusion of all” and aims to address global problems based on commonly-agreed principles 
and institutions. In addition, the relational rationality of the Tianxia leads to the Chinese logic 
of guanxi/relationality, and the latter is widely manifested in China’s foreign affairs. The 
Humane Authority, being different from hegemony and tyranny, stresses the significance of 
benevolent governance. This benevolent governance pattern does not exclude the role of power, 
but it emphasizes the significance of morality. In the field of IR, a country, with a strong moral 
code, tends to set an exemplary role for other countries to follow without imposing and 
enforcing its values and ideas. In this regard, the Humane Authority pattern of governance does 
not pursue the elimination or aggressive assimilation of other civilizations, rather it emphasizes 
inclusiveness and relationality among countries and civilizations.  
The State of Equilibrium and Harmony, as the core value of Confucianism, has shaped the 
Chinese approach to governance, characterized by a step-by-step progressive model in terms of 
avoiding extremes and seeking common ground while maintaining differences. This 
governance model attaches significance to “harmony in diversity” and “unity and equilibrium 
of contradiction”’. Moreover, Yin-Yang dialectics, as the philosophical foundation of State of 
Equilibrium and Harmony, cherishes continuous and dynamic process. As Jiang explains, “all 
things are in constant ongoing process with changes, all changes are caused by the interactions 
between yin and yang, and everything involves its negation” (Jiang, 2013: 439). In the same 
vein, according to a famous comment in the Romance of Three Kingdoms (a 14th-century 
Chinese historical novel), it is a general truism of this world that anything long divided will 
surely unite, and anything long united will surely divide (话说天下大势，分久必合，合久必
分). In this regard, processuality is a central rule of law for investigating and studying the 
international situation. Chinese elites tend to understand the international situation by exploring 
the general tendency rather than focusing on individual issues.  
Last but not least, it should be noted that the three extrapolated features of the Chinese 
ontological worldview – relationality, inclusiveness, processuality – commonly possess an 
integrative and encompassing nature. This integrative and encompassing nature can be 
interpreted as a sort of ontological pluralism that has two-tier implications: (1) from the 
perspective of the content of this thesis, ontological pluralism implies that the Chinese 
ontological worldview shapes the “Chinese” (elites and decision makers’) way of 
understanding global issues and implementing its foreign policies in global governance; (2) 
from the perspective of the structure of this thesis, ontological pluralism leads to 
 56 
epistemological pluralism and methodological pluralism, since there is a directional/causal 
relationship between ontology, epistemology, and methodology. Both perspectives are not only 
essential foundations in the formation of the dissertation’s core conceptual notion – 
“international leadership with Chinese characteristics” – but also in the way that the conceptual 
notion is theoretically applied and empirically verified. 
2.2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION 
Epistemology is a branch of philosophy relating to the acquisition of knowledge. Epistemology 
provides the ultimate toolset for searching for the answers to the most fundamental questions: 
what is knowledge and what are its limits? What can be considered as acceptable knowledge? 
How is knowledge justified? and so on. In this respect, epistemology is defined as “the claims 
or assumptions made about the ways in which it is possible to gain knowledge of reality” 
(Blaikie 1993: 6-7). For a long time, epistemological approaches, particularly within the scope 
of social science and international relations, have generally been grouped into two enduring 
and rival camps: positivism/empiricism and post-positivism/interpretivism/reflexivism. 
On the one hand, positivism/empiricism aims to provide casual explanations for observable 
general patterns of actors’ behavior. It insists that the research methods of natural science can 
be drawn into the study of social science. As Lamont argues, empiricism is based on the broad 
assumption that “knowledge can be accumulated through experience and observation and is 
also often referred to as positivism” (Lamont, 2015: 19). In addition, positivists believe in the 
distinction between research objective (“facts”) and researcher (value). In the context of 
international relations, positivism/empiricism consists of several features. First, international 
relations is said to have an objective and independent existence from the researcher; second, 
international relations theory is seen as one significant tool and criterion for making valid 
predictions; third, in line with the methods of natural science, hypotheses in international 
relations should also be falsifiable (Lamont, 2015). 
On the other hand, post-positivism/interpretivism focuses on disclosing the constitutive role of 
ideas and social structures on actors’ identity and behavior. According to post-
positivists/interpretivists, natural science research methods, such as the replicable experiment, 
cannot simply be applied in the realm of social science, since the goal of social science is the 
“grasping or understanding of the meaning of social phenomena” (Schwandt, 1998: 221). Thus, 
followers of this approach contend that there is no distinct line between the research objective 
and researcher, and “the researcher intervenes in observed social realities through their own 
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role in knowledge production” (Lamont, 2015: 20). In other words, the research objective and 
researcher are “mutually constituted through intersubjective understanding” (Lamont, 2015: 
20). In this respect, constructivism and interpretivism are interchangeable. According to 
Schwandt, constructivists share the interpretivists’ emphasis in the sense that “the world of 
lived reality and situation-specific meanings that constitute the general object of investigation 
is thought to be constructed by social actors” (Schwandt, 1998: 221). 
Given the directional/instrumental relationship between ontology, epistemology, and 
methodology, the ontological pluralism of the “Chineseness”, presented in last section, leads to 
epistemological pluralism – the combination of interpretivism and empiricism – for 
conceptualizing and conducting empirical analysis of the core conceptual framework of 
“international leadership with Chinese characteristics” (ILCC). According to Ron Weber, 
“interpretivists recognize that the knowledge they build reflects their particular goals, culture, 
experience, history, and so on” (Weber, 2004: vi). In this respect, an interpretive 
conceptualization of the ILCC through the application of relational theory to study the extent 
that “Chineseness”, i.e., the role of history, culture, value and worldview for Chinese IR 
decision-makers and scholars, is decisive in answering the research question. However, the 
verification and falsification of the ILCC is an empirical analysis process, since this process 
requires observable and reliable evidence according to the guidelines provided by role theory. 
Using role theory, China’s national role conception (NRC) and its national role performance 
(NRP) are identified as an appropriate analytical lens for conducting an empirical analysis of 
the construction and implementation of the ILCC. 
2.3. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION 
With epistemology considered as an overall guide to the acquisition of knowledge and 
production of legitimate conclusions, the methodology part of this thesis aims to draw a road 
map (or GPS) consisting of two major parts: the choice of theory (2.3.1) and the choice/design 
of empirical analysis (2.3.2). In this respect, methodology represents a research strategy or set 
of guiding principles for the choice of analytical methods rather than the method itself. Briefly, 
methodology is best understood as “the means by which we reflect upon the methods 
appropriate to realize fully our potential to acquire knowledge of that which exists” (Hay, 2006: 
83).  
In line with directional influence between ontology, epistemology, and methodology, the 
above-mentioned epistemological pluralism naturally leads to a methodological pluralism that 
 58 
is characterized by a combination of interpretative analysis and empirical analysis. In this way, 
the thesis is able to contribute a comprehensive and holistic answer to the defined research 
question and to fulfill the identified knowledge gap. 
2.3.1. THE CHOICE OF THEORY 
Generally speaking, theory and research questions are isomorphic (L. Lu, 2017), i.e. they reflect 
each other. Thus, in line with the various types of research questions, IR theories can be 
identified and categorized into the following six functions: (1) descriptive function, i.e., the 
statement of existence of phenomena or facts; (2) explanatory function, i.e., reduction of 
complex phenomena to simple explanations or ideal-typical insights; (3) interpretative function, 
i.e., meaningful structuring of specified areas of ‘reality’; (4) constitutive function, i.e., 
constitution of specified areas of ‘reality’ by means of theoretical concepts; (5) goal defining 
function, i.e., guidance for practical action in ‘reality’; (6) legitimation function, i.e., 
legitimation of acts and/or results of actions in ‘reality’. In a similar vein, Tim Dunne (2013) 
and his colleagues have classified IR theories into five types, as follows:  
Explanatory theory attempts to explain events by providing an account of causes in temporal 
sequence…critical theory explicitly sets out to identify and criticize a particular set of social 
circumstances and to demonstrate how they came to exist…normative theory typically 
addresses how things should be, or ought to be, whether or not we should value them, which 
things are good or bad, and which actions are right or wrong…constitutive theory examines the 
ways in which rules, norms and ideas constitute social objects…the “lens” type of theory which 
simply attempts to explore how social actors navigate their way through social events and 
processes (Dunne, Hansen, & Wight, 2013: 409-411).  
As a consequence, the project argues that the deliberate selection of theory, on the basis of 
functions and types, is one of the most important factors in ensuring the applicability and 
legitimacy of research design in terms of answering the questions and filling up the knowledge 
gap. 
In addition to ensuring consistency between the choice of theory and research question and the 
knowledge gap, it is critical to ensure that the choice of theory reflects the ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological considerations of the project. On the one hand, with 
respect to ontological considerations, as Robert Cox and Björn Hettne assert, “the first task of 
a contemporary political theory is to declare its ontology” (Cox & Hettne, 1995: 36), and Cox 
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also argues that “theory is always for someone, and for some purpose” (Cox, 1981: 128). In this 
regard, the above-mentioned Chinese ontological assumptions of IR – characterized by 
relationality, inclusiveness, and processuality – have largely influenced my choice of relational 
theory (2.3.1.1), which is constructed based on Chinese cultural heritage and political thought. 
On the other hand, ontological considerations have “profound epistemological, methodological, 
and practical political consequences” (Hay, 2006: 79). In this respect, the choice of theory is 
also closely associated with epistemological and methodological considerations. As noted 
above, the project attaches significance to epistemological pluralism characterized by a 
combination of interpretivism and empiricism, and this epistemological pluralism further leads 
to methodological pluralism, characterized by compatibility and complementarity between 
interpretative analysis and empirical analysis. As a result, the selected theories have been 
specifically chosen to achieve methodological pluralism and are equipped with both 
interpretive and explanatory/empirical functions. Thus, in addition to the choice of relational 
theory as the interpretive theory, role theory (2.3.1.2) functions as an empirical/explanatory 
theory and plays a complementary role to relational theory in the study of the ILCC. Figure 2.2 
below depicts the theoretical and functional complementarity between relational theory (in 
yellow) and role theory (in blue) in responding to the research question. 
 
Figure 2.2 The conceptualization of the ILCC as an analytical framework 
(source: the author’s compilation) 
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2.3.1.1 The choice of relational theory (interpretive theory) 
As shown in the yellow part of Figure 2.2, the choice of relational theory is largely influenced 
by ontological considerations – Chinese ontological assumptions of IR. Specifically, the major 
function of relational theory is manifested in (1) the redefinition the major components (power, 
interest, and vision) of international leadership and (2) the conceptualization of the 
“international leadership with Chinese characteristics” (ILCC). The choice of relational theory 
is mainly based on the following four major considerations. 
In the first place, Qin Yaqing made a great contribution in bringing Chinese ideas and culture 
into IRT and developing relational theory (Qin, 2016). According to Qin, “culture matters in 
social theory construction because the metaphysical component of the theoretical hard core is 
primarily shaped by the background knowledge of a cultural community” (Qin, 2016: 33). In 
this respect, Qin argued that relational theory “will bear its cultural birthmark throughout” (Qin, 
2016: 45). In addition to its implications for the construction of theory, Qin also contended that 
“culture plays an important role in human life, in the way of thinking, and therefore in policy-
making” (Qin, 2012). Generally speaking, according to Qin’s analysis, Chinese culture is 
presented as having four major features:  
Contextuality refers to the overall situation and the relational context wherein decisions are 
made. It is believed that actors are always part of the context rather than isolated from the 
context and problems are within the context rather than out of the context…Correlativity means 
that everything is related to everything else, and nothing is isolated. Chinese correlativity has 
four major connotations, namely, relationality, processuality, the mianzi complex and the 
guanxi assumption…Complementarity derives from Chinese dialectic. It emphasizes that thesis 
and antithesis work as opposing forces to complete a transformation into a new 
synthesis…Changeability comes from Yiching. It emphasizes that the two opposites in a 
conflict can transform to each other or they can co-move together. Everything in the universe 
is in the process of consistent change rather than static (Qin, 2012). 
From Qin’s viewpoint, the four major features of Chinese culture – contextuality, correlativity, 
complementarity, and changeability – have exerted a tremendous influence on the 
understanding of the rationalities behind China’s foreign policy making and are the basis for 
constructing a Chinese culture-based IR theory – relational theory. In this regard, Qin’s 
argument coincides with the major features of Chinese ontological assumptions of IR. 
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Therefore, this ontological convergence is the primary consideration for selecting relational 
theory as the interpretative theory of the project. 
In the second place, relational theory treats relationality as the metaphysical core. According to 
Qin, relationality “represents a worldview, a way of thinking and doing, and a perspective that 
differ from IR theories with individual rationality as their theoretical core” (Qin, 2016: 35). By 
reviewing the (Western) existing literature on international leadership (3.1.1), three major 
concepts/components of international leadership are abstracted as power, interest, and vision. 
As a consequence, the project argues that various ways of defining these concepts/components 
shape the different ways of understanding and implementing international leadership in global 
governance. As Qin argues, relational theory “provides new possibilities for research, for 
revisiting key IR concepts, and for a broader comparison of international systems” (Qin, 2016: 
41). For instance, in the context of relationality, power is redefined as relational power, which 
refers to “a process of constantly manipulating and managing one’s relational circles to one’s 
advantage” (Qin, 2016: 42). In this respect, as shown in Figure 2.2, compared to Western 
approaches to the interpretation of power, interest, and vision, the project proposes that the 
logic of relationality (3.2.1) provides a complementary perspective for redefining these 
concepts/components as relational power, relational interest, and relational vision (3.2.2.1). 
More importantly, these redefinitions further lay significant foundations for the 
conceptualization of “international leadership with Chinese characteristics”. 
In the third place, on the basis of the above redefinitions, relational theory provides a “lens” 
through which to interpret and conceptualize the “international leadership with Chinese 
characteristics” (3.2.2.2) as shown in Figure 2.2. Compared to the traditional understanding of 
international leadership (the ideas of Pax Britannica and Pax Americana) based on the 
established interpretations of power, interest, and vision, relational theory conceptualizes 
“international leadership with Chinese characteristics” (ILCC) in accordance with the above-
mentioned definitions of relational power, relational interest, and relational vision. More 
specifically, by virtue of relational theory, “international leadership with Chinese 
characteristics” is conceptualized as a triad analytical framework consisting of facilitative 
leadership, constructive leadership, and exemplary leadership. Moreover, relational theory also 
contains the elements of inclusiveness and processuality. In this respect, it endows the ILCC 
with inclusive and progressive features. 
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Last but not least, as mentioned in the literature review, structural constructivism emphasizes 
the role of an ideational structure in terms of constraining and shaping behavior in both a 
regulative and constitutive manner (Copeland, 2000). As Alexander Wendt argues, “state 
cognition depends on states systematic culture…in analyzing what states think it makes sense 
to start with the culture of the international system and work top-down, rather than start with 
unit-level perceptions and work bottom-up” (Wendt, 1999: 372). Wendt’s preference for top-
down logic is clearly manifested in his categorization of three kinds of systematic culture 
(Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian) and their implications for actors’ ideas and behavior. As a 
result, in terms of complementing the partial ontological assumptions of structural 
constructivism, relational theory weakens “the top-down causality between the ideational 
structure at the systematic level and the identity construction of the units, shifting from 
emphasizing ideational structures to studying inter-subjective practices” (Qin, 2009: 8). In this 
respect, relational theory provides more opportunities for investigating actors’ individual 
features and interaction between actors. Thus, the project argues that relational theory is 
appropriate for interpreting the ILCC due to its Chinese culture-based ontological assumptions. 
However, the project also argues that relational theory is inadequate for providing essential 
empirical analysis for verifying or falsifying the proposed analytical framework of ILCC or for 
responding to research questions. Thus, role theory, as an empirical/explanatory theory, is 
chosen as a complementary theory. 
2.3.1.2 The choice of role theory (empirical/explanatory guiding theory) 
As shown in Figure 2.2 above, the conceptualization of the ILCC through the relational theory 
(in yellow) can provide only half of the answer to the research question, while role theory (in 
blue) provides the other half of the answer in verifying/falsifying the ILCC. In other words, 
role theory, as an empirical theory, is complementary to interpretative relational theory in terms 
of providing guidelines for conducting empirical analysis.  
First of all, the choice of role theory is closely associated with the major research question: 
being applied with the purpose of guiding empirical analysis of the ILCC conceptualized by 
relational theory, role theory functions as an empirical tool. Holsti, the scholar who first 
introduced role theory into Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), interpreted and decomposed role 
theory into two major concepts/components: national role conception (NRC), referring to 
national leaders’ perceptions of their nations’ positions in the international system, and national 
role performance (NRP), referring to the general foreign policy behavior of governments 
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(Holsti, 1970). As a result, the project argues that the two core concepts/components of role 
theory are conducive to the empirical verification or falsification of the ILCC, since it supposes 
that the major components of ILCC – facilitative leadership, constructive leadership, and 
exemplary leadership – are manifested in Chinese decision-makers’ rhetoric and China’s 
foreign practices in the field of global governance. 
Second, role theory remedies the deficiencies of mainstream systematic theories on the rise of 
China in terms of their underestimations of China’s individual agency. First, as an important 
branch of sociological theory, role theory shares some ontological assumptions with Wendt’s 
constructivism on the issue of idealism. Role theory claims that role is constructed in the 
process of social interaction between actors. Almost all of the role theorists present their 
research by first mentioning Mead’s differentiation between “I” and “me”: the “I part” is 
regarded as the objective reality, and it has certain social meaning only if socialized as the “me 
part”, and the latter “has been reconciled with the perceptions of social norms through 
performances (routines)” (Mead, 1934: 199). For example, as the core concept of role theory, 
NRC is conceived as an ideational product of material factors. Second, being different from the 
structuralist approaches which neglect or underestimate the role of agency, role theory promises 
to “build an empirical bridge between agent and structure in international relations” (Breuning, 
2011: 16). In this regard, role theory aims to analyze the NRC not only based on the distribution 
of power and social norms in the international system, but also on the basis of the state’s 
material capability, cultural heritage, and self-perception. (Breuning, 2011: 26).  
Third, role theory integrates empiricism and interpretivism in terms of maximizing the utilities 
of causal and constitutive modes of thinking in the analysis of a state’s NRC without accounting 
for the traditional sharp epistemological opposition. For instance, as a critical concept of role 
theory, role learning is either conceptualized as a causal process from the perspective of 
rationalism and cognitivism, or it is depicted as a constitutive process from the perspective of 
social constructivism (Harnisch, 2011). In this respect, role learning implies one state either 
changes its NRC on the basis of new experience in a causal manner or obtains a new NRC in 
an evolving social context in a constitutive sense. Overall, it is argued that role theory plays a 
significant role in the integration of two factors (material and ideal) and two levels of analysis 
(individualism and holism) into one theoretical framework (MinGyu, 2014). 
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2.3.2. THE DESIGN OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS – CASE STUDY 
APPROACH 
In order to undertake the empirical analysis (verify/falsify) of the proposed conceptual 
analytical framework of the “international leadership with Chinese characteristics” (ILCC) and 
investigate how this framework can play a decisive role in explaining the nexus between the 
rise of China and global governance through representative cases, the project intends to apply 
a case study approach to analyzing China’s NRP embedded in the ILCC via four significant 
international mechanisms: The Group of Twenty (G20), the BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As Figure 2.3 below shows, the two 
major concerns of empirical research design are the choice of cases (2.3.2.1) and the 
operationalization of cases (2.3.2.2). The former illustrates the case selection on the basis of 
research question and core concept, and the latter further consists of three major components: 
case study materials, case study methods, and case study process. 
 
Figure 2.3 Structure of empirical analysis of the ILCC 
(source: the author’s compilation) 
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2.3.2.1 The choice of cases 
Before discussing the details involved in designing and operationalizing case studies, there are 
two fundamental questions that should be answered. The first fundamental question is: what 
can I expect to learn from the case study? The project supposes that Christopher Lamont’s 
argument is an appropriate insight to this question. According to Lamont, case study research 
not only “provides insights into particular cases. In fact, carefully constructed case studies often 
provide insights into social processes that inform how we understand or explain IR more 
broadly. In fact, paradigmatic work that has generated new insights into IR has often come in 
the form of case studies” (Lamont, 2015: 126). The second fundamental question is: why should 
I select these cases for analysis? As Alexander George and Andrew Bennett argue, “case 
selection should be an integral part of a good research strategy to achieve well-defined 
objectives of the study” (George & Bennett, 2005: 83). In this respect, the appropriateness of 
case selection greatly influences the legitimacy and reliability of research results and the 
achievement of the research objective. Consequently, using the method of structured and 
focused comparison, the project discusses the selection of four major cases (G20, BRICS, SCO, 
BRI) for conducting empirical analysis of the conceptualized “international leadership with 
Chinese characteristics” in the context of global governance. Specifically, in the following 
paragraphs, three major criteria account for the choice of cases: (1) to what extent is the core 
concept most relevant, visible, and consensual in connection with these cases; (2) to what extent 
are the cases representative in terms of their authority, role, scope, and function in global 
governance; and (3) to what extent do the institutional features influence the construction and 
implementation of the ILCC in these cases? 
First, it should be pointed out that the primary consideration of case selection is closely related 
to the research objective and core concepts. As Klotz argues, “appropriate case selection 
depends first and foremost on ontology, because any research question relies on core concepts. 
That bring us to the starting point for case selection: a case of what?” (Klotz, 2008: 44).  In this 
respect, it is argued that the mechanisms of G20, BRICS, SCO, and BRI are considered as 
appropriate cases for undertaking empirical analysis of the ILCC – the core concept and 
research objective of the project. (1) The G20. Compared to the G7, which is dominated by the 
advanced industrial countries, the G20 is co-dominated by the established and emerging powers. 
Thus, as the largest emerging power in the world, China’s role in the G20 has become more 
prominent since the G20 was upgraded to be the most significant international cooperation 
mechanism in the post-crisis era. Against this backdrop, China has become an indispensable 
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player in the G20 and has gradually participated in the process of agenda setting and framing 
of this mechanism. The most outstanding example to confirm China’s vital role in the G20 is 
China’s hosting of the G20 summit in 2016. The successful hosting of this summit is widely 
recognized as signaling that China has assumed a leadership role (Chin and Dobson, 2015; 
Kirton, 2016; W. Wang, 2016) in the G20. (2) The BRICS. Unlike the G20, the BRICS is solely 
constituted by a group of emerging powers. After demonstrating a relatively vigorous trend of 
economic growth during the early years of the post-crisis era, since 2013, the BRICS has been 
criticized as having faded (Davis, 2013; Freund, 2017) in terms of the member states’ slowing 
economic growth. In these circumstances, China’s role as the “ballast stone” – manifested in 
its continuous and stable economic growth at a relatively high level – of the BRICS group is 
quite exceptional. In addition, China is also a key player in the establishment of the BRICS’ 
New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA). To create 
a $100 billion CRA, China committed $41 billion, Brazil, India, and Russia committed $18 
billion each, and South Africa committed $5 billion. In this respect, China undoubtedly plays a 
sort of leadership role in the development of the BRICS. (3) The SCO. During the last two 
decades, China has played a central role in the establishment, operation, and institutionalization 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. From the Shanghai Five to the Shanghai Spirit, and 
from an emphasis on security and economy to a focus on multiple cooperative fields, China has 
continuously injected strong drivers and innovation into the development of the SCO. As a 
result, China’s leadership role in the SCO has received wide attention and has been studied by 
many scholars (Jia, 2007; Yuan, 2010; Carroll, 2011; Song, 2016). (4) The BRI. In 2013, the 
new Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping proposed the “Belt and Road Initiative” (the former 
“One Belt One Road”). This initiative is seen as a landmark in China’s strategic transformation 
from “Tao Guang Yang Hui” (keep a low profile) to “You Suo Zuo Wei” (make a contribution 
to international society). As the initiator and major driver, China has contributed a lot to this 
grand project, both materially and ideationally. For instance, with the aim of turning this 
initiative into practice/reality, China led the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) to provide financial support for regional infrastructure construction. 
More importantly, both BRI and AIIB were greeted with a massive, positive response from a 
large number of countries (Solmecke, 2016; Suetyi, 2017). This situation, to some extent, 
confirms China’s role of leadership in the BRI. 
Second, the selected cases are identified and classified into a focused phenomenon or a specific 
field. According to George and Bennett, “the cases in a given study must all be instances of 
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only one phenomenon, and the identification of the class or subclass of events for any given 
study depends upon the problem chosen for study” (George & Bennett, 2005: 69). Thus, the 
project supposes that although the G20, BRICS, SCO, and BRI are designed for various 
purposes and equipped with different functions, their common ground is manifested in their 
key roles in regional and global governance. (1) The G20. Due to the 2008 global financial 
crisis, the G20 has replaced the G8 as the most important platform of global economic 
governance. The increasing significance of the G20 gives the developing countries a louder 
voice in the construction of the global economic order, strengthens international financial 
regulation, and enhances the representativeness of the international financial system. In 
addition, in recent years, with ever-deepening communication and cooperation between 
members, the G20 has gradually expanded its cooperative areas. For instance, at the 2016 
Hangzhou G20 summit, the major issue-areas of global governance – climate change and green 
finance – were added to the agenda of the G20. Thus, it is undoubtedly true that the G20 is one 
of the most important and representative mechanisms in the field of global governance. (2) The 
BRICS. Since the first summit held in 2009 and the inclusion of South Africa as a new member 
in 2010, the BRICS group has increasingly improved its standing in global governance as its 
members continue to insist on reforming the existing system of global financial governance. 
One outstanding example is the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) by the 
BRICS members in 2014. It reflects the BRICS members’ dissatisfaction and their strong 
resolution to address the “governance deficit” caused by the Western-based financial 
institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) and the Western-based governance model (the 
Washington Consensus). Moreover, with the purpose of forestalling short-term balance of 
payments pressures, providing mutual support, and strengthening financial stability, the 
Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA) was also founded by the BRICS members in 2014. 
(3) The SCO. In the post-Cold War era, non-traditional security problems have become an 
imperative factor influencing the security of Central Asia. Against this backdrop, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization has gradually shifted its focus from traditional security cooperation 
to non-traditional security cooperation. It makes many contributions to regional and global 
security governance in terms of constructing a comprehensive security system and shaping the 
New Security Concept. Moreover, the SCO also devotes itself to promoting economic 
cooperation and improving the regional economic mechanism. (4) The BRI. In the face of 
feeble global economic growth and the huge infrastructure gap in Asia, the BRI mainly focuses 
on regional development and infrastructure construction, and it aims to provide solutions to 
regional and global development. Thus, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
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established under the leadership of China, provides financial support for Asian infrastructure 
construction. Furthermore, China has also contributed a “China Plan” to a new modality of 
global governance based on the major principles of the BRI in terms of policy coordination, 
facilitated connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and a people-to-people bond.  
Third, the project selects cases based on their diverse (institutional) characters within the same 
given class (global governance). By doing so, the thesis aims to conceptualize the ILCC in 
global governance in a more comprehensive manner and in a broader scope. In other words, it 
is argued that the legitimacy and reliability of the conceptualization is enhanced if the coverage 
of cases is as broad and as wide as possible. (1) The G20. Compared to formal 
intergovernmental organizations such as the IMF and World Bank, the G20 is characterized as 
an informal mechanism or forum of international cooperation. The informal nature of the G20 
is largely manifested in the fact that its members prefer to seek for non-legally binding 
international consensus (communiques, declarations, announcements) rather than international 
legal obligation. The major advantage of this informality is observed in its flexibility in adapting 
to changes in the international situation, i.e., “the ability to renegotiate or modify previous 
agreements as circumstances change” (Choe, 2010: 6). (2) The BRICS. The BRIC was 
originally proposed as a business concept by Jim O’Neill, the then Goldman Sachs economist, 
in 2001. The proposition of this concept initially aimed to identify promising investment 
destinations for potential investors. In June 2009, in order to jointly cope with the global 
financial crisis, leaders from China, Russia, India, and Brazil gathered at the first BRIC’s 
summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, transforming the loose concept into a leader-level mechanism 
for South-South Cooperation (SSC) and global governance. However, it should be pointed out 
that the New Development Bank (NDB), jointly founded by the BRICS members, is a formal 
intergovernmental organization for providing financial support for regional and global 
development. In this regard, according to Cooper and Farooq, “the NDB represents a formal 
institutional extension of the BRICS as an informal club” (Cooper & Farooq, 2015: 5). (3) The 
SCO. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is an intergovernmental organization created in 
2001. The SCO consists of a number of formal and permanent organs. The Council of Heads 
of State is the highest SCO organ and the ultimate decision-making body. Its functions comprise 
the identification of priority areas, the determination of principles, and the shaping of basic 
direction for the SCO. The SCO’s formal organs also include the Council of National 
Coordinators, the Secretariat, and the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS), etc. In the 
meantime, with the purpose of overcoming mutual suspicion between intra-organizational 
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powers (notably Russia and China), the SCO also relies on an informal and flexible normative 
base with the emphasis of friendship-building and a meeting mechanism. In this respect, the 
SCO is defined as “an inter-governmental organization with a minimal institutional structure 
and an extensive informal cooperation network” (Maduz, 2018). (4) The BRI. The institutional 
character of the “Belt and Road Initiative” is distinct from the former three cases/mechanisms., 
Its degree of institutionalization is by far the lowest among the four. As its name implies, the 
BRI is more appropriately viewed as a China-proposed initiative that calls for the (potential) 
participants to be involved in the construction of an open and inclusive regional and global 
economy. The open and inclusive character of the BRI is manifested in its non-specific set of 
defined participants.  However, as with the relationship between the NDB and the BRICS, the 
China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as a formal intergovernmental 
organization, plays a significant role within the framework of the BRI. The formal nature of the 
AIIB is observed in its international standards, governance structure, governing principles, and 
the choice of investment projects. 
Fourth, the final consideration in case selection focuses on the possibility of undertaking a 
comparative study and the potential of generating a comparable and inductive conclusion. As 
Klotz argues, “well-crafted case selection takes into account the universe of possible cases and 
the logic of comparison implied by the research question” (Klotz, 2008: 43). On the basis of 
the previous three considerations, it is argued that the ILCC can be interpreted by (1) the various 
manifestations of the ILCC China exhibits in (2) a myriad of issue-areas in global governance 
(3) through China’s participation in and establishment of mechanisms with diverse characters. 
Moreover, using the method of structured and focused comparison, it is necessary to ask “a set 
of standardized, general questions of each case, and these questions must be carefully developed 
to reflect the research objective and theoretical focus of the inquiry” (George & Bennett, 2005: 
69). In this regard, the project contends that the G20, BRICS, SCO, and BRI are appropriate 
for the application of standardized questions and the subsequent acquisition of comparable data 
for the empirical research. In this respect, the comparative study of selected cases contributes 
to the comprehensive and reliable analysis and interpretation of the ILCC in global governance. 
As George and Bennett contend, “both within-case analyses, which help test historical 
explanations of cases, and cross-case comparisons, which help identify the domains to which 
these explanations extend” (George & Bennett, 2005: 124). 
Last but not least, with respect to the issue of selection bias, the thesis clarifies three major 
points. (1) Since the thesis intends to discuss and conceptualize the ILCC in the post-crisis era, 
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it does not regard the international organizations of the Western-based Bretton Woods system 
– the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO – as appropriate cases. In the similar vein, although 
China has consistently named the United Nations as the core organization and the most 
representative and authoritative actor in international cooperation and global governance, this 
international organization was established at the end of the Second World War and its rules and 
institutional design were mainly shaped by the major Western victors, especially the United 
States. As a result, in these established organizations, there is little room for the construction 
and implementation of the ILCC, which is based on a combination of the rise of the Chinese 
economy and China’s unique culture heritage and political thought. (2) Some critics contend 
that the BRI is a Chinese initiative in which China is the sole player and others are just recipients 
of Chinese investment. However, this thesis argues that compared to other Western-based 
established international mechanisms, because the BRI was solely proposed by China, there are 
more opportunities and less historical constraints for China in fully constructing and 
implementing the ILCC through the promotion of the BRI. However, it does not mean that 
China will not face real challenges and constraints during the development process of the BRI: 
because the BRI was solely led by China, other countries may suspect, and even fear, that this 
China-proposed initiative was established on the basis of their perceptions of China’s 
motivations and strategic goals. In this regard, the BRI can be considered as both an opportunity 
and a severe test for China’s construction and implementation of the ILCC. (3) The thesis does 
not select cases that are closely related to China’s national core interests of sovereignty and 
territory, such as the South China Sea and anti-separatism in Xinjiang, since China’s 
government consistently claims that it will never compromise on its national core interests. 
However, the implementation of the ILCC exhibits and allows for a certain degree of flexibility 
and compromise that are derived from the major features of Chinese ontological assumptions 
of IR – relationality, inclusiveness, and processuality. Nonetheless, the thesis does not believe 
that the framework of the ILCC is applicable to issues that are closely associated with China’s 
core interests. 
2.3.2.2 The operationalization of cases 
Another major concern of case study design is to figure out how the selected cases can be 
operationalized appropriately for conducting an empirical analysis of the ILCC. Generally, the 
operationalization of cases is closely related to three major issues: the choice of case study 
materials, the choice of case study methods, and the design of case study process. The project 
argues that the three issues are mainly influenced and determined by the choice of theory. As 
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mentioned above, role theory has been selected as the major empirical/explanatory theory of 
the project, and it consists of two components: national role conception (NRC) and national 
role performance (NRP). Therefore, first, research materials were identified and collected based 
on Chinese top leaders’ and decision-makers’ statements and speeches, China’s top-level 
domestic and international documents, Chinese and English academic articles, and semi-
structured interviews conducted among Chinese-speaking and English-speaking scholars. 
Second, the choice of research materials indicates that qualitative analysis is the primary 
research approach. Thus, textual analysis and practice analysis are selected as the major 
analytical methods. Third, based on the choice of research materials and analytical methods, 
the project maps a four-step interpretive process of conducting empirical analysis of the ILCC 
in terms of an historical analysis, the interpretation of China’s NRC embedded in the ILCC, the 
interpretation of China’s NRP embedded in the ILCC, and the summary. 
Case study materials: reliability, validity, and the defined periods 
Before discussing the types of research materials used, it is essential to first identify the time 
period for the empirical data collection. The thesis argues that the construction and 
implementation of the ILCC follows an implicit logic embedded in Chinese diplomatic practice 
over the last decade (from 2009 to 2018). The choice of 2009 as the start year results from two 
key events. First, the 2008 global financial crisis led to a shift in power distribution from the 
West to the East and from the established powers to the emerging powers. This situation 
objectively provided China, the largest developing country and emerging power, an opportunity 
to play a more active role in global governance. Second, is the then Chinese president Hu 
Jintao’s argument of “four stronger” elements regarding China’s role on the international stage, 
i.e. “stronger political influence, stronger economic competitiveness, stronger image affinity, 
stronger moral appeal” (Wang, 2009). Hu’s argument is interpreted as China’s political 
willingness to shoulder more international responsibility and enact the role of international 
leadership in the post-crisis era (Li and Zhang, 2009). Thus, it is appropriate to collect the 
relevant empirical data during the period between 2009 and 2018. 
Moreover, the choice of research materials is question-oriented and theory-based. Thus, the 
selected materials should be suitable for the application of role theory in the interpretation of 
China’s NRC and NRP embedded in the ILCC. In addition, the issues of reliability, validity, 
and accessibility of the selected materials are discussed and evaluated. 
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a. Case study materials for interpreting China’s NRC embedded in ILCC 
First of all, since NRC refers to leaders’ and decision-makers’ perceptions of their country’s 
role in the international system, the primary research materials for interpreting China’s NRC 
embedded in the ILCC, are speeches and statements made by Chinese top leaders and foreign 
policy makers. Thus, in line with the time period (2009-2018) identified above, the project 
focuses on speeches, statements, and comments from the following Chinese leaders and 
decision-makers: the former Chinese President and General Secretary of CCP Hu Jintao (2003-
2013), the current Chinese President and General Secretary of CCP Xi Jinping (2013 to now), 
the former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (2003-2013), the current Chinese Premier Li Keqiang 
(2013 to now), the former Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi (2007-2013), the 
current Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (2013 to now), and both Yang Jiechi 
(2013 to now) and Wang Yi (2018 to now) who hold the influential positions of State Councilor.  
It is well known that China is an authoritarian party-state in which the Central Committee of 
the CCP enjoys incomparable authority over and exerts unrivaled influence on domestic and 
foreign issues. This implies that Chinese decision-makers’ statements have a high level of 
reliability and validity. As Teemu Naarajarvi argues, “in the centrally controlled political 
system of China, known as democratic centralism, the statements of the decision-makers carry 
an even stronger message than in liberal democracies” (Naarajarvi, 2017: 25). In this respect, 
these speeches and viewpoints represent the grand trends of Chinese foreign strategy and the 
domestic legitimacy of its foreign policy. In addition, these types of research materials also 
have a high level of accessibility, since the statements and speeches are delivered on public 
occasions and are accessible in both Chinese and English written versions. 
Second, academic articles and literatures are another important source for the interpretation of 
China’s NRC embedded in the ILCC. Specifically, two influential Chinese-based journals were 
selected: Contemporary International Relations (CIR) and China International Studies (CIS). 
These two journals are respectively published by two Chinese policy-related think tanks. The 
former is published by the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), 
affiliated to the Ministry of State Security, and the latter is published by the China Institute of 
International Studies (CIIS), affiliated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The CICIR and the 
CIIS concentrate on the issues of international affairs and world politics and economy, and they 
play a central role in the study of the international situation and provide policy 
recommendations to Chinese leaders and decision-makers. In this respect, it is believed that, 
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due to their function of academic and governmental exchange of views and their strong 
influence on the Chinese government, these two journals (CIR and CIS) have a high level of 
reliability and validity for interpreting China’s NRC, especially in terms of explaining Chinese 
leaders’ rhetoric, deliberating international situations, and analyzing China’s national role 
expectations from other states. 
Finally, in addition to the written materials, the Chinese-based semi-structured interview plays 
a part in providing heuristic insights into the actual intentions and considerations behind 
Chinese leaders’ and decision-makers’ speeches and statements. According to Wengraf Tom, 
the major advantage of a semi-structured interview is manifested in the fact that it is “designed 
to have a number of interviewer questions prepared in advance but such questions are designed 
to be sufficiently open that the subsequent questions cannot be planned in advance but must be 
improvised in a careful and theorized way” (Tom, 2001: 5). Moreover, the major location for 
carrying out the semi-structured interviews is Beijing. As the capital of China, Beijing is the 
political center and the center of foreign affairs. In Beijing, the author carried out a number of 
semi-structured interviews with professors and experts on China’s foreign policy and global 
governance. The interviewees came from different institutes, including the official think tank, 
the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), the civil think tank, the 
Center for China and Globalization (CCG), and the University of International Relations (UIR), 
etc. In addition, interviews are also conducted with international scholars from university and 
international think tank, such as the University of Nottingham and Finnish Institute of 
International Studies (FIIS). 
b. Case study materials for interpreting China’s NRP embedded in the ILCC 
In the first place, the primary research material for interpreting China’s NRP embedded in the 
ILCC is identified as state practice. Traditionally, state practice is a term used in the discipline 
of international law. As Mark Weisburd contends, state practice is “an important element of 
international law, both as a key component of customary international law and as a crucial tool 
for interpreting treaties” (Weisburd, 2009: 295). In addition, according to Michael Wood and 
Omri Sender, state practice is defined as “an element in the formation and identification of rules 
of customary international law,  one of the principal sources of international law” (Wood and 
Sender, 2017). Inspired by these above definitions, in the context of IR and global governance, 
state practice refers to one country’s practices/behaviors in the formation and implementation 
of its foreign policies, and these practices generate certain outcomes in terms of declaring joint 
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communiques, achieving cooperation agreements, establishing international mechanisms, and 
shaping international norms and rules, etc.  
In the second place, the academic article is regarded as another major source for the 
interpretation of China’s NRP embedded in the ILCC. However, unlike the application of the 
above-mentioned two Chinese policy-related journals in the analysis of China’s NRC, the 
selection of academic articles is based on a broader range of journals specializing in the fields 
of IR, IPE, and global governance. Also, the selected articles are in both Chinese and English. 
It is believed that the wide range of academic articles published by Chinese and international 
scholars allows for a comprehensiveness and reliability of analysis in terms of explaining the 
intentions and motivations behind certain state practices and in interpreting the implications of 
China’s policy making and implementation of specific issue-areas. 
Last but not least, since a study of international leadership cannot neglect the significance of 
the expectations and thoughts of non-Chinese observers, the project carries out semi-structured 
interviews among international scholars to collect their understanding and interpretations of 
China’s practice as regards leadership implications in global governance. Specifically, since 
the project’s central argument is culture-based and attaches significance to “Chinese 
characteristics”, the choice of interviewees focuses on scholars and pundits who are specialized 
in Chinese political culture, China’s foreign policy, and China’s unique role in global 
governance, etc. On the basis of their viewpoints, it aims to analyze the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of China’s NRP embedded in the ILCC. 
Case study methods 
Being similar to the choice of research materials, the choice of analytical methods is question-
based and theory-oriented, and it is also closely associated with the selected research materials. 
In this respect, textual analysis and practice/behavior analysis are identified as the two major 
analytical methods of the project. 
a. Textual analysis 
Given that speeches, academic articles, and interviews are selected as the principal analytical 
materials for interpreting China’s NRC embedded in the ILCC, the primary analytical method 
of the project is identified as textual analysis. 
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First of all, the primary function of applying textual analysis is to identify and interpret the 
connotation behind tens of thousands of words in speeches and articles. While the United States 
often takes its leadership role in the world for granted and believes it is “bound to lead” (Nye, 
1990), China is much more modest and has often sought to remove the word “leadership” from 
its statements (Medeiros, 2009). Although several scholarly studies have started to label China 
as having various types of “international leadership”, it is rare to see Chinese decision-makers 
officially acknowledging China as an “international leader” in their speeches, statements, and 
official documents, etc. However, this situation does not indicate that Chinese leaders and elites 
do not have the willingness or the sense of responsibility to exhibit China’s leadership role in 
international relations and global governance, at least the role of leadership with Chinese 
characteristics. Under these circumstances, the proposed analytical framework of the ILCC 
provides the author with an opportunity to pay due attention to the relevant information in 
Chinese leaders’ and decision-makers’ speeches. For instance, the ILCC, as a triad framework, 
mainly consists of three types of manifestation: facilitative leadership, constructive leadership, 
and exemplary leadership, and each type of leadership respectively contains certain conceptual 
connotations (3.2.3).  Therefore, one major target in conducting textual analysis is to carefully 
read the relevant speeches, statements, and articles and interpret why and how the ILCC are 
conceptionally constructed (NRC) and practically implemented (NRP) by Chinese elites. 
Second, with the purpose of effectively and comprehensively investigating and analyzing the 
selected speeches, statements, and articles, the author used the guidelines provided by 
Breuning’s model (3.3.2) of NRC to study these research materials more pertinently. The most 
significant value of Breuning’s model lies in its identification of identity, domestic audience, 
cultural heritage, capability, and opportunity, acting as five functional components for 
interpreting one country’s NRC. In this respect, it is argued that Breuning’s model, as an 
empirical toolkit, plays a complementary role to the proposed analytical framework in terms of 
interpreting China’s NRC embedded in the ILCC in the selected cases. 
b. Practice analysis 
The major function of practice analysis is to investigate China’s NRP (state practice) embedded 
in the ILCC in the selected cases. As mentioned above, state practice refers to one country’s 
practices/behaviors in the formation and implementation of its foreign policies, and these 
policies and practices generate certain outcomes in terms of declaring joint communiques, 
achieving cooperation agreements, establishing international mechanisms, and shaping 
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international norms and rules, etc. Therefore, in this project, practice analysis takes the form of 
four major perspectives – institutional, policy, material, and ideational perspectives – to 
interpret China’s policy implementation and practical contributions to the architecture and 
process of global governance. 
From the institutional perspective, China’s practical contributions to global governance are 
demonstrated in its active participation in the existing institutions. As the largest emerging 
power and developing country, China’s integration in and compliance with the established 
institutional rules and norms have greatly strengthened the legitimacy of the existing 
international system. However, with the purpose of further increasing the representativeness of 
the international system and the effectiveness of global governance, China’s practices are also 
manifested in its reform of the existing international institutions and the establishment of new 
ones. 
From the policy perspective, China’s practices are mainly exhibited through its policy proposals 
and policy implementation. The former refers to China’s policy propositions with respect to the 
strengthening of and innovative developments/supplements to the existing institutional 
arrangements and the established code of conduct. The latter refers to China’s contribution of 
putting the policy documents into practice through the material and institutional channels. In 
this context, policy documents consist of joint declarations, action plans, policy programmes, 
policy frameworks, and development strategies, etc. 
From the material perspective, China’s practices in global governance were initially manifested 
in its material provision of public goods in the areas of economic development, security 
management, and trust building, etc. Another critical practical contribution by China to global 
governance is its provision of material foreign development assistance (FDA) to the vast 
number of developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs). It aims to support the 
capacity building of these countries. China’s material contribution is also observed in the fact 
that it strongly emphasizes collective goods over individual good and self-restrains its own 
dramatic increasing material power for the sake of establishing new types of interstate 
relationships and shaping the new-modality of regionalization and globalization. 
From the ideational perspective, China’s practices are exhibited in its propositions of a number 
of ideas and visions as to how international relations should be managed and how regional and 
global affairs should be governed. With its increasing significance in world economics and 
politics, China has articulated its understanding of the nature and development trends of global 
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governance and proactively contributed a “China Plan” to a myriad of issue-areas, such as the 
community of human destiny, community of shared interests, and new types of major power 
relations, etc. 
Case study process 
On the basis of the selected theories, case selection, research materials, and analytical methods 
above, it is essential to further design an interpretive analytical process of operationalizing the 
selected cases. As shown above, each case is presented as one mechanism (G20, BRICS, SCO, 
or BRI). Broadly speaking, in the context of global governance, mechanism refers to an 
international organization, an institutional arrangement, a multilateral platform, or an initiative 
for regional/global cooperation, etc. Thus, the interpretive process provides a guideline for 
undertaking an empirical analysis of the proposed conceptual framework of “international 
leadership with Chinese characteristics” (ILCC) through the selected mechanisms (G20, 
BRICS, SCO and BRI). In other words, the empirical analysis of each selected case/mechanism 
follows an established interpretive process in order to verify the interpretive conclusions. This 
conclusion leads to the conceptual verification of the dissertation’s core notion of ILCC. 
Specifically, as Figure 2.4 below shows, the project identifies the interpretive process as a four-
step process: (1) the historical analysis, (2) the interpretation of China’s national role 
conception (NRC) embedded in the ILCC, (3) the interpretation of China’s national role 
performance (NRP) embedded the ILCC, and (4) the summary. 
 
Figure 2.4 The four-step interpretive analytical process of the ILCC in the selected cases 
(source: the author’s compilation) 
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a. Historical analysis 
The empirical analysis of each case starts with an historical analysis of the selected mechanism 
(G20, BRICS, SCO, or BRI). This historical analysis aims to provide an holistic picture of the 
mechanism’s formation and development by interpreting its dynamics. In this respect, the 
historical analysis makes a fundamental contribution to the subsequent interpretation of China’s 
NRC and NRP embodying ILCC in two major aspects. 
First and foremost, by doing the historical analysis, the thesis places each of the selected 
mechanisms within the broader international environment and makes it echo/reflect the 
evolution of the existing international order and the transformation of global governance as 
discussed in the introduction of the thesis. By doing so, the thesis aims to interpret the nexus 
between the mechanism and the existing international system in terms of its founding 
background and developing impetus. In addition, the thesis investigates the implications of this 
mechanism for the development of international relations and global politics and economics. In 
other words, the historical retrospect is important in providing overall background knowledge 
of the dynamic international interplay to which each mechanism is relevant. 
Second, based on a critical assessment of the international situation and the significance of the 
mechanism, the historical analysis of each case illustrates the specific mechanism’s 
implications for China. As the largest emerging power and developing country, China has 
increasingly been involved in global governance in terms of participating in the existing 
international institutions and in establishing China-led international financial institutions. As 
mentioned above, the choice of cases/mechanisms (G20, BRICS, SCO, BRI) is closely 
associated with China’s increasingly significant role in global governance. Thus, in each case, 
a comprehensive historical study of the specific mechanism’s process of development and 
dynamics provides inspirational clues for understanding China’s motivations and calculations 
in shaping its role conception and undertaking its role practice, as embedded in the ILCC in 
each of these mechanisms. 
Third, by reviewing and being inspired by the existing literature, the thesis divides the 
development of each selected mechanism into several historical periods. In doing so, it is 
conducive to an understanding of the evolutionary features of this mechanism, which can help 
in an interpretation of the manifestations and dynamics of the ILCC that is characterized by the 
logic of processuality. 
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b. Interpretation of China’s NRC embedded in the ILCC 
The second step of the interpretive process is the interpretation of China’s NRC embedded in 
the ILCC for each case/mechanism. As Figure 2.2 shows, this interpretation is achieved through 
the dyad combination of the ILCC conceptualized by relational theory and Breuning’s model, 
derived from role theory. On the one hand, the ILCC, as a triad conceptual/analytical framework, 
provides several conceptual propositions and arguments to be verified or falsified; on the other 
hand, as an empirical toolkit developed from role theory, Breuning’s model plays a guiding role 
of examining and interpreting China’s national role conception on the basis of five components 
– identity, cultural heritage, domestic audience, material capability, and opportunity to act. This 
interpretation is expected to reflect (verify or falsify) the analytical framework of ILCC to 
various extents in different cases. 
As the left-hand side of Figure 2.3 shows, two major factors influence the interpretation of 
China’s NRC embedded in the ILCC; the research materials and analytical methods. 
Specifically, as mentioned above, the interpretation of China’s NRC embedded in the ILCC is 
achieved through (1) textual analysis of Chinese leaders’ and decision-makers’ speeches, 
statements, and arguments which are directly or indirectly associated with the selected 
cases/mechanisms, such as Chinese Presidents’ and Premiers’ speeches at the summits of each 
of the mechanisms (G20, BRICS, SCO, BRI) and the relevant comments made by Chinese 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and State Councilors in press conferences and interviews; (2) 
textual analysis of scholarly research articles from the two major policy-related journals, 
Contemporary International Relations (CIR) and China International Studies (CIS). The 
articles published by these two journals are highly relevant to and influential in Chinese policy 
making. Thus, the viewpoints expressed in these articles are selectively utilized with the 
purpose of comprehending and interpreting the connotations contained in Chinese leaders’ 
rhetoric; and (3) direct quotation or reinterpretation of the data collected through semi-
structured interviews with scholars and pundits specializing in international relations or in 
specific issue-areas of global governance. Moreover, in each case, China’s NRC is interpreted 
in line with the stage of development of each specific mechanism. In doing so, an evolutionary 
process of China’s NRC symbolized as the ILCC can be mapped. 
c. Interpretation of China’s NRP embedded in the ILCC 
The third step of the interpretive process is to analyze China’s NRP embedded in the ILCC in 
the selected cases/mechanisms. As with the interpretation of China’s NRC, the interpretation 
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of China’s NRP as ILCC is obtained by exploring the mutual complementarity between the 
analytical framework of the ILCC guided by relational theory and the empirical analysis 
demanded by role theory.  
However, unlike the identification of role conception based on the five components of 
Breuning’s model, in each case, the project interprets China’s NRP embedded in the ILCC 
through the analysis of China’s four-dimensional practices and actions, i.e., China’s 
institutional, policy, material, and ideational contributions to the specific mechanism of global 
governance. Precisely, as shown in the right-hand side of Figure 2.3, the interpretation of 
China’s NRP embedded in the ILCC is achieved through: (1) an analysis of China’s actual 
practices and its implementation of policies. These practices and policy implementations are 
categorized into China’s material, institutional, and ideational contributions to the specific 
mechanism/issue-area; (2) a textual analysis of Chinese and English articles in the relevant 
fields and issue-areas. These articles provide interpretations of China’s external practices and 
actions from the perspectives of both domestic and international-based scholars. Their 
viewpoints are conducive to a more holistic understanding of the connotations and implications 
of China’s practices; and (3) a discourse analysis of the materials collected by semi-structured 
interview. Unlike the interpretation of China’s NRC, at this interpretive stage, the semi-
structured interviewees comprise both Chinese and international scholars. This ensures the 
relatively high reliability and comprehensiveness of the interpretation of China’s NRP 
embedded in the ILCC from the above-mentioned four dimensions. 
d. Summary 
The final step of the interpretive process is to summarize the analytical findings in each case. 
In other words, the thesis undertakes an overall analysis of the ILCC for each mechanism (G20, 
BRICS, SCO, or BRI) on the basis of the previous three steps. Specifically, the summary largely 
consists of three parts, as follows. 
The first section of the summary draws some general conclusions about the ILCC exhibited in 
each case/mechanism. Specifically, using the interpretations of China’s NRC and NRP 
embedded in the ILCC based on the stage of each specific mechanism’s historical development, 
this section summaries the various manifestations of the ILCC on the basis of the different 
stages and depicts the dynamic process of the ILCC exhibited in each selected case/mechanism. 
In doing so, this general assessment of the ILCC in each mechanism provides empirical 
evidence for the next two sections of the summary.  
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The second section of the summary, on the basis of the above generalizations, interprets the 
ILCC in each case/mechanism in relation to the major features of Chinese ontological 
assumptions of IR, identified as relationality, inclusiveness, and processuality in the 
methodology. This activity has two critical implications: (1) in terms of the thesis content, it 
clearly demonstrates how the practical manifestation of the ILCC echoes Chinese philosophical 
and political ideas, which strengthens the thesis’ core assumption that Chinese political thought 
and cultural legacies influence the Chinese way of thinking, policy making, and behaving; (2) 
in terms of the thesis structure, this activity ensures the consistency and coherence of the thesis’ 
logic, which is regarded as the most significant indicator of measuring quality of the thesis. 
The third section of the summary dissects the challenges and limitations faced by China’s role 
in the ILCC in each case/mechanism. The thesis contends that, in relation to the existing 
international order, the ILCC is still a new concept and practice that is embedded in 
“Chineseness”. As a result, given that the IR discipline is Western-dominated and that 
international politics is a complicated arena, it is not difficult to understand that the ILCC faces 
conceptual and practical challenges. Hence, the summary adopts a multilevel (i.e., global, intra-
regional, regional, sub-regional, and domestic levels) and multidimensional (i.e., divergences 
in political system and appeals, economic competition, potential security risk and conflict, and 
diverse development stages) perspective to interpret these challenges. In this respect, the 
interpretation of the challenges and limitations is conducive to a more dialectic understanding 
of the ILCC in global governance, and it is also useful in predicting the possible scenarios in 
the development of the ILCC in a more realistic and reasonable manner. 
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CHAPTER 3. THEORY APPLICATION – THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF “INTERNATIONAL 
LEADERSHIP WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS” 
AS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
As shown in the research objective and research question outlined in Chapter 2, the 
“international leadership with Chinese characteristics” (ILCC) is seen as the core concept of 
the project. Therefore, this section has twofold objectives: (1) to review the existing research 
on international leadership in a general sense, and (2) to construct an analytical framework for 
“international leadership with Chinese characteristics” based on this review. 
3.1. THE EXISTING RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL 
LEADERSHIP  
In the context of international relations, leadership has long been an under-researched and self-
evident concept (Ren, 2017). The situation is manifested in some scholars’ arguments; Joseph 
Nye, for example, considers that we still lack a consensus definition regarding international 
leadership (Nye, 2008: 21). In the same vein, Oran Young also argues that “international 
leadership is a complex phenomenon, ill-defined, poorly understood, and subject to recurrent 
controversy among students of international affairs” (Young, 2001: 1). This section reviews 
several representative pieces of research on international leadership in the mainstream Western 
academic community as well as emerging explorations of international leadership in the context 
of China’s rise more specifically. 
3.1.1. WESTERN MAINSTREAM RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL 
LEADERSHIP  
From the behavioristic perspective, Oran Young argues that leadership refers to “the actions of 
individuals who endeavor to solve or circumvent the collective action problems that plague the 
efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains in processes of institutional bargaining” (Young, 
1991: 285). Specifically, he further classifies international leadership into three major types: 
structural leadership, entrepreneur leadership, and intellectual leadership. Structural leadership 
refers to the ability of a leader to transform their material possessions into bargaining leverage 
in order to reach agreement during institutional bargaining. Entrepreneurial leadership indicates 
the negotiating skill possessed by a leader to frame issues, promote coordinative bargaining, 
and integrate various deals with the purpose of formulating international regimes. Intellectual 
 84 
leadership implies the leader’s production of intellectual capital to shape the perception of 
participants and has a determining influence on the establishment of international institutions. 
This categorization shows that Young’s research on international leadership has little to say in 
the areas of international institution building and international bargaining and, hence, is unable 
to provide an inclusive definition of international leadership (Chen, Zhou and Wang, 2018). 
Similar to Young’s categorization, John Ikenberry has also proposed three types of international 
leadership: structural leadership, institutional leadership, and situational leadership (Ikenberry, 
1996). According to Ikenberry, structural leadership indicates that some states make good use 
of the distribution of material capabilities, using them to their advantage to shape the 
international political and economic order (Ikenberry, 1996). In this regard, the relevant 
concepts of “hegemonic stability theory” (Gilpin, 1987), “hegemonic leadership” (Wiener, 
1995), and “world leadership” (Modelski, 1987) share common ground in suggesting that 
leadership is rooted in the distribution of power. Institutional leadership refers to the capabilities 
of leaders to materialize performances, rules, and principles as institutions for ensuring the 
continuity of interstate relations, facilitating concerted action, and realizing mutual interest. The 
most representative interpretation of institutional leadership is Robert Keohane’s “neoliberal 
institutionalism theory”, proposed in the era of declining American hegemony (Keohane, 1984). 
Situational leadership refers to the ability of leaders to seize opportunities to initiate actions, 
promote cooperation, and shape international order. In this regard, this type of leadership shares 
some similarities with Oran Young’s “entrepreneurial leadership”. Similar to Robert Keohane, 
Ikenberry finally points out that the future of American international leadership lies in the 
resilience of the existing US-led institutional arrangements against the backdrop of the relative 
decline of US material capabilities. 
From the power perspective, Nye argues that hard power and soft power are major sources for 
establishing leadership (Nye, 2008). Based on this view, we can deduce that the above-
mentioned structural leadership relies on hard power, and institutional/entrepreneur/situational 
leadership results from soft power. Moreover, on the basis of the nature and various definitions 
of hard power and soft power, Nye articulates the distinct differences between transactional 
leadership and transformational leadership. On the one hand, transactional leadership is the 
capability of leaders to take advantage of its hard power to mobilize followers in terms of 
material interest. On the other hand, transformational leadership is the ability of leaders to make 
good use of its soft power to induce followers to prioritize the purposes of the group on the 
basis of common expectations and moral principles. 
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3.1.2. RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN THE 
CONTEXT OF CHINA’S RISE 
The above research on international leadership is obviously Western-centric and embedded in 
the Western (American) experience and practice. China has not yet officially and explicitly 
announced that it is assuming a leadership role in international relations. However, due to 
China’s increasing significance in global politics and the global economy, and its proactive 
participation in global governance, this thesis argues that China is already exhibiting a pattern 
of international leadership in a number of issue-areas. Against this backdrop, a number of 
Chinese scholars have begun to discuss international leadership from various perspectives, and 
most of the research, more or less, reflects Chinese thinking on the construction and 
implementation of international leadership. 
From the perspective of multilateralism, Pang Zhongying argues that one leading state is 
currently an initiator, supporter, or accelerator of international collective action, and he points 
out that ineffective multilateralism is usually caused by a lack of international leadership. In 
this regard, Pang believes that strong shared or collective international leadership is urgently 
required in the era of post-American hegemony, and that China can play an important role in 
this type of international leadership (Pang, 2010). From the perspective of international norms, 
Yan Xuetong claims that the prevailing type f international leadership influences the principle 
of international interaction between states through three mechanisms in terms of example-
imitation, support-reinforcement, and punishment-maintenance. These principles of 
international interaction ultimately evolve into an international norm. Moreover, Yan predicts 
that the competition for leadership between China and the United States will be more beneficial 
than harmful to the world, and that “China and the United States should demonstrate to the 
world the advantages of their different leadership” (Yan, 2011b).  
By accounting for the indicators of the number of leaders, the purpose of leadership, and the 
style of leadership, etc., Chen Zhimin (2018) and his colleagues make a detailed categorization 
of various types of leadership through the analysis of the China-led Belt and Road Initiative. 
Having undertaken a comparative study between American and Chinese leadership models on 
the basis of this categorization, Chen et a. propose the concept of “facilitative leadership” as a 
new model of international leadership and argue that “facilitative leadership is the most proper 
type for China in the near future” (Z. Chen et al., 2018: 25). Specifically, Chen and his 
colleagues interpret “facilitative leadership” in terms of its collective, attractive, win-win, and 
empowering features (Z. Chen et al., 2018: 18-21). By focusing on the specific case of the G20, 
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Ren Xiao (2017) argues that China and global governance are in a relationship of mutual 
reliance and mutual necessity, i.e., “China has an important role to play in global governance, 
and global governance needs a larger role for China” (X. Ren, 2017: 433). However, Ren also 
points out that Chinese “culture” leads China to prefer to take a low profile, placing an emphasis 
on partnerships in its rhetoric to publicly announce its role as an international leader. In this 
respect, the thesis argues that Ren’s understanding of Chinese culture reflects the nature of the 
State of Equilibrium and Harmony and the Yin-Yang Dialectics. Nevertheless, according to 
Ren, it cannot be denied that China is taking a  leadership role in the G20 in terms of forging a 
partnership for structural reform, improving global financial governance, institutionalizing the 
coordination of the G20 trade and investment policy, formulating guiding principles for global 
investment, and co-leading the ratification process of the Paris Agreement on climate change 
(X. Ren, 2017: 438-440). 
3.1.3. FOUR MAJOR REFLECTIONS ON THE EXISTING RESEARCH ON 
INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP  
Having reviewed the literature of international leadership in both Western and Chinese 
academic communities in the previous section, four major reflections can be abstracted and 
articulated as follows. 
The first major reflection is the identification of three key elements of international leadership 
as power, interest, and vision. First, power is an essential component of international leadership. 
Used to exert effective leadership in international relations, power should be appropriately 
understood (hard power, soft power, or smart power) and exercised (reward or punishment), 
according to the situation. In other words, the way in which power is exercised shapes the 
interstate relationship and determines the success or failure of international leadership. Second, 
the interest of international leadership refers to the provision of public goods to other states. It 
emphasizes the leader’s capability and willingness to transform its superiority in the distribution 
of material power into regional and global public goods for other countries to gain free ride. 
Third, the construction and dissemination of vision is regarded as another significant element 
for effective leadership in international relations. A leading country either enforces (by applying 
its hard power) a specific vision on other countries or persuades (by virtue of its soft power) 
the others to accept or follow its vision. 
The second major reflection is made on the basis of Chinese scholars’ debates about the Chinese 
model or style of international leadership in the context of China’s rise. Specifically, this 
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reflection is manifested in two aspects. First, three key elements of international leadership, 
power, interest, and vision, are clearly observed in the majority of Chinese scholars’ discussions 
and research. Second, based on their various interpretations of how these elements should be 
understood and manipulated, they reach a consensus that China is gradually practising and 
shaping China-based types/styles of leadership in international relations as opposed to the 
traditional Western/American ones. For example, compared to the United States’ reliance on 
its (political, economic, military) coercive power, to varying degrees, to preserve its 
hierarchical leadership throughout various administrations (from Bill Clinton to Donald Trump), 
China is inclined to wield its material superiority to attract, rather than to enforce, potential 
partners to be involved in an inclusive network under its horizontal leadership (Chen, Zhou and 
Wang, 2018). 
The third major reflection is Chinese scholars’ understanding of the concept of “leadership”. In 
Chinese, the concept of “leadership” (领导) has a number of various connotations, such as 
leader (领导者 ), hegemony (领导权 ), the leading class (领导阶层 ), and leadership 
ability/skills (领导能力/才干), etc. In this respect, by examining Chinese scholars’ research on 
China’s international leadership from a myriad of perspectives, it is argued that they share a 
common ground of understanding and interpreting the concept of leadership as a sort of 
ability/skill rather than a position or status. As a consequence, compared to traditional Western-
based conceptualizations of international leadership or hegemony, the thesis argues that this 
ability/skill-based understanding of leadership leads to new interpretations of China’s 
leadership role in global governance. 
Last but not least, on the basis of the previous reflections, the last major reflection aims to 
provide a complementary means of conceptualizing and interpreting China’s leadership role in 
IR and global governance to the existing theoretical approaches. Therefore, this thesis has the 
following goals: (1) the abstraction of the logic of relationality (3.2.1) from relational theory 
and relevant research; (2) the redefinition (3.2.2) of power, interest, and vision as relational 
power, relational interest, and relational vision through the logic of relationality; (3) the 
conceptualization (3.2.3) of an analytical framework of “international leadership with Chinese 
characteristics” on the basis the above redefinition, and (4) the design of an empirical analysis 
for verifying/falsifying the proposed analytical framework through the application of role 
theory (3.3). By doing so, it expects to enrich the understanding of international leadership by 
reflecting the Chinese ontological assumptions of IR (ontological reflection), achieving full 
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engagement with the selected theories, answering the research questions, making a conceptual 
conclusion, and responding to the knowledge gap, etc. 
3.2. THE APPLICATION OF RELATIONAL THEORY 
As previously discussed in Chapter 2 (Research Design), the three major features of Chinese 
ontological assumptions of IR are identified as relationality, inclusiveness, and processuality. 
In the meanwhile, the thesis’ proposition of relational theory aims to fill the conspicuous gap 
in mainstream IR theories in terms of their neglect of “relations”. According to Qin, “processes 
and relations are two important factors in the Chinese socio-cultural context and key concepts 
of Chinese political philosophy” (Qin, 2009: 6). Thus, the thesis argues that relational theory is 
an appropriate lens of reflecting the major features of Chinese ontological assumptions of IR 
and provideing the logic of relationality to define the concepts of relational power, relational 
interest, and relational vision and conceptualize the analytical framework of “international 
leadership with Chinese characteristics” (ILCC). 
3.2.1. THE LOGIC OF RELATIONALITY/GUANXI 
According to Qin, one of the major reasons why there is no Chinese IR theory is “the absence 
of a theoretical hard core” (Qin, 2007: 322). The hard core, or the nucleus, of a social theory 
consists of two components: the substantive component and the metaphysical one. The former 
is related to the material world and plays a role of perception, and the latter is related to the 
speculative world and plays a role of conception (Qin, 2016: 34). To be more specific, the 
substantive hard core is normally manifested in the verifiable/falsifiable theoretical hypotheses 
on the basis of the observable empirical experience, whereas the metaphysical hardcore is 
closely associated with certain cultural contexts in terms of history, world outlook, universal 
vision, intellectual tradition, and way of thinking (Qin, 2009). Of the two components, Qin 
argues that the metaphysical part is particularly important as it “produces the ontological 
essence” and “defines a distinct social theory” (Qin, 2007: 327). Based on this presupposition, 
compared to Western mainstream IR theories which have rationality as their common hard core, 
Qin defines relationality as the theoretical hard core of relational theory. 
Relational theory endows relationality with ontological significance and defines relational 
orientation as one of the basic features of Chinese society. According to Qin, relational 
orientation emphasizes the overall environment in a complex relational system (a relational 
web), and individuals change along with the change in their relations (Qin, 2009: 15). The 
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relational orientation further leads Qin to interpret a number of concepts, such as relational 
power, relational identity, relational governance, and relational international system, etc.  
- Relational power means that a state’s power results from its relational circles and the state 
can make use of its relational circles to accumulate its prestige and reputation, which can 
be seen as the intangible type of power (Qin, 2016: 42).  
- Relational identity not only refers to the identity of an individual being defined in terms of 
their positioning in the complex relational web, but also indicates the identity is “multifold, 
interactive and changeable along with practice” (Qin, 2009: 16). 
- Relational governance, as an alternative and a complementary governing pattern to rule-
based governance, refers to the management of “complex relationships in a community to 
produce order so that members behave in a reciprocal and cooperative manner with mutual 
trust evolved over a shared understanding of social norms and human morality” (Qin, 2011: 
133). 
- Relational international system, unlike the atomistic system depicted by mainstream IR 
theories, is seen as a “relational system, a system of complex relations rather than individual 
actors” (Qin, 2016: 44). 
Through the interpretation of these concepts, the logic of relationality is observed in three 
dimensions. First, whether states’ action is rational or not is judged on the basis of their 
relational totality or social context. In this respect, the logic of relationality triumphs over the 
logic of instrumental rationality (consequences) and the logic of normative rationality 
(appropriateness). In other words, social relationships define what is rational and appropriate 
(Qin, 2016: 38). Second, states actively take advantage of their relational circles to reach their 
instrumental goals in terms of material and nonmaterial gains. Material gains refers to the state’s 
national interest, and the latter indicates the state’s social capital as reputation and prestige. 
Driven by the logic of relationality, states typically prioritize long-term intangible and 
nonmaterial gains through the maintenance and cultivation of their relations with others over 
merely seeking short-sighted, egoistic benefits (Qin, 2016: 38). Third, in line with the logic of 
relationality, states strive to accomplish social order through the utilization of their relational 
circles and stress the significance of collective agency in a cultural community. In this respect, 
harmony is seen as the ultimate ideal type of (international) society and it “does not mean to 
converge all members of a society into a homogeneous one, but to manage relations among 
these members in such a way that their differences will not lead to conflict and disorder, but on 
the contrary, can add up to stability” (Qin, 2016: 39). 
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Furthermore, relationality, as an English term, normally reminds Chinese people of its 
counterpart in the Chinese language, Guanxi (关系). As an indispensable element in Chinese 
culture, guanxi has been studied and defined from a myriad of perspectives. Luo Yadong has 
labeled guanxi as  “the lifeblood of all things Chinese – business, politics, and society” (Luo, 
1997: 45). From a political perspective, Lucian Pye, a famous American political scientist and 
sinologist, defined guanxi as “one of the most fundamental aspects of Chinese political behavior” 
(Pye, 1995: 35). From a philosophical perspective, according to Jia Wenshan, guanxi is depicted 
as a central philosophical concept that “reflects the Chinese way to know about reality 
(ontology), the Chinese way to interpret reality (phenomenology), and the Chinese values about 
humanity (axiology)” (Jia, 2006: 49-54). From a practical perspective, guanxi is often 
interpreted as the “establishment and maintenance of an intricate and pervasive relational 
network engendered by the practice of unlimited exchange of favors between its members and 
bound by reciprocal obligation, assurance, and mutuality” (Pye, 1982: 882; Luo, 1997: 44).  
Based on these definitions, the nature of guanxi is identified as interdependence, mutuality, and 
reciprocity or “reciprocal obligation” (Barbalet, 2015: 1046). Guanxi emphasizes social 
relations and sees relations as “ends in and of themselves rather than means for realizing various 
individual goals” (Tsui & Farh, 1997: 61; Farh et al., 1998: 473). Given the complexity and 
dynamics of external circumstances and situations, the maintenance of guanxi relationships 
demands “ongoing adaptations from all those involved in its webs of reciprocal implication” 
(Kavalski, 2018). The significance of maintaining a long-term guanxi relationship is manifested 
in the increase of predictability by “lowering the transaction costs, ensuring the peaceful 
resolution of conflict, and aiding the ability to engage an ever-changing world” (Kavalski, 
2018). In light of these interpretations of the nature of guanxi, Emilian Kavalski has recently 
proposed the logic of guanxi (2018). In this thesis, it is argued that Kavalski’s logic of guanxi 
and Qin’s logic of relationality are mutually complementary and echoing, and they express the 
same idea in different words, beautifully (异曲同工之妙). Being similar to the interpretation 
of the logic of relationality, the logic of guanxi also contains three major components: (1) its 
harmonious respect for the other; (2) its logic of relationship; (3) its community of practice 
(Kavalski, 2018). 
Qin emphasizes that harmony in diversity is not achieved through the convergence of all 
members into a homogeneous one (Qin, 2016); in a similar vein, Kavalski defines respect for 
the other as the “cardinal value” of harmony. According to Barbalet, the implicit meaning of 
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“respect for the other” refers to “non-willful actions directed to realizing the potential events 
and others, and is action that animates others to act on their own behalf” (Barbalet, 2011: 342-
347). Premised on this understanding of “harmonious respect for the other”, Kavalski further 
interprets the nature of harmony as both a pattern of order and a sort of interaction (Kavalski, 
2018). As a pattern of order, harmony is built upon reciprocal relationships and it emphasizes 
the dedicated cultivation of connectivity. As an interaction, harmony is maintained on the basis 
of actors’ intentional commitments to exercise self-restraint and allay the concerns of other 
actors. This establishment of harmonious order and maintenance of harmonious interaction “is 
not about the intentional projection of self-interest, but about strategic receptivity” (Kavalski, 
2018: 242). In this respect, harmonious order and harmonious interaction are shaped and 
mediated by the ethical responsibilities characterized by the awareness of coexistence and the 
practices of sharing a relational global life (Kavalski & Cho, 2015). In sum, an international 
actor, following guanxi’s philosophy of harmonious respect for the other, aims to cultivate its 
reputation profile on the world stage (Kavalski, 2018), to acquire and expand its social 
resources (Barbalet, 2015: 1044), and to enhance its trustworthiness by “meeting the 
expectations of others” (Ho, 1976: 873). 
The logic of relationships is another significant component of guanxi. As with Qin’s logic of 
relationality, Kavalski’s logic of relationships also provides another perspective for defining 
the concepts of power and practice and framing “future patterns of interaction” (Kavalski, 2018) 
in a non-material manner. The logic of relationships emphasizes the continuity of relationships 
and sees it as the minimum meaning of “mutual benefit”. In this respect, the logic of 
relationships favors the longevity of a relationship over the pursuit of immediate gains 
(Kavalski, 2018). The longevity of a relationship is achieved through “an active, committed, 
and responsible involvement in world affairs” (Kavalski, 2018: 243) and through reciprocity 
rather than equality of exchanges (Womack, 2008: 295-297). The involvement and reciprocity 
demonstrate the significance of interaction through which the likelihood of future relations is 
facilitated and shared understandings are shaped rather than imposed as rules and obligations 
(Kavalski, 2018).  
Finally, guanxi’s community of practice motivates shared meaning-generation and engenders 
the reputational profile of participants (Kavalski, 2018). Community of practice emphasizes the 
establishment and maintenance of “a set of particular international relationships with concrete 
obligations rather than the application of abstract norms to cases” (Womack, 2008: 265; 
Kavalski, 2017: 234). For this purpose, community of practice helps “stimulate new and 
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contextual definitions of the ‘common good’ and reveal a new way of being present in the world” 
(Kavalski, 2018: 245). Above all, respect for the other, the logic of relationships, and 
community of practice together spell “a longer-term horizon for relations than the short-term 
gains espoused by mainstream IR” (Kavalski, 2018: 245). 
3.2.2. REDEFINITION OF THE KEY COMPONENTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP THROUGH THE LOGIC OF 
RELATIONALITY 
As shown in Section 3.1.3 above, three key elements of international leadership are identified 
as power, interest, and vision. One of the central arguments of the project indicates that this 
different way of defining these elements shapes and leads to the different conceptualization 
and interpretation of international leadership. Hence, as shown in Figure 3.1, the project 
redefines these elements as relational power, relational interest, and relational vision through 
the logic of relationality/guanxi. 
 
Figure 3.1 Redefinition of the components of international leadership through the logic of relationality 
(source: the author’s compilation) 
3.2.2.1 Relational power 
By reviewing the existing literatures on power in political science and IR, two major approaches 
to power are identified as the “substantive power” approach and “relational power” approach. 
The former sees power as a possession or property. Nye’s conceptualization of hard power 
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(economic capability, military force, and population size, etc.) and soft power (political 
institution, cultural appeal, and diplomatic skill, etc.) belongs to this “power-as-resource” 
approach. The latter conceives of power as a type of causation or a relationship between actors. 
In this relationship, the behavior of A is the cause of the behavior of B. In this respect, Dahl’s 
definition of power as “command” and Lukes’ understanding of power as “manipulation” are 
considered as manifestations of “relational power”. 
However, compared to the Western (Dahl’s and Lukes’) interpretations of a causal or linear 
logic, relational power is illustrated in a more circular manner through the above-mentioned 
logic of relationality/guanxi, thus, it contains broader connotations and implications. As Qin 
argues, relational power means that “power comes from relations, or simply, relations are power” 
(Qin, 2016: 41). Moreover, according to Melody Chong and her colleagues, “guanxi can 
become a source of power to a leader and also influence the leader’s attitudes and behavior in 
ways different from the position power or personal power of an agent as identified in the 
Western power literature” (Chong, Fu, & Shang, 2013: 56). In this respect, being distinct from 
the substantive type of power, relational power is interpreted as a process during which one’s 
relational circles are under constant manipulation and management in one’s favor (Hwang, 
1987). The effective manipulation and management of one’s relational circles lead to the gain 
and accumulation of mianzi/reputation – a major manifestation of relational power. In the field 
of IR, mianzi is so significant that it influences the acceptance rates of one country’s initiative 
by other international actors. Therefore, as Figure 3.2 below shows, the project argues that a 
country cultivates its relational power through two major channels: (1) the self-restraint of its 
own power in order to maintain its relational circles with others; (2) its empowerment of others 
in terms of creating opportunities for increasing the others’ sense of importance and providing 
development assistance for strengthening the others’ capacity building. 
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Figure 3.2 Relational power 
(source: the author’s compilation) 
One state’s self-restraint of power is the foundation of securing its relational circles and 
obtaining its relational power. Normally, great asymmetric material power possessed by one 
state results in panic and uneasiness in others. If one state refuses to limit the abuse of its 
asymmetric power, it risks provoking negative responses from others who feel they are being 
manipulated or victimized. Even worse, relational circles between states may be weakened and 
collapse. Thus, with the purpose of maintaining its relational circles, it is necessary for the state 
that has huge material advantages to consciously self-restrain its power and bind itself to the 
other states through institutions or legal agreements. Nevertheless, one state’s self-restraint of 
power does not mean the absolute reduction of its power, rather it requires the state to figure 
out a grand strategy for exercising its power in a less threatening manner in the eyes of the 
others. In doing so, the state’s self-restraint of power contributes to the decrease of fear and 
suspicion among other states and prevents the deterioration or collapse of relational circles 
between them, eventually leading to the state’s accumulation of relational power. 
However, as mentioned above, the cultivation of one state’s relational power also stems from 
its empowerment of others in terms of (1) increasing the others’ sense of importance and (2) 
strengthening their capacity building. First, generally, empowerment refers to the mitigation or 
removal of barriers and the construction of a favorable environment which encourages the 
participants to make meaningful contributions to and be fully involved in common projects. In 
the field of IR, empowerment indicates that one state shares its power and responsibilities with 
others and creates sufficient conditions for others to be involved in the process of 
communication, coordination, and decision-making on regional and global affairs. In addition, 
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as Chen argues, empowerment means that one state “cannot impose its solutions onto other 
countries, and should respect and encourage the primary role of other states in managing their 
own problems and participating in international issues” (Z. Chen et al., 2018: 21). By doing so, 
the state grants the others a sense of justice and importance, and this is conducive to the 
maintenance and improvement of their relational circles. 
Second, empowerment in IR also denotes one state’s efforts and willingness to use its material 
superiority as an essential support for the capacity building of others. As a famous Chinese 
saying goes, “giving the method of fishing is better than giving fish” (授之以鱼不如授之以
渔). In doing so, one state helps the others develop their own problem-solving capabilities in 
addressing further challenges and building their capacities to develop their economies 
sustainably. This logic of empowerment is clearly reflected in the Chinese idea and policy of 
providing foreign development aid (FDA) to developing countries and the least developed 
countries (LDCs). Specifically, China’s FDA mainly focuses on the recipients’ development 
without attaching any political conditionality, and it does not aim to transform their political 
and economic systems into so-called universal “good governance” models. From this 
perspective, compared to the traditional model of hegemonic power, an empowerment-focused 
China can be seen as a horizontal instructor in global governance, and China’s attitude and 
policies are thus more readily accepted by others. 
3.2.2.2 Relational interest 
This thesis redefines interest using the Chinese logic of relationality/guanxi, in a similar way 
to the redefinition of the concept of relational power in the previous section. As mentioned 
above, in the Chinese context, the core of relationality or guanxi is the construction and 
maintenance of relational circles. Thus, the concept of relational interest is understood as a 
symbiotic/co-existent relationship between self-interest and others’ interest. In other words, 
relational interest indicates that individual/self-interest is always closely associated with 
collective/others’ interest, and it is normally realized through an emphasis on and search for the 
common interest rather than as an absolute zero-sum game. Specifically, in line with the logic 
of relationality/guanxi, as shown in Figure 3.3 below, relational interest is realized in two major 
ways: one is in the reconstruction of interest, and the other is in an emphasis on inclusive growth. 
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Figure 3.3 Relational interest 
(source: the author’s compilation) 
One way of realizing relational interest is through the reconstruction of interest. The possibility 
of reconstructing interest lies in the open, dependent, dynamic, and negotiable features of 
interest. Owing to the profound changes in the global market system and international security 
structure, no country can now realize its interest in isolation, and it is also impossible for one 
country to continuously maintain interest in its original form. In the contemporary world, few 
countries can protect their interest in a closed and stagnant way, no matter whether the country 
is a small one or a superpower. In the long term, a country’s ignorance of the open, dynamic, 
and dependent features of interest and its failure to achieve interest reconstruction usually leads 
to the shrinkage and loss of its national interest. The openness and dynamics of interest 
reconstruction are ultimately manifested in the interdependence of interest between countries, 
especially between major powers. In this regard, the most effective way of reconstructing 
interest is to emphasize the interdependence of (economic, security, social) interest. Openness 
in international relations and the mobility of transnational capital both contribute to the 
reconstruction of interest. 
Moreover, interest reconstruction largely results from the emergence of new cooperation areas. 
New cooperation areas are largely manifested in a number of emerging problems and challenges 
in “global governance systems”. More specifically, the emergence of new cooperation areas 
has resulted from the following situations. First, it has been impossible for the traditional 
international system to fully accommodate the dramatic development of globalization. For 
example, there are increasing calls for the reform of the international monetary system and 
global economic governance (Zhou, 2009; Caliari, 2011). Second, owing to the rapid 
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development of science and technology, human activities have expanded to some areas that 
were previously inaccessible. These areas, including space, deep sea, and polar, urgently require 
the creation of new operational and management rules. Third, the rise of uncontrolled and 
unsustainable problems, such as resources shortages, ecological deterioration, and climate 
change, are seen as common challenges/threats for all mankind. This situation requires that all 
countries, particularly the great powers, shoulder their respective responsibilities. Fourth, the 
development of networks and the global flow of information has led to serious network security 
and hacking problems. These security issues, together with transnational criminal networks, 
have become major challenges for global governance. However, according to Chinese 
dialectics, the Chinese word weiji [危机] (wei means the challenges and ji refers to the 
opportunities) indicates the coexistence of challenges and opportunities. In this respect, the 
emerging problems are not only challenges that are common to different countries, but they 
also create new opportunities for countries to seek out common ground for cooperation and 
interest reconstruction. 
Relational interest is also realized through the achievement of inclusive growth. According to 
the American economic historian Rostow, social development can be divided into five stages: 
the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the 
age of high mass consumption (Rostow, 1959). In this respect, countries, at different 
development stages, inevitably choose their own development models and priorities, such as 
the development of innovation capabilities, the optimization of their industrial structure, or the 
increase of productive inputs, etc. This situation inevitably leads to policy contradictions and 
strategic conflicts between countries. China’s consistent advocacy of inclusive growth aims to 
overcome these contradictions and conflicts. Specifically, China is focusing on the reform of 
the international economic order currently dominated by the developed countries and the 
establishment of a new one that brings the benefits of economic globalization to all countries, 
regions, and people. This new order is built upon principles of fairness and reasonableness, 
mutual reliance, common interests, and cooperation. In this new world order, countries have 
the freedom to adopt the appropriate economic growth modes for their particular circumstances, 
and this diversity of economic growth modes contributes to the dynamics of the world economy 
and promotes a situation of “harmony but not sameness”.  
Furthermore, inclusive growth also highlights “common development” or “common 
prosperity”. According to the Chinese experience, development is an effective prescription for 
addressing a series of social problems including social inequality and social instability. In this 
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regard, at the international and global level, the realization of common development is an 
effective prescription for problems of global inequality and regional instability. The provision 
of public goods characterized by non-excludability and non-rivalry and other empowering 
practices are seen as appropriate ways of achieving common development or common 
prosperity.  
3.2.2.3 Relational vision 
In this thesis, as Figure 3.4 below shows, relational vision has inclusive and ethical features 
embodied in its mechanism of formation and dissemination. First, the inclusive feature of 
relational vision is mainly manifested in its formation and dissemination through 
communicative consensus. Relational vision implies that all of the participants are involved in 
the process of seeking a shared vision in a communicative and interactive way, and the shared 
vision functions as a driving force for their collaboration. In this regard, shared vision is 
understood as a socialized vision, i.e. a vision established between participants, rather than 
considered as an individual vision announced and promoted by a hegemonic country. In this 
respect, relational vision, seen as socialized vision or shared vision, means that all participants 
are encouraged to take part in the process of shaping a vision that provides a “realistic, credible, 
attractive future” (Nanus, 1992: 8). Moreover, in relational vision, differences and variations 
between participants are not eliminated, rather, the role of creativity and energy, brought about 
by these differences and variations, in the construction of shared vision is emphasized. 
 
Figure 3.4 Relational vision 
(source: the author’s compilation) 
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Second, from the ethical perspective, relational vision is closely associated with issues of values 
and standards, since ethics is understood as “the principles of conduct” or “standards of 
behavior” (Shea, 1988) that govern a profession. Values, as a form of ethics, are regarded as 
the guiding principles in relation to the desired social ends (Kouzes and Posner, 1993). In this 
respect, relational vision aims to construct or reconstruct shared values and to take advantage 
of them as “sources of motivation for the exertions required of the group” (Gardner, 1990: 191). 
For a long time, Western values have played a dominant role in the field of IR and are 
considered as the accepted “standards of behavior”. However, with the rise of the emerging 
powers and the power transition from the west to the east, the hegemonic status of Western 
values has been challenged and a greater diversity of values is increasingly being appreciated. 
Against this background, the reconstruction of values has been placed on the agenda of world 
politics. For China, the reconstruction of values implies neither a complete reproduction of the 
Western “universal value system” nor complete discarding of the existing values accumulated 
and tested during the long evolution of the world system. As a builder of global governance, 
China provides the dynamics and innovative ideas for the reconstruction of the value system of 
contemporary international relations (R. Huang, 2013).  
Along with the ethical characteristic of relational vision, shared vision/values are also formed 
and disseminated by means of emulation. In other words, one country’s vision or values are 
voluntarily accepted and embraced by others. In this respect, it is implied that some countries, 
intentionally or unintentionally, play an exemplary role of “showing others by their own 
example that they live by the values that they profess” (Kouzes & Posner, 1987: 134) or simply 
by “modeling the way”. In the context of IR and global governance, “modeling the way” does 
not mean that an exact copy is imposed in  the hierarchical relationship between a hegemon and 
other states, but it refers to “a medium of diffusion of normative principles that serve as the 
ground to develop novel governance, policy and legislation thinking and performances” 
(Vangeli, no date). In other words, unlike the hegemon’s imposition of its hegemonic visions, 
values, and codes of conduct on other states, relational vision emphasizes that the diffusion of 
vision, values, and norms is “to a great extent a voluntary process, which depends on the 
demand side of the interaction” (Vangeli, no date). 
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3.2.3. THE PROPOSED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: THE 
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF “INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP WITH 
CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS” 
In response to the research objective and research question, this section aims to conceptualize 
the “international leadership with Chinese characteristics” (ILCC) for investigating the nexus 
between the rise of China and global governance. Specifically, the conceptualization of the 
ILCC is achieved on the basis of three major considerations, as follows. 
First and foremost, as one central argument of the project implies, the diverse ways of defining 
the core elements of international leadership (power, interest, and vision) shape and lead to the 
various conceptualizations and interpretations of international leadership. Thus, the 
conceptualization of the ILCC largely benefits from the concepts of relational power, relational 
interest, and relational vision defined through the Chinese logic of relationality/guanxi. In other 
words, these three newly-defined concepts play a heuristic role of interpreting the formation 
and performance of international leadership on the basis of Chinese culture and political thought.  
Second, as discussed in the first chapter, in the context of Chinese culture, the legitimacy of 
leadership is mainly derived from the Chinese understanding of meritocracy and performance 
legitimacy. As Coicaud argued, meritocracy is rooted in performance legitimacy suggesting 
that the fact that “the government has an obligation to improve the people’s material well-being 
and intellectual/moral development is a central part of the Confucian tradition” (Coicaud, 2017: 
26). In this respect, according to Chinese culture and philosophical ideas, the ideas of 
meritocracy and performance legitimacy place a strong emphasis on the significance of ability 
in shaping a legitimate leadership. Therefore, this thesis conceptualizes the framework of the 
ILCC through an ability-based understanding of leadership rather than a position-based one. 
Third, in line with Chinese ontological assumptions of IR, the ILCC is also characterized by 
processuality and inclusiveness. In relational theory, process refers to “on-going interactive 
relations, embedded in social practice and producing social meaning” (Qin, 2009: 9). The major 
roles of process are identified as: (1) generating norms and rules; (2) constituting meaning for 
interaction between states; (3) nurturing collective identity and emotion; (4) building the 
structure of roles in the system; and (5) defining interest and shaping the behavior of actors 
(Qin, 2009: 12-13). In this respect, the ILCC is understood as an inclusive process of social 
influence that is characterized by co-discussion, co-consummation, or co-promotion of 
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cooperative issues and common concerns through interactions between the participants and 
relevant stakeholders. 
In sum, by virtue of the above three conditions, as shown in Figure 3.5 below, the ILCC is 
conceptualized as a triad analytical framework that consists of three manifestations of 
leadership: facilitative leadership, constructive leadership, and exemplary leadership. Before 
interpreting each of them in more detail, it is worth mentioning that, from the perspective of 
semantics, the three manifestations of the ILCC are likely to be considered as different 
leadership styles. However, the essence of these so-called leadership styles should be 
understood as different varieties of leadership ability that influence the construction and 
implementation of the ILCC. 
 
Figure 3.5 Conceptualization of “International leadership with Chinese characteristics” 
(source: the author’s compilation) 
3.2.3.1 Facilitative leadership 
Facilitative leadership is one manifestation of the ILCC. The project borrows and refines the 
concept of facilitative leadership proposed and articulated by Chen Zhimin (2018). In light of 
Chen’s idea, as shown in Figure 3.6 below, the project interprets facilitative leadership through 
its three major features – collectiveness, inclusiveness, and empowerment. 
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First, the collectiveness of facilitative leadership indicates that the number of leaders is multiple 
rather than single. Compared to the unparalleled dominant positions of the United States and 
Soviet Union in their respective camps during the Cold War, facilitative leadership emphasizes 
that a group, co-operative, or project is co-led by a number of key actors. With the rise of the 
emerging powers and the redistribution of global power, the collectiveness between the 
established powers and the emerging ones represents an irresistible trend. According to Barry 
Naughten, “the world at large would be looking to such a concert of great powers to provide 
collective leadership on global policy issues such as a stable and durable peace, mitigating the 
risk of catastrophic climate change and the prevention of pandemics” (Naughten, 2013: 677). 
Specifically, inspired by relational power, the collectiveness of facilitative leadership is 
manifested in two major aspects. First, China’s self-restraint of its power helps it to relieve 
anxiety and gain trust from other states, generating a peaceful and favorable international and 
neighboring environment for China’s continuous economic development. Second, the 
collectiveness of China’s facilitative leadership places an emphasis on coordination between 
major powers in different issue-areas. This inclusiveness is conducive to the democracy of 
international relations and shape the structure and process of global governance with higher 
representativeness and effectiveness.  
Second, inclusiveness is another important feature of China’s facilitative leadership. The 
inclusiveness of facilitative leadership is mainly derived from interpretations of relational 
interest and relational vision. In this respect, inclusiveness emphasizes the realization of 
inclusive interest/vision rather than individual interest/vision. According to Joseph Stiglitz, one 
manifestation of individual interest can be observed in American leadership, “the United States 
used its leadership to create a globalization that advanced corporate and financial interests in 
America and rich countries; the interests of workers, consumers, and those in emerging markets 
and developing countries were only of secondary concern” (Stiglitz, 2017: 77). In this situation, 
old-fashioned globalization under US leadership aims to consolidate the foundation of the US-
led international system and to expand American asymmetric advantage over other states. In 
addition, examples of individual vision are also manifested in the US-led international system, 
such as the previous hegemonic vision of the Washington Consensus. Conversely, in 
accordance with the inclusiveness of China’s facilitative leadership, the inclusive 
interest/vision attaches great significance to the accomplishment of common development and 
shared vision. Chen, for example, explains that the realization of facilitative leadership “is 
based on the promotion of the win-win development of the leading country and all other 
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countries” (Z. Chen et al., 2018: 20). By doing so, China’s facilitative leadership aims to 
facilitate the emergence and development of a “new and open” globalization, characterized by 
the inclusion and integration of a myriad of interests and visions. 
Third, in addition to collectiveness and inclusiveness, empowerment is another key feature of 
China’s facilitative leadership. To be precise, the feature of empowerment is observed in two 
aspects. First, as exhibited in American international/hegemonic leadership in the post-Cold 
War era, a traditional hierarchical leader tends to take its own experience and ideas as gospel 
truth and impose these “credendum” on others without serious consideration of their specific 
conditions. In this respect, hierarchical leadership can be seen as a sort of patronal leadership 
that accentuates the omnipotence of Western-based policies and values in addressing all 
problems across the world. However, it cannot be denied that different countries have their own 
particular problems and conditions. The empowerment of China’s facilitative leadership, unlike 
hierarchical and patronal leadership, recognizes the primary role of others in addressing their 
own problems. For instance, with the rise of the so-called “Beijing Consensus” or “China 
Model”, China has never sought to force other countries to follow its own mode of governance 
and path of development. China has always respected other countries’ choices for governing 
their political and economic systems. In other words, empowerment leads to a situation in which 
differences between countries are inclusively understood and mutually accommodated. Second, 
the above interpretation of empowerment does not imply China’s ignorance of other countries’ 
problems and difficulties. Rather, China’s facilitative leadership seeks to support others’ 
capability building rather than imposing a specific mode or direction on them. For instance, 
China’s facilitative leadership is manifested in its provision of FDA to African countries 
without any political conditionality. It is believed by China that development, rather than 
democracy, is the basic prerequisite for addressing domestic and global problems. 
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Figure 3.6 Facilitative leadership embedded in the ILCC 
(source: the author’s compilation) 
3.2.3.2 Constructive leadership 
Constructive leadership is another significant manifestation of the ILCC. The thesis’ 
proposition of constructive leadership not only benefits from the concepts of relational power, 
relational interest, and relational vision, but also it is largely inspired by Ren Xiao’s (2017) 
definition of China’s role as a “reform-minded status quo” in global governance. As Figure 3.7 
below shows, China’s constructive leadership comprises three features: institutional 
construction, interest construction, and ideational construction. 
China’s constructive leadership plays a critical role in the institutional construction of global 
governance in two major ways. First, China simultaneously contributes a lot to the 
strengthening and reforming of existing international institutions. Since the introduction of its 
Reform and Opening-up Policy, China has proactively attended the existing international 
institutions and complied with the established rules and norms. In this respect, the existing 
international order has been consolidated by China’s attendance, since the latter is the largest 
developing country. However, the “governance deficits” of the established institutions badly 
hinder the representativeness and effectiveness of the governance system. Due to economic 
globalization, political multi-polarization, and cultural diversity, the existing system of global 
governance is experiencing a significant period of transformation. During this transformation, 
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China’s constructive leadership has been prominent in its advocacy for reform of the existing 
institutions and in requesting more representativeness for developing countries and emerging 
powers. Second, China’s constructive leadership is also manifested in the establishment of new 
international institutions. Given that the emerging powers are deeply “frustrated by the fact that 
the international institutions built in the 1940s and 1950s remain unreformed, and western 
powers still hold sway” (Nougayrede, 2015), China and other emerging powers have taken a 
circuitous route in shifting global governance towards a more representative situation. For 
instance, the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) is allowing the voices of the emerging powers and developing 
countries to be heard. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the use of “constructive”, 
rather than “destructive”, denotes that China’s constructive leadership does not seek to 
overthrow the established international institutions, but aims to construct a more balanced and 
representative international order on the basis of the complementarity between the existing and 
the emerging institutions. 
Interest construction is another vital feature of China’s constructive leadership. Being a double-
edged sword, globalization not only promotes economic growth and technological development, 
but it also generates a large number of non-traditional security problems with global impact. 
Few states can escape the effects of these problems or deal with these challenges on their own, 
and it requires joint coordination between states to address these non-traditional security 
problems. Certainly, these problems/challenges have objectively opened up new areas or 
created new opportunities for countries to find common ground and build common interest. 
With its increasing integration into the existing international system, China has shown a great 
willingness to construct shared interest with other members in the international community, 
since its interests are deeply intertwined with others’. For instance, by virtue of its extraordinary 
political and economic influence, China’s constructive leadership plays a crucial role in 
proposing and implementing the construction of a “community of common interests” (利益共
同体) in various issue-areas. In general, the community of common interests meets the common 
aspiration of addressing the challenges of globalization and achieving economic and social 
development. Thus, with regard to interest construction, China’s constructive leadership is 
prominent in the building of communities of common interests in terms of identifying common 
challenges, proposing constructive solutions, and emphasizing relational interest and inclusive 
growth, etc. 
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Finally, ideational construction is the third feature of China’s constructive leadership 
underneath the ILCC. In an era of deepening globalization and increasing diversity, Western-
based ideas, visions, and values are no longer considered as universal. The rise of the non-
Western powers (Asian Tigers and BRICS) proves that Western-based development ideas and 
values are not omnipotent and are unique (Huntington, 1996). Moreover, the success of the 
non-Western countries has led to the recognition of plural ideas and plural values. In line with 
relational vision, common ideas/visions/values are constructed or reconstructed through 
communication or emulation rather than being solely shaped and imposed by a hegemonic 
power. In this respect, in terms of ideational construction, China’s constructive leadership 
contributes to the proposal of innovative concepts, such as the “community of common destiny” 
(命运共同体), for the discussion and the promotion of people-to-people exchange by sticking 
to the principle of “finding common ground and shelving differences”. 
 
Figure 3.7 Constructive leadership embedded in the ILCC 
(source: the author’s compilation) 
In sum, by reviewing the above three features, it is argued that China’s constructive leadership 
will make a significant contribution to the improvement of global governance in terms of (1) 
making insightful judgments of the overall international situation, consisting of the major 
challenges and the major development trends, (2) contributing innovative/constructive 
proposals to resolve pressing issues and to the reform of the existing global governance system 
on the basis of insightful judgment, (3) promoting the realization of such proposals – the 
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establishment of new institutions and the construction of communities of common 
interest/destiny – by virtue of its material capabilities and political influence. However, it is 
essential to emphasize once again that China’s constructive leadership does not represent a 
subversive power in relation to the existing institutions and arrangements in global governance, 
rather it is more appropriate to define China as a “reform-minded status quo” (Ren, 2017). 
3.2.3.3 Exemplary leadership 
In addition to facilitative leadership and constructive leadership, exemplary leadership is 
another vital manifestation of the ILCC. In Chinese culture, the exemplary role of leader is 
consistently canonized as one of the most effective ways of implementing a benevolent and 
legitimate governance. Amongst the various streams of Chinese ancient beliefs, Confucianism 
attaches great significance to exemplary leadership in state governance. In the Confucian school, 
this type of leadership is mainly illuminated through the concept of Junzi (君子), referring to 
an exemplary or paradigmatic person. According to Guo Xuezhi (2002), the nine major features 
of Junzi can be identified as follows: 
(1) A deep inner sympathy towards other human beings. The junzi personality demonstrates 
consideration for others; (2) a strong sense of honor. The junzi personality implies a strong 
motivation for political success; (3) fearlessness. The junzi personality is founded on strength, 
courage, and determination. It also demonstrates strength of purpose, willpower, and endurance; 
(4) a sense of a strong moral mission. The junzi personality implies a strong personal moral 
mission in pursuing the Way, regardless of possible negative consequences for oneself. The 
junzi personality demonstrates a strong sense of social justice; (5) a pursuit of altruism based 
on the virtue of shu (reciprocity); (6) a capacity for self-restraint; (7) a sense of self-respect; (8) 
a desire for individual autonomy and self-development. This feature also implies a liberality of 
mind; (9) a sense of dignity and integrity. Trustworthiness toward other human beings is central 
to the junzi personality (Guo, 2002: 56).  
Using Guo’s interpretation, Christine Wong (2013) proposes the concept of Junzi leadership, 
and she clarifies the features of Junzi leadership in terms of an awareness of moral obligation, 
a passion for social harmony, and a model for transformation (Wong, 2013: 66-81). These 
features together shape Junzi as an exemplary or paradigmatic person. Junzi leadership has 
inspired the interpretation of China’s exemplary leadership underpinning the ILCC in this thesis. 
As a consequence, in the following paragraphs, we will (1) discuss the features of Junzi 
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leadership according to the interpretations of Confucian scholars, and (2) deliberate the 
implications of Junzi leadership on domestic governance in relation to China’s exemplary 
leadership in global governance. 
First and foremost, Junzi leadership cares a great deal about moral obligation. Junzi, as a moral 
leader, upholds a code of moral conduct that influences the mindset and behavior of others. As 
Shun argues, the Junzi leader is closely associated with an ethical ideal and “someone who has 
approximated the ideal will have affection and reverence for others and will seek actively to 
promote their well-being. This involves not just attending to their material goods, but also 
educating them and helping them and cultivating themselves” (Shun, 1997: 140). In this respect, 
a Junzi leader does not need to gain support by exerting hierarchical and coercive force on their 
followers; on the contrary, potential followers are attracted by and voluntarily follow the 
behavior modelled by the Junzi leader.  
Second, it is argued that Junzi leadership emphasizes the achievement of the collective good 
and the promotion of social harmony. With the purpose of realizing social harmony, the 
concepts of Ren (仁, benevolence), Li (礼, rite), and Zhi (智, wisdom) are considered as the 
indispensable qualities of Junzi leadership. To be more specific, a Junzi leader’s quality of Ren 
stresses that power cannot be abused immorally and it should be understood and implemented 
for the sake of achieving the collective good; a Junzi leader’s quality of Li defines the roles that 
people should play and the relationships through which people should interact with each other, 
and it focuses on the issue of a proper title or “name” (名) by which a leader can be recognized; 
a Junzi leader’s quality of Zhi identifies the appropriate timing for establishing appropriate 
visions for guiding their actions and those of their potential followers.  
Third, the pursuit of social harmony reflects the transformational feature of Junzi leadership. 
Specifically, the transformational role of Junzi leadership is embodied in two ways. On the one 
hand, a Junzi leader is required to keep in mind that they should constantly improve themselves 
through a process of self-transformation. On the other hand, a Junzi leader empowers and 
transforms others, intentionally or unintentionally. A Junzi leader’s role of empowering and 
transforming others is not limited to the provision of material assistance to others, but it can be 
observed in four dimensions: idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual 
stimulation, and individualized consideration (Bass, 1985). To be more precise, idealized 
influence, also known as model setting, is regarded as a mechanism of norm diffusion; 
inspirational motivation refers to the creation of a shared vision for a common future; 
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intellectual stimulation emphasizes the importance of knowledge accumulation and education; 
individualized consideration stresses each individual’s differences and provides opportunities 
for each member’s development and growth in the community. 
Inspired by the above discussion of Junzi leadership, as shown in Figure 3.8 below, this thesis 
identifies the major features of China’s exemplary leadership in the context of international 
relations and global governance as follows: (1) China’s exemplary leadership underneath the 
ILCC is morally orientated (仁) in terms of upholding certain moral standards and being 
responsible for the collective good of all states. Establishing a harmonious world order is one 
of the key demonstrations of the morality of China’s exemplary leadership. Another critical 
moral proof of China’s exemplary leadership is China’s strong sense of self-restraint of its own 
power. This self-restraint echoes the Ren character of Junzi leadership; (2) China’s exemplary 
leadership emphasizes the significance of self-cultivation and self-transformation. During the 
last decade, China’s great economic achievements and social development have gradually 
produced demonstrative effects on other states. In other words, China’s exemplary leadership 
is manifested in the (unintentional) dissemination of its successful experience to others. In this 
respect, it is argued that China’s exemplary leadership unintentionally exerts a certain 
“idealized” influence over others. This “idealized” influence is a process of norm diffusion that 
objectively transforms others; (3) China’s exemplary leadership is also presented as intellectual 
guidance (智). China was an outsider to the Western-based international system before it started 
its program of Reforming and Opening-up. However, today’s successful China has largely 
benefitted from its integration into the existing international order. Thus, on account of China’s 
unique position as the second largest economy of the capitalist system and the largest 
developing country in the South-South cooperation, it is argued that China’s exemplary 
leadership affords it an open-minded understanding of how the regional and global economy 
should be promoted and of how the world should be governed to help the formation and 
development of a long-term vision for the international community. 
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Figure 3.8 Exemplary leadership embedded in the ILCC 
(source: the author’s compilation) 
3.3. THE APPLICATION OF ROLE THEORY 
As shown in the empirical framework established in Section 2.3, China’s leaders’ and decision-
makers’ speeches and statements were chosen as the primary research materials for exploring 
China’s NRC, i.e., the “international leadership with Chinese characteristics” in global 
governance. In this respect, the project identifies Breuning’s model as an appropriate empirical 
tool for achieving this target, since the model provides a relatively comprehensive framework 
that gives due consideration to the structural, agent-based, ideational, and material factors used 
to interpret these speeches and statements. The major function of this model is observed by 
Breuning as follows: 
It seeks to understand how actors fashion their role in the international system, navigating 
between domestic sources of identity and/or cultural heritage, taking advantage of the material 
resources at their disposal, circumnavigating as best as possible the obstacles imposed by their 
position in the international structure. More importantly, it accommodates both domestic and 
international sources of national role conceptions by adopting a cognitive perspective: decision 
makers form their conceptions of their state’s role on the basis of both their understanding of 
the state’s identity and cultural heritage, and their perception of their state’s place and 
possibilities within the international system (Breuning, 2011, p. 26). 
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More precisely, as shown in Figure 3.9 below, China’s NRC embedded in the ILCC will be 
empirically analyzed using the following five elements: 
 
Figure 3.9 Breuning model of role theory 
(source: Breuning, 2011: 26) 
 (1) Identity is considered as the ego aspect of role conception (Breuning, 2011: 26). In this 
thesis, it mainly refers to Chinese decision-makers’ understanding with respect to China’s role 
and function in international relations. Such self-perception can also shape Chinese decision-
makers’ understanding of the collective identity connecting China and other member states in 
the selected cases – G20, BRICS, SCO, and BRI. More importantly, this self-identity and 
collective identity can further shape China’s construction and implementation of the ILCC. For 
instance, Chinese decision-makers’ emphasis on collective identity among the BRICS member 
states influences China’s role of facilitative leadership that was conducive to the establishment 
of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). China’s self-identify, for example, with regard 
to the necessity to transform its model of economic growth, has encouraged China to practise 
its exemplary leadership in reforming its domestic economy and exerting spillover effects on 
other members. In practice, China’s self-identity and its perception of collective identity can be 
revealed by examining Chinese elites’ speeches and statements delivered at summits and other 
significant occasions involving the above-mentioned cases. 
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(2) Cultural heritage indicates the “ego aspects from the state’s history that are, or have been, 
makers of identity” (Breuning, 2011: 26). In China’s case, it refers to Chinese decision-makers’ 
understanding of the relationship between China’s history and culture and its identity. As 
discussed in the ontological part of the thesis (Section 2.1), it is argued that Chinese political 
thought and cultural legacies largely influence China’s understanding of contemporary 
international relations, and they are repeatedly observed in Chinese decision-makers’ speeches 
and statements. To be more specific, in terms of the research question of the thesis, Chinese 
history and its unique cultural heritage clearly shape China’s construction and implementation 
of the ILCC in global governance. 
(3) Domestic audience is understood as domestic popular opinion. As Breuning argues, a 
country’s national role conception is issue-specific, and it is partly due to the influence of the 
domestic audience. With China’s rapid economic development and the rise of the middle class, 
its citizens, especially the intellectual elites, enjoy more freedom to express their ideas and 
(professional) opinions. In this respect, the domestic audience, to some extent, influences 
China’s decision-makers in terms of their understanding and interpretation of international 
affairs. 
(4) Capability refers to the usable power resources, relative to relevant other states (Breuning, 
2011, p. 26). In Breuning’s model, China’s capability indicates Chinese decision-makers’ 
understanding and assessment of China’s economic, technology, and military capabilities for 
dealing with regional or global issues. For instance, Chinese decision-makers’ perceptions of 
China’s material capability influence the way in which China constructs and implements the 
ILCC in global governance. In addition, the way in which Chinese decision-makers understand 
a specific opportunity also influences the extent to which China emphasizes its material 
capability for achieving its target.  
(5) Opportunity to act implies the opportunities afforded by circumstances, whether temporary 
or enduring (Breuning, 2011, p. 26). Opportunities, in this project, comprise the ego aspect of 
NRC and the alter aspect of NRC as the role expectation. From the perspective of the ego aspect 
of NRC, opportunity refers to Chinese decision-makers’ understanding of the international 
situation according to how many opportunities China can seize for exhibiting the ILCC in world 
affairs. For example, against the background of Donald Trump’s retreat from the global 
international stage and his refusal to take international responsibility in various issue-areas, 
Chinese decision-makers see this as a good opportunity to advance China’s global influence. 
 113 
Moreover, from the perspective of the alter aspect of NRC, or the role expectation, opportunity 
implies that other states expect China to play a more proactive role in defending globalization 
and multilateralism and to become an emerging international leader in the invigoration of the 
world’s economic development. Although opportunity, as the component of capability, is seen 
as a component of the material aspect of NRC, it needs to be reinterpreted by Chinese decision-
makers through their speeches and statements. 
In sum, Breuning’s model of role theory, including the above-mentioned five major elements, 
provides an empirical toolkit for collecting data based on the speeches and statements delivered 
by Chinese decision-makers to either verify or falsify the “international leadership with Chinese 
characteristics”. 
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CHAPTER 4. CASE I: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
ILCC IN THE G20 
4.1. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
The birth of the G20 mechanism has a profound historical background. After the Second World 
War, three major international economic organizations, the IMF, the World Bank, and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, came to constitute the cornerstone of global economic 
governance and solidified the dominant position of Western developed countries in global 
economic governance. During that time, the vast number of developing countries were in the 
position of being governed. After the Cold War, the rapid development of economic 
globalization and the rise of a large number of emerging economies prompted the developed 
countries to gradually reach a consensus: effective global economic governance could not be 
achieved without the effective participation of the developing countries and contributions from 
the emerging economies.  
However, the traditional mechanisms of international economic governance, represented by the 
Western-led institutions, have failed to adapt to changes in the global economic situation and 
international economic structure. A small number of developed countries, such as the United 
States, still control the processes of decision-making and agenda setting. This results in 
problems for the developing countries in truly integrating into the core system of international 
economic governance. In this respect, the need to reform  global economic governance mainly 
stems from contradictions between economic globalization and the non-globalization of 
economic management. More precisely, these contradictions are manifested in three aspects: 
(1) the contradiction between the globalization of demand and supply and the non-globalization 
of macroeconomic management, (2) the contradiction between financial globalization and the 
non-globalization of financial management, and (3) the contradiction between the globalization 
of trade and the non-globalization of trade management. These contradictions are seen as the 
major causes of the shock of the financial crisis. 
Against this background, the developed countries carried out a “passive revolution” in terms of 
inviting China, India, Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa to be involved in the discussions at the 
G8 summit and in establishing the G8+5 mechanism. Nevertheless, these measures did not lead 
to the effective reform of the existing Western-dominant order. Thus, given the increasing calls 
for the establishment of a more representative and effective international system, the G20 has 
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gradually become the central component of international economic cooperation and global 
economic governance. More importantly, due to its high representativeness and inclusiveness, 
the G20 better reflects world development trends and has a number of positive implications for 
the existing international system, as follows. 
First of all, in terms of its members, the G20 includes all of the major established powers and 
the emerging ones. In addition, the total GDP of G20 accounts for more than 85% of the global 
economy and the G20 member states account for two-thirds of the world’s population. In the 
light of these statistics, compared to the G7/8, the G20 has a higher degree of representativeness 
in the era of globalization. Thus, any consensus achieved under the framework of G20 is more 
likely to be accepted by countries and to influence global politics and the global economy. In 
this respect, the G20 contributes to the realization of global macroeconomic policy coordination. 
Second, traditional international economic governance mechanisms cannot cope with the risk 
brought about by globalization and cannot effectively avoid economic crises. However, the G20 
is able to incorporate major emerging economies into the global economic governance system 
and to promote coordinated macroeconomic policies among the developed and developing 
countries. In this respect, the G20 has a greater ability to stem risks. It is argued that the 
foundation and development of the G20 is in accordance with the nature of world economic 
development and meet the needs of global governance in a new era. 
This thesis argues that the nexus between China and the G20 is mutually supportive and 
mutually reliant. On one hand, as the second largest economy in the world and the largest 
emerging power, China contributes a great deal to the enhancement of the representativeness 
and legitimacy of the G20. China’s engagement with and endorsement of the G20 has granted 
this mechanism a central role in the world economy. On the other hand, the G20 also provides 
China with a number of opportunities to play a more proactive role in world development and 
global governance. Specifically, the G20 meets China’s requirements from the following 
perspectives. 
First, from an economic perspective, China needs a vigorous, stable, and development-oriented 
international economic system. The eruption of the global financial crisis and the subsequent 
unstable world economic situation highlighted several weaknesses in various issue-areas of the 
existing economic system. For instance, in the field of international finance, the existing 
financial system does not truly reflect the interests of the developing countries. Although the 
global financial crisis broke out in the United States and involved all of the Western established 
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powers, the US dollar’s hegemonic status was not undermined and the reform of the existing 
international financial institutions is wavering. Against this backdrop, the G20 plays a 
significant role in the alleviation of the negative effects caused by the lack of representativeness 
of the existing economic governance and is driving the reform of the Western-based established 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. In this respect, the G20 demands to build a 
more representative, stable, and flexible international financial system. In the field of 
international energy, due to poor supervision of financial derivatives based on bulk 
commodities (food and oil), the price of bulk commodities keeps fluctuating at a high level. 
This situation poses a severe challenge for China, which is a major energy importer. Fortunately, 
the G20 provides a cooperation platform for addressing this challenge by virtue of its role of 
gathering the producers and consumers of the bulk commodity around the same table. 
Second, from the perspective of international order, China has requested a platform on which 
to play a more proactive role. The last four decades have witnessed a dramatic increase of 
China’s influence in the global economic system in terms of its astonishing GDP growth, 
international trade, and foreign-exchange reserves. With the purpose of transforming itself from 
a big country to a great power, China needs to participate in the construction of the international 
system. Against this background, compared to other groupings such as the G2 and G8, the G20 
is considered as the most appropriate grouping by China. This mainly results from the G20’s 
balance between legitimacy and effectiveness. One major concern of global governance is to 
seek a balance between representativeness and effectiveness. An overemphasis of 
representativeness challenges effectiveness, as seen in the UN and G33. In this respect, the G20 
has provided an forum that is repeatedly balanced between the two indicators. The G20 consists 
of the major developed and emerging countries and it also includes the representative 
international organizations. Thus, it is seen as one of the most important platforms on which 
China can participate in global economic governance. 
Third, from the perspective of value, China requires an international mechanism that is in 
accordance with its identity. Politically, for a long time, China has claimed itself to be an 
indispensable component of and steadfast supporter of the vast number of developing countries. 
However, China is the second largest economy, and it shares a number of common interests 
with the developed countries. Hence, in terms of economic capability, China is no longer treated 
as a developing country. For this reason, it is essential for China to actively participate in an 
institution that provides China with a platform that strikes a balance between its relationship 
with the developing countries and its relationship with the developed countries. In this regard, 
 118 
compared to the G8 or G8+5, the G20 is an appropriate mechanism through which China can 
be involved in the dialogue and cooperation of global governance, since the G20 has greater 
cultural and geographical inclusiveness. The inclusiveness of the G20 creates opportunities for 
balancing the North-South relationship in a more effective way. 
Fourth, from the perspective of addressing global problems, China needs a broader and more 
inclusive international stage. With the development of economic globalization, economic, 
political, cultural, and social interdependence between countries has become far greater. In the 
meanwhile, a number of global problems, such as environmental deterioration, climate change, 
inequality between north and south, and economic crisis, have been exacerbated. In terms of 
economic governance, most of the contemporary economic problems are globally significant, 
also requiring a pertinent global solution. These challenges suggest that the solutions to global 
economic problems should be discussed and agreed under a multilateral framework. In this 
respect, the G20 is a suitable choice in terms of focusing on the “global, strategic, long-term, 
and macroeconomic issues” and emphasizing the persistence and stability of the multilateral 
trade system. Moreover, the G20 is in a position to obtain bilateral and multilateral cooperation.  
By considering the implications of the actions of the G20 that have motivated China and the 
rest of the world to participate in the G20, this chapter undertakes an empirical analysis of the 
“international leadership with Chinese characteristics” (ILCC) in the G20 using interpretations 
of China’s NRC and its NRP. In line with Breuning’s model, China’s NRC embedded in the 
ILCC is verified or falsified based on five major factors: identity, cultural heritage, domestic 
audience, capability, and opportunity to act. The major research materials for interpreting 
China’s NRC are Chinese leaders’ speeches at the G20 summits, decision-makers’ comments 
on relevant occasions, and Chinese policy-related journals. In addition, the chapter also 
conducts an empirical analysis of China’s NRP embedded in the ILCC in terms of China’s 
material, institutional, and ideational contributions to the G20. 
Furthermore, this chapter’s empirical analysis of China’s NRC and NRP embedded in the ILCC 
in the G20 is in accordance with the stages of the G20’s development. In this respect, the project 
borrows and modifies John Kirton’s chronological division. According to Kirton (2016), having 
been upgraded from a ministry conference to a leaders’ summit in 2008, the development of 
the G20 over the last decade can be divided into three major stages: the stage of counter-crisis 
management (2008-2009), the stage of consolidating cooperation (2010-2012), and the stage of 
global steering (2013-2018). 
 119 
4.2. THE INTERPRETATION OF CHINA’S NRC EMBEDDED IN 
THE ILCC IN THE G20 
4.2.1. COUNTER-CRISIS MANAGEMENT (2008-2009)  
Against the backdrop of the global financial crisis, the G20 was successfully upgraded to the 
most significant mechanism of international economic cooperation in 2008. Between 2008 and 
2009, the primary function of the G20 was to address the crisis’ immediate side effects in terms 
of “an exceptionally sharp fall in global industrial production, significant contractions in GDP 
in most of the major economies, and the collapse of business and consumer confidence” (Edey, 
2009: 188). Thus, at this stage, China’s NRC embedded in the ILCC was shaped and 
characterized by Chinese decision-makers’ judgments of the crisis’ causes and effects, their 
proposals of possible countermeasures and solutions to these side effects, and their perceptions 
of China’s leadership role in overcoming these immediate effects, etc. 
First and foremost, according to role theory, China’s NRC embedded in the ILCC in the G20 
is closely associated with Chinese decision-makers’ understanding of the “opportunity to act” 
– their overall judgment of the international situation. Specifically, at the level of crisis 
management, Chinese leaders clearly recognized that the world economy had been significantly 
damaged by the fatal financial crisis, as the then Chinese President Hu Jintao argued: 
The international financial crisis has spread from parts of the world to the entire globe, from 
the developed countries to the emerging markets, and from the financial sector to the real 
economy, which has exerted a big impact on the economic development and people’s life 
worldwide.  
[国际金融危机已从局部发展到全球，从发达国家传导到新兴市场国家，从金融领域扩
散到实体经济领域，给世界各国经济发展和人民生活带来严重影响] (Hu, 2008a). 
This perception was also manifested in Hu’s speeches in the subsequent two summits held in 
London and Pittsburgh in 2009. In his remarks during the London G20 summit, Hu repeatedly 
highlighted the achievements of the Washington G20 summit, such as the strengthening of 
financial supervision and the promotion of financial system reform; however, Hu also pointed 
out that the “international financial crisis is still sprawling and intensifying with ever increasing 
impact on the global real economy and the world financial and economic situation remain 
complicated and grim” [国际金融危机仍在蔓延和深化，对全球实体经济的冲击日益显现，
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世界经济金融形势依然复杂严峻] (Hu, 2009a). At the third summit held in Pittsburgh, 
although Hu recognized the positive changes in the world economy and the increasing stability 
of financial market, he insisted that “the foundation of an economic rebound is not yet solid, 
with many uncertainties remaining. A full economic recovery will take a slow and tortuous 
process” [世界经济形势好转的基础并不牢固，不确定因素仍然很多，实现全面复苏将
是缓慢和曲折的过程] (Hu, 2009b). 
On the basis of the overall judgments of the then international environment, Chinese leaders 
stated several times that China had the capability and willingness to alleviate the negative 
effects caused by the crisis. On one hand, although China was also badly influenced by this 
financial crisis, the generally positive trend in China’s economic growth and development did 
not change, and Chinese economic fundamentals and capabilities remained solid, as Hu 
explained: 
Through the open-up and fast enduring economic development for three decades, China has 
accumulated abundant material basis and further improved the domestic institutional 
environment. There is a huge development space for infrastructure construction, industrial 
optimization and upgrading, technological progress and innovation, conservation of ecosystem, 
resident consumption, the expansion of domestic demand, and social undertakings, etc. China 
also has rich human resources, and its financial system is generally sound. 
[经过改革开放 30年持续快速发展，中国积累了较为雄厚的物质基础，体制环境进一步
完善，基础设施建设、产业优化升级、科技进步和创新、生态环境保护、居民消费、
扩大内需、社会事业等方面有巨大发展空间，人力资源丰富，金融体系总体稳健] (Hu, 
2009a). 
On the other hand, by virtue of its material capabilities, China showed its great determination 
and willingness to respond to this crisis. This determination and willingness were observed in 
all three of Hu’s speeches at the G20 summits during that stage. For instance, faced with the 
impact of the global financial crisis, Hu said that “China will persist in the basic state policy of 
opening to the outside world and pursue a win-win strategy of opening up” [继续坚持对外开
放的基本国策，始终不渝奉行互利共赢的开放战略] (Hu, 2009a). As one of the largest 
beneficiaries of globalization and international cooperation, “with a responsible attitude, China 
would like to continuously participate in the preservation of international financial stability and 
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be engaged in the international cooperation for promoting world economic development” [继
续本着负责任的态度，参与维护国际金融稳定、促进世界经济发展的国际合作] (Hu, 
2008a). In this respect, it is argued that China exhibited exemplary leadership by insisting on 
its opening-up policy and responsible attitude. At that stage, although China was as seriously 
affected by the disastrous crisis as many other countries, it tried to play an exemplary role of 
pursuing the collective good and appealing for anti-protectionism. As Hu emphasized, “we 
should together fight against any types of trade protectionism” [我们应当共同反对任何形式
的贸易保护主义] (Hu, 2009a). 
In addition to showing their determination and willingness to address the crisis, Chinese leaders 
and decision-makers also illustrated their understanding of the causes of the crisis, such as the 
“inappropriate macroeconomic policies of the economies and deficiencies in financial 
regulation” [既有经济体宏观经济政策不当的原因，也有金融监管缺失的原因] (Hu, 
2008a). Thus, China recognized the necessity to reform the existing system of economic 
governance. As the major representative of the emerging powers and developing countries, 
China dedicated itself to “promoting the development of international financial order towards 
more fair, equitable, inclusive, and well-organized” [推动国际金融秩序不断朝着公平、公
正、包容、有序的方向发展 ] (Hu, 2009a). More precisely, by virtue of its increasing 
influence in world politics and the global economy, China exhibited constructive leadership 
through its proposals, including a number of specific suggestions alluding to the deficiencies 
of the existing financial system: 
First, we need to strengthen cooperation on financial regulation, including the formulation of 
internationally accepted standards and norms for international financial regulation and the 
improvement of the code of conduct and the regulatory system for rating agencies; second, the 
international financial institutions should increase assistance to the developing countries; third, 
the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) should play a bigger role in terms of providing applicable 
advice in order to stabilize financial market and strengthen financial supervision; fourth, the 
IMF should reinforce and improve supervision over the macroeconomic policies of related 
parties, especially the major economies issuing reserve currencies. Particular focus should be 
put on the regulation of currency issuance policies. Fifth, the governance structure of the IMF 
and the World Bank should be improved to enhance the representativeness and voice of the 
developing countries. Sixth, we should improve the international monetary system and the 
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reserve currency issuing regulatory mechanism, maintain the relative stability of the exchange 
rates of major reserve currencies and promote a diverse and reasonable international currency 
system. 
[一是加强金融监管合作，尽快制定普遍接受的国际金融监管标准和规范，完善评级机
构行为准则和监管制度；而是国际金融机构应当增强对发展中国家的救助；三是金融
稳定论坛应该发挥更大作用，就稳定金融市场、加强金融监管提出更多可行性建议；
四是国际货币基金组织应该加强和改善对各方特别是主要贮备货币发型经济体宏观经
济政策的监督，尤其应该加强对货币发行政策的监督；五是改进国际货币基金组织和
世界银行治理结构，提高发展中国家代表性和发言权；六是完善国际货币体系，健全
储备货币发行调控机制，保持主要储备货币汇率相对稳定，促进国际货币体系多元化、
合理化] (Hu, 2009a). 
Furthermore, given the austerity and deteriorating economic conditions faced by the developing 
countries during the crisis, China attached great importance to the provision of foreign 
development assistance (FDA) to these countries. As a result, China not only appealed to G20 
members to provide material support to the developing countries and the least developed 
countries (LDCs), but it also actively displayed facilitative leadership in making a commitment 
to a large number of African countries, as observed in Hu’s speech: 
China explicitly promised that it will conscientiously implement the various assistant measures 
to Africa identified during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. China will, in its power, 
continue to increase aid to African countries, reduce or cancel their debts, expand trade with 
and investment to Africa, and strengthen China-Africa substantial cooperation. Under the 
framework of South-South Cooperation, China will continue to provide assistance to other 
developing countries in an affordable manner, including grant assistance, debt relief, and trade 
promotion assistance, etc. 
[中国明确承诺，将认真落实中非合作论坛北京峰会确定的各项援非举措，在力所能及
范围内继续增加对非援助、减免非洲国家债务，扩大对非贸易和投资、加强中非务实
合作。中国将在南南合作框架内，继续向其他发展中国家提供力所能及的援助，包括
无偿援助、债务减免、贸促援助] (Hu, 2009a). 
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4.2.2. THE CONSOLIDATION OF COOPERATION (2010-2012) 
Having effectively contained the most acute effects of the crisis over the previous two years, in 
2010, Chinese decision-makers made a new pronouncement on the international situation, i.e., 
“with the concerted efforts of G20 members and the entire international community, the world 
economy is gradually recovering” [在二十国集团成员和国际社会共同努力下，世界经济
正在复苏] (Hu, 2010b). However, Chinese leaders also recognized that “the recovery is neither 
firmly established nor balanced and there are still quite many uncertainties down the road” [复
苏基础不牢固、进程不平衡，存在较大不确定性] (Hu, 2010b). Against this backdrop, they 
commented that China and other member states should play a more important role in the 
consolidation of the G20’s achievements. In this respect, it is essential to “reform the financial 
system and promote stable development” [完善金融体系，推动稳定发展] (Hu, 2010d). 
This pronouncement was followed by a transformation in China’s perceptions of the G20. 
During the fourth G20 Toronto summit in 2010, the then Chinese President Hu Jintao proposed 
that “we need to turn the G20 from an effective mechanism to counter the international financial 
crisis to a premier platform for advancing international economic cooperation” [推动二十国
集团从应对国际金融危机的有效机制转向促进国际经济合作的主要平台] (Hu, 2010b). 
More specifically, Hu advocated that the major concerns of the G20 members should transform 
“from co-stimulation to co-growth, from short-term emergency to long-term governance, from 
passive response to active project” [从协同刺激转向协调增长、从短期应急转向长效治理、
从被动应对转向主动谋划] (Hu, 2010b). Through these proposals, China provided a long-
term vision for the development of the G20. 
In addition to providing a long-term vision, China’s constructive leadership was manifested in 
its detailed plan for the reform of existing international financial and economic governance, as 
follows: 
We should continue to push for fair and merit-based selection of the management of 
international financial institutions (IFIs), enable more people from developing countries to take 
up mid-level and senior management positions and redress the underrepresentation of 
developing countries at the management level in the institutional framework of IFIs. We should 
support the IMF in its effort to strengthen the monitoring and early warning of capital flows 
and prevent the destructive impact of large capital movement, both inward and outward, on 
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individual economies. We should improve the international monetary system and build an 
international reserve currency system with stable value, rule-based issuance and manageable 
supply. 
[我们应该继续推动以公平择优为原则选择国际金融机构管理层，提高发展中国家中高
层管理人员比例，填补发展中国家在国际金融机构制度框架中的管理缺口。我们应该
推动国际货币基金组织加强资本流动监测预警，防止资金大进大出对单个经济体的破
坏性冲击。我们应该完善国际货币体系，建立币值稳定、供应有序、总量可调的国际
储备货币体系] (Hu, 2010d). 
Furthermore, China’s constructive leadership was also observed in its construction of common 
interests and a common vision among the G20 members. In terms of interest construction, 
during the Seoul G20 summit in 2010, the then Chinese President Hu actively proposed that 
“we should make great efforts to promote North-South cooperation, expand common interests” 
[我们应该着力推动南北合作，拓展利益交汇点 ] (Hu, 2010d). Hu’s statement 
acknowledged the fact that different countries have diverse economic situations and interests. 
However, it also indicated that countries with diverse interests can also pursue win-win 
cooperation. In the post-crisis era, common interests between countries are built upon their 
aspirations to eliminate the crisis’ effects and prevent potential crises in the future. Specifically, 
Hu proposed detailed measures for constructing common interests: “we should strengthen 
consultation and coordination, introduce mutually supporting and complementing policy 
measures, and tackle sovereign debt risks, massive unregulated cross-border flow of capital and 
other financial risks” [我们应该加强沟通和协调，努力形成相互支持、相互补充的政策
措施，妥善化解主权债务、跨境资本大规模无序流动等金融风险] (Hu, 2011b). In terms 
of vision construction, with the purpose of maintaining the hard-won economic recovery and 
achieving world economic sustainable development, in line with Hu’s Scientific Outlook on 
Development regarding China’s domestic governance, Chinese leaders firmly advocated the 
Concept of Sustainable Development for the international community. According to Hu, “we 
should actively develop green industries such as energy-saving and environment-friendly 
industries, and build a resource-saving, environment-friendly society” [我们应该积极发展节
能环保等绿色产业，增加资金投入，强化机制保障，努力建设资源节约型、环境友好
型社会] (Hu, 2012b). 
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Moreover, at the G20 Seoul summit in 2010, Chinese decision-makers identified one major 
bottleneck of world economic development as the failure of the vast number of developing 
countries to achieve full development and strengthen their capacity building. Thus, at that stage, 
in order to strengthen the capabilities of the developing countries and the least developed 
countries (LDCs), in terms of achieving recovery from the current crisis and avoiding potential 
future crises, China stressed the importance of empowering these countries in two aspects. First, 
China claimed that it maintained the principle of “taking into full account of different national 
circumstances and development stages of various countries, and appreciate and respect each 
country’s independent choice of development path and policies” [充分考虑各国不同国情和
发展阶段，理解并尊重各国选择发展道路和发展政策的自主权] (Hu, 2010d). Second, 
China committed to “offer sincere and selfless assistance to fellow developing countries as its 
ability permits and actively promoted South-South cooperation, contributing its share to world 
development” [中国尽己所能、向其他发展中国家提供真诚无私援助，积极促进南南合
作，努力为世界发展做出贡献] (Hu, 2010d). As Hu said: 
China has taken various measures, including tariff reduction and exemption, to create 
conditions for other developing countries to increase exports to China. To further help the least 
developed countries in their development endeavor, China will, in the context of South-South 
cooperation, give zero-tariff treatment to 97 percent of the tariff items of exports to China from 
the least developed countries having diplomatic ties with China. 
[中国坚持通过减免关税等多种途径，为发展中国家对华出口各类产品创造条件。为进
一步帮助 不发达国家发展，中方愿在南南合作框架内，对同中国建交的 不发达国
家 97%的税目的产品给予零关税待遇] (Hu, 2011b). 
Furthermore, for the sake of sustaining the sound momentum of its economic and social 
development in the post-crisis era, China also placed a strong emphasis on its self-cultivation 
and self-transformation. At the G20 Cannes summit in 2011, Chinese decision-makers 
identified China’s grand strategy for its economic growth and social development as follows: 
We will continue to pursue development in a scientific way and redouble efforts to shift the 
growth model. We will continue to strengthen and improve macro control and maintain a 
balance between achieving steady and fast economic growth, adjusting the economic structure 
and managing inflation expectation. Putting people’s interests first and taking a holistic 
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approach to development. We will work harder to achieve all-round, balanced and sustainable 
development, deepen reform and opening-up, and improve people’s well-being. 
[我们将坚持以科学发展为主题、以加快转变经济发展方式为主线，继续加强和改善宏
观调控，继续处理好保持经济平稳较快发展、调整经济结构、管理通胀预期的关系，
更加注重以人为本，更加注重全面协调可持续发展，更加注重统筹兼顾，更加注重改
革开放，更加注重保障和改善民生] (Hu, 2011b). 
4.2.3. GLOBAL STEERING (2013-2018) 
Since 2013, according to John Kirton, the G20 has “moved beyond coping with successive 
financial and economic crises to become a more general steering committee for the world” 
(Kirton, 2016: 70). Occasionally, since then, China’s participation and role in the G20 has also 
entered a new phase. This new phase is marked by the selection of a new Chinese leadership 
under Xi Jinping in 2013. Under Xi’s leadership, China’s foreign policy has gradually become 
more proactive than that of Hu’s era, and China is showing a stronger willingness to play a 
more significant role in shaping international order and global governance. Against this 
background, during this stage, China’s NRC embedded in the ILCC in the G20 was more 
pronounced than in the previous two stages, and it was most prominent during the G20 
Hangzhou summit in 2016. 
During this stage, China reaffirmed the nature of the G20 in the following aspects. First, as the 
host of the G20 Hangzhou summit in 2016, China placed strong emphasis on the collectiveness 
of the G20 rather than defining it as a sort of hegemonic project. This position resulted from 
Chinese leaders’ recognition of the G20 members’ prominent positions in world development 
and economic growth, as Chinese President Xi explained at the Opening Ceremony of the 2016 
G20 summit, “the G20 has brought together the world’s major economies, and their influence 
and role are significant. They are at the forefront of addressing risks and increasing growth 
space” [二十国集团聚集了世界主要经济体，影响和作用举足轻重，也身处应对风险挑
战、开拓增长空间的 前沿] (Xi, 2016e). In this respect, although the G20’s member 
countries vary in political system, economic level, and social culture, China advocated that they 
should carry out collective actions and “all parties should strengthen macroeconomic policy 
communication and coordination, and form synergy in our policies and actions” [加强宏观经
济政策沟通和协调，形成政策和行动合力] (Xi, 2015e). Second, China identified the 
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inclusiveness of the G20 through its emphasis on the G20 as a mechanism of sharing rather 
than as a political tool dominated by any one superpower. According to Xi, the G20 “should be 
about participation by all and benefits for all. Instead of seeking dominance or winner-takes-all 
results, it should encourage the sharing of interests and win-win prospects” [提倡所有人参与，
所有人收益，不搞一家独大或者赢者通吃，而是寻求利益共享，实现共赢目标] (Xi, 
2016d). Third, Chinese decision-makers repeatedly endorsed the G20 as an empowering 
mechanism for addressing global development problems and promoting global economic 
growth. As a result, China identified the necessity of “promoting the G20 member states to 
conduct cooperation and help these countries to accelerate industrialization through capacity 
building, increasing investment, improving infrastructure and other measures, so as to achieve 
their poverty alleviation and sustainable development goals” [中方推动 G20成员开展合作，
通过能力建设、增加投资、改善基础设施等举措，帮助这些国家加速工业化发展，实
现减贫和可持续发展目标] (Y. Wang, 2016). 
Moreover, in line with its understanding of the nature of the G20, China further contributed its 
own plan for the development of the G20 in terms of institutional construction, interest 
construction, and vision construction. First, Chinese leaders consistently emphasized that the 
G20 is the most representative mechanism in global economic governance. Thus, China is 
devoting itself to strengthening the institutionalization of the G20. For instance, at the Closing 
Ceremony of the G20 Hangzhou summit, Chinese President Xi confirmed that “it is necessary 
to transform the G20 from a crisis-responding mechanism to a long-term governance 
mechanism, and expand its focus from short-term policy response to a combination of short-, 
medium-, and long-term policy making” [二十国集团有必要进一步从危机应对机制向长效
治理机制转型，从侧重短期政策向中长期政策并重转型] (Xi, 2016f). More precisely, 
China puts a great deal of emphasis on the revitalization and institutionalization of international 
trade and investment as two critical engines of world economic growth, as Xi said: 
We have worked out the G20 Strategy for Global Trade Growth which promotes the 
development of inclusive and coordinated global value chain, supports the multilateral trade 
system and rejects protectionism. We have also worked out the G20 Guiding Principles for 
Global Investment Policymaking which lays out the first global framework of multilateral rules 
governing international investment. We look forward to renewed vitality of the world economy 
driven by strong international trade and investment. 
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[我们共同制定《二十国集团全球贸易增长战略》，促进包容协调的全球价值链发展，
继续支持多边贸易体制，反对保护主义。我们制定了《二十国集团全球投资指导原
则》，这是全球首个多边投资规则框架，填补了国际投资领域空白。期待在我们的共
同努力下，在强劲的国际贸易和投资推动下，世界经济将重新焕发活力，经济全球化
进程继续蓬勃发展] (Xi, 2016f) 
Second, during this stage, Chinese decision-makers repeatedly stressed the importance of two 
major concepts: growth linkage [增长联动 ] and integration of interests [利益融合 ]. 
Specifically, on one hand, growth linkage indicates that “all countries should build the 
awareness of a community of common destiny. Give consideration to the interests of other 
countries, when pursuing the national interests of our own” [各国要树立命运共同体意识，
在追求本国利益时兼顾别国利益] (Xi, 2013b). On the other hand, integration of interests 
implies that “all countries should build a global value chain that shares interest, and foster a big 
global market that benefits all parties, achieving the development of mutual benefits and win-
win results” [各国应当建设利益共享的全球价值链，培育普惠各方的全球大市场，实现
互利共赢的发展] (Xi, 2013b). Third, China also proposed a number of visions for guiding the 
development of the G20. The most eye-catching China-proposed vision during this stage was 
the construction of a ‘Community of Common Destiny’ [命运共同体]. As Chinese President 
Xi articulated at the G20 Brisbane summit in 2014, “the G20 members should establish the 
awareness of a community of common destiny, and strive to form a pattern of win-win 
cooperation in which the growth of each country promotes and complements that of other 
countries” [二十国集团成员要树立命运共同体意识，坚持做好朋友、好伙伴，积极协调
宏观经济政策，努力形成各国增长相互促进、相得益彰的合作共赢格局] (Xi, 2014c). 
Furthermore, during this stage, China exhibited its exemplary leadership in terms of being 
morally orientated, emphasizing self-transformation, and providing intellectual guidance. First, 
in order to promote mutual trust and maintain positive relational circles/links between G20 
members, Chinese decision-makers attached great importance to the principle of morality. As 
the world’s second largest economy, China has massive asymmetric advantages (economically 
and politically) over other G20 member states. Nevertheless, Chinese leaders repeatedly 
advocated that “all countries should be committed to building a fair, just, inclusive and orderly 
international financial system, enhance the representation and voice of emerging markets and 
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developing countries, and make sure that all countries enjoy equal rights and equal 
opportunities under equal rules in international economic cooperation” [建设公平公正、包容
有序的国际金融体系，提高新兴市场国家和发展中国家的代表性和发言权，确保各国
在国际经济合作中权利平等、机会平等、规则平等] (Xi, 2014c). Second, due to persistent 
global economic weakness, China’s economic growth has continuously slowed in recent years. 
In this respect, China is facing a number of concerns and doubts from external observers, such 
as whether China will be able to achieve sustainable economic development and whether China 
will sustain and further promote the policy of opening-up and reform. Against this backdrop, 
to the members of the G20 group, China insists upon its willingness and resolution to transform 
itself into a more responsible and capable player domestically and internationally. Chinese 
decision-makers have acknowledged that China’s reform has entered a “deep-water zone”, with 
tough challenges to be met, as Chinese President Xi stressed in his keynote speech at the 2016 
B20 Hangzhou summit: 
We have the resolve to make painful self-adjustments and tackle problems that have built up 
over many years, particularly underlying issues and entrenched interests and carry reform 
through to the end. We are implementing the innovation-driven development strategy so as to 
leverage the role of innovation as the primary growth driver and make growth quality based 
rather than quantity based. We will unwaveringly pursue a strategy of sustainable development 
and stay committed to green, low-carbon and circular development and China’s fundamental 
policy of conserving resources and protecting the environment. We will meet the people’s 
aspirations for a better life, raise their living standards and the quality of their lives, improve 
the public services system and enlarge the middle-income group. We will continue to be fully 
involved in economic globalization and support the multilateral trading regime. 
[我们将以壮士断腕的勇气、凤凰涅槃的决心，敢于向积存多年的顽瘴痼疾开刀，敢于
触及深层次利益关系和矛盾，把改革进行到底；我们正在实施创新驱动发展战略，发
挥创新第一动力的作用，努力实现从量的增长向质的提升转变；我们将毫不动摇实施
可持续发展战略，坚持绿色低碳循环发展，坚持节约资源和保护环境的基本国策；我
们将顺应人民对美好生活的向往，不断提高人民生活质量和水平，健全公共服务体系，
扩大中等收入者比重；我们将继续深入参与经济全球化进程，支持多边贸易体制] (Xi, 
2016d) 
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Third, although China suffers from the sluggish global economy, it still maintains relatively 
high growth rates and is trying to transform itself to a “New Normal”. On the basis of its own 
successful experience in addressing difficulties and preserving sustainable economic and social 
development, China has provided intellectual guidance for other G20 members. For instance, 
as the host of the 2016 Hangzhou G20 summit, Chinese leaders issued a G20 Blueprint on 
Innovative Growth [二十国集团创新增长蓝图], aiming to pave a new way for growth in terms 
of “seeking impetus through innovation and vitality through reform, seizing the historic 
opportunity presented by innovation, new scientific and technological revolution, industrial 
transformation and digital economy to increase medium- and long-term growth potential of the 
world economy” [向创新要动力，向改革要活力，把握创新、新科技革命和产业变革、
数字经济的历史性机遇，提升世界经济中长期增长潜力] (Xi, 2016d).  
4.3. THE INTERPRETATION OF CHINA’S NRP EMBEDDED IN 
THE ILCC IN THE G20 
4.3.1. COUNTER-CRISIS MANAGEMENT (2008-2009) 
In 2008, the G20 was upgraded to the level of a leaders’ summit. During the period from 2008 
to 2009, the major targets of the G20 were to alleviate the damage caused by the crisis and 
prevent the crisis from leading to more serious detriment. This thesis argues that China made a 
number of contributions to the realization of the G20’s targets. In line with the practice analysis 
defined in the methodology part (section 2.3), China’s contributions are analyzed through its 
NRP embedded in the ILCC from institutional, material, and policy perspectives. 
First of all, from the institutional perspective, Chinese decision-makers highlighted the causes 
of the crisis as both the inappropriate macroeconomic policies and deficiencies in financial 
regulation. Thus, with the purpose of increasing the effectiveness and representativeness of 
global financial governance, China struggled for equal rights and positions for itself and other 
major emerging powers in the reform of the existing international economic mechanisms. At 
the London G20 summit in April 2009, by demonstrating its willingness to be a global leader 
(Kirton, 2016: 39), China made a contribution to the establishment of and obtained full 
membership of the G20’s Financial Stability Board (FSB), which replaced the Financial 
Stability Forum led by the G7. As a newly-established international body that monitors and 
makes recommendations in the field of global finance, the FSB shapes the existing global 
financial system in a more democratic and authoritative fashion, and it plays a significant role 
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in promoting macroeconomic policy coordination between the established and emerging 
powers and in strengthening global financial regulation.  
China’s contribution to the existing financial institutional architecture was also witnessed in its 
accession to a number of international financial platforms, such as the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (Ye, 2015b). Given China’s profound economic influence, China’s accession 
increases the representativeness and legitimacy of these mechanisms in international financial 
governance. At the Pittsburgh G20 summit in September 2009, China achieved a number of 
accomplishments in the institutional reform and construction of the G20. Among them, the most 
decisive achievement was the promotion of the G20 as the primary platform for international 
economic cooperation. This promotion of the G20 led to a more equal top-tier place for China 
and the other major rising powers in the field of global financial governance (Kirton, 2016: 40). 
Moreover, due to the increased significance of China and other emerging powers in the world 
economy, the established powers promised to share some of their quotas in the existing IFIs. 
For instance, they decided to increase the quota of the developing countries in the IMF from 
43% to 48%, and to increase China’s voting power from 3.81% to 6.07%. At the same time, at 
the World Bank, China’s voting power rose to third place in the ranking.  
Second, from the material perspective, China made several material contributions to the G20, 
as follows. At the Washington G20 summit in 2008, China practised its facilitative leadership 
through the provision of major support on exchange rate and financial policy, and China led the 
agreement on large-scale, simultaneous stimulus among the G20 member states. At the London 
G20 summit in 2009, before it secured its proportionate international rights to greater 
representation at the World Bank and the IMF, China showed its willingness to assume global 
responsibilities by providing US$ 40 billion to the IMF’s US$ 500 billion financial support 
package. In addition, although China was unsatisfied with its IMF quota shares, it aimed to 
address the financial crisis by purchasing $50 billions of IMF debt (He, 2015). Through its 
provision of these public goods for the recovery of the global economy, China not only 
benefitted its export-dependent economy, but also it ensured a multiplier effect that profited the 
world as a whole (Kirton, 2016: 34). In this respect, it is argued that China practised its 
exemplary leadership in addressing the financial crisis and stabilizing the financial order.  
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Moreover, China also practised its exemplary leadership by transforming itself into a more 
capable actor in coping with the financial crisis. Given China’s huge economic power and its 
implications for the world economy, its steady and relatively fast pace of growth is regarded as 
making a significant contribution to global financial stability and world economic development. 
China promoted its economic growth by adopting incentive policies in terms of reducing the 
bank reserve ratio, lowering the deposit interest rate, reducing the corporate tax burden, etc. In 
addition, in 2008, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China announced a stimulus 
package of 4 trillion RMB (US$586 billion) in an attempt to stimulate both China’s and the 
world’s economic growth and to minimize the impact of the global financial crisis. 
Third, from the policy perspective, China practised its facilitative leadership by making policy 
contributions to the G20 in terms of strengthening the existing arrangements in a collective and 
inclusive manner. In 2008, financial regulation was the focal point of the Washington G20 
summit. Due to its closed domestic financial system and its lack of relevant specialized 
knowledge, China could not contribute much to the discussion or to policy making. However, 
as the largest developing country, China showed a responsible attitude by allowing its first 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) to take place before August 2009. With the 
purpose of responding to the crisis, in 2009, the FSAP experienced critical changes in terms of 
producing a clear definition of the components of stability assessments and the Risk Assessment 
Matrices (RAMs). China’s policy consequently resulted in the agreement of the United States 
on its own first FSAP. Following co-promotion by China and the United States, the other G20 
member states were also encouraged to conduct that program for themselves. At the Pittsburgh 
summit in 2009, with the purpose of securing a durable world economic recovery in the post-
crisis era, China accepted the US-proposed initiative and contributed to the creation of the 
Framework for Strong, Sustained and Balanced Growth. In the meanwhile, China actively 
participated in and promoted the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) – the backbone of the G20 
– that contributes to the identification of shared objectives and corresponding policies among 
member states. 
Moreover, at the London summit in 2009, Zhou Xiaochuan, the then governor of the People’s 
Bank of China, published an article “Reform the International Monetary System”, in which he 
pointed out the inherent weakness of the current international monetary system and made a 
public policy proposal that “called for a gradual move towards using IMF special drawing rights 
(SDRs) as a centrally managed global reserve currency” (Zhou, 2009). In this regard, it is 
argued that Zhou’s article was one of China’s most important proposals for global governance 
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reform during that stage, and it is considered to have demonstrated China’s public support for 
the success of the US-initiated creation of US$250 billion in SDRs (Kirton, 2016). 
4.3.2. THE CONSOLIDATION OF COOPERATION (2010-2012) 
As mentioned above, this stage witnessed a transformation of the G20 “from being a mechanism 
to counter the international financial crisis to becoming a platform for advancing international 
economic cooperation” (Kirton, 2016: 49). One of the major achievements of this stage was the 
G20’s success in preventing a European-centered financial crisis from spreading globally, as 
the 1997 Asian crisis and the 2008 American one had. In addition to its contribution to 
preventing an upgrade of the eurozone crisis, China also made a number of institutional, 
material, and policy contributions to consolidating cooperation between the G20 members. 
First, from the institutional perspective, China worked hard to consolidate the 
institutionalization of the G20 as the most significant international cooperation mechanism. For 
instance, China promoted the establishment of a cooperative relationship between the G20 and 
G8 in terms of its and other members’ co-promotion of thematic consistency between the G20 
Toronto summit and the G8 Muskoka summit. By emphasizing the convergence between the 
G20 and the G8, it increased the representativeness and legitimacy of the G20, which 
objectively led to the consolidation of cooperation between the G20 members. This form of 
collectiveness in China’s facilitative leadership can be observed in the birth of a new China-
France partnership at the 2011 Cannes G20 summit. The establishment of this partnership 
played a decisive role in the host’s (France) acceptance of China’s priorities on monetary 
system reform. 
Moreover, the first three G20 summits were held in developed countries without exception. 
However, during this stage, China played a significant role in assisting the transfer of the G20 
hosting rights from the advanced member states to the emerging and Asian ones. For instance, 
with China’s support, South Korea, as a non-G8 member, successfully hosted the 5th G20 
summit. The then South Korean President Lee Myung-bak publicly expressed his appreciation 
for Chinese leaders’ support of Seoul’s successful hosting of the summit (Xinhua, 2010). At 
the Seoul summit, with the purpose of encouraging the emerging powers to achieve agreement 
on the reform of IMF’s quota share, China practised its facilitative leadership and exemplary 
leadership in abnegating part of its rightful share to other G20 emerging powers, such as India 
and Brazil. According to Kirton, China’s compromising behavior demonstrated “its 
institutional leadership had again appeared in self-abnegating form” (Kirton, 2016: 54). 
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Second, from the material perspective, at the 2012 Los Cabos G20 summit, China ($43 billion) 
co-sponsored nearly 40% of IMF’s new US$430 billion fund with two other major developed 
countries: Japan ($60 billion) and Germany ($54.7 billion). China also allied with other 
emerging countries from the BRICS (Brazil, India, Russia, and South Africa) to contribute 
US$75 billion to this recapitalization. China’s exemplary leadership was especially prominent 
against the backdrop of the United States’ absence from leading the IMF recapitalization for 
the first time. In the meanwhile, by virtue of its large foreign exchange reserve topping US$2.85 
trillion, China practised its facilitative leadership by purchasing US$7.5 billion in Spanish 
bonds and at least US$5 billion of Portuguese debt (Saunders, 2011) and empowering the 
troubled European countries to cope with this crisis. In this respect, China contributed a great 
deal to preventing the eurozone crisis from spreading into other regions and to stabilizing the 
international financial order. By doing so, as Kirton argues, “China had partly replaced the 
United States as the global leader in the core hegemonic financial function of acting as lender 
of last resort” (Kirton, 2016: 69). 
Third, from the policy perspective, during this stage, China’s policy priorities had accepted by 
other members of the G20, and it practised its constructive leadership in shaping the common 
interests among the G20 members. At the Seoul summit in 2010, under China’s strong advocacy, 
G20 members reached the Seoul Development Consensus. This consensus included the 
development-related issues in the G20 agenda for the first time. At the Cannes summit in 2011, 
in response to its vulnerabilities in the fields of food and energy security, China successfully 
introduced its policy priorities for dealing with commodity price fluctuations. At the Los Cabos 
summit in 2012, China attached great significance to food security in the Development Working 
Group. China’s arguments obtained positive feedback from other G20 members, the latter 
reaffirming poverty eradication and sustainable growth as the core objectives of the G20 
development agenda. In addition, China also introduced a number of its priorities in terms of 
green technology transfer, science and technology, and structural reforms to the G20 agenda 
for the first time (Kirton, 2016: 58). 
4.3.3. GLOBAL STEERING (2013-2018) 
Having experienced the stages of countering crisis and consolidating cooperation between G20 
members, the G20 has, since 2013, been transforming itself in to a more comprehensive flagship 
institution for the promotion of economic growth and global governance. In the meanwhile, 
since China’s new leadership under Xi Jinping was elected in 2013, China’s foreign strategy 
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has also transformed from “Tao Guang Yang Hui” (keep a low profile) to “You Suo Zuo Wei” 
(make more contributions). Under this strategic shift, China has repeatedly emphasized the 
central role of the G20 in global economic governance and China’s willingness to contribute 
further to the development of this mechanism. During this stage, the most prominent event was 
China’s hosting of the G20 summit in Hangzhou in 2016; this summit to a large extent reflects 
China’s NRP embedded in the ILCC. As in the previous two stages, China’s practices are also 
invested in the institutional, material, policy, and ideational dimensions. 
First, from the institutional perspective, China practised its constructive leadership by 
developing and strengthening the institutional arrangements of the G20. Specifically, China 
made a great contribution by promoting the member states to implement the G20’s achieved 
documents. As an authoritarian county, China’s political system is characterized by a high 
degree of effectiveness and strong execution. These features were also vigorously practised at 
the Hangzhou G20 summit. For a long time, the G20 summit has been criticized as a talk shop 
or a theory-discussing forum. With the purpose of enhancing the G20’s institutional 
effectiveness, China made a great deal of effort at the Hangzhou summit to ensure four major 
aspects: (1) the first is to strengthen the importance of implementation. According to the G20 
Leaders’ Communique Hangzhou Summit, “the founding spirit of the G20 is that major 
economies are working together on an equal footing and taking actions together. All 
commitments are set to be implemented” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016);  (2) the second 
is to strengthen the operability of document planning at the summit. For instance, the G20 
Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development not only set out the guiding 
principles and scope of work for the implementation of the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, but also it made specific proposals on relevant issues for member states in order 
to safeguard the implementation of this action plan. In other words, the action plan was 
considered as constructing a vision for the further development of the G20; (3) the third is to 
strengthen the working group mechanism. The G20 working group is an intermediary that 
transforms policy from concept to concrete action and plays an important role in implementing 
the conference documents. Under China’s constructive leadership, the Hangzhou summit 
decided to establish a number of new working groups in addition to the existing ones, such as 
the G20 Trade & Investment Working Group (TIWG) and the G20 Network Working Group; 
(4) the fourth is to strengthen the measurement and supervision of the implementation of 
documents. One typical example is the drawing up of the G20 Enhanced Structural Reform 
Agenda in which nine priority areas and eight specific operational guidelines are identified. In 
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addition, the agenda also established a quantitative framework and indicator system for testing 
the reform process (Yu, 2016).  
Second, from the material perspective, according to China’s own experience, development is 
the basic condition for accumulating material capabilities and addressing global affairs. Thus, 
at the G20 Hangzhou summit, China promoted the G20 members to achieve “Three First” 
(Zhang, 2016) in the development field: (1) for the first time, the development issue was placed 
in a prominent position under the global macro-policy framework; (2) for the first time, an 
action plan was proposed for the implementation of the UN 2030 Sustainable Development 
Agenda; (3) for the first time, all of the G20 members showed their collective support for the 
industrialization of the African countries and the least developed countries (LDCs) by releasing 
the G20 Initiative on Supporting Industrialization in Africa and Least Developed Countries. 
This initiative has groundbreaking implications in the G20’s history. In addition, during the 
preliminary negotiations for a further replenishment of the World Bank’s International 
Development Association (IDA) in 2013, compared to a decrease in foreign assistance from 
Western countries, China’s exemplary leadership was once again manifested in its contribution 
of US$300 million, twice as much as its last donation, to this international organization. In this 
regard, China has made important contributions to the successful completion of this donor 
mission (Ye, 2015a). Moreover, with the purpose of modernizing China’s economy and 
promoting the structural reform of the G20, China has strived to achieve its self-transformation 
by cutting its excess and backward capacity, even though it has led to a number of problems in 
terms of short-term unemployment and the slowdown of economic growth. For instance, in 
2017, China slashed its crude steel production capacity by more than 50 million tonnes, 
exceeding its annual target (F. Li, 2018). According to the state planner, “China has hit the 
halfway point towards meeting its target of cutting coal mining capacity by 800 million tonnes 
a year by the end of 2020” (South China Morning Post, 2017). By doing so, as the largest 
emerging power, China practised its exemplary leadership by phasing out its outdated 
production capacity; it also aims to reduce highly energy-wasting and highly polluting output 
and to contribute high-quality growth to the development of the world economy. 
Third, from the policy perspective, under China’s chairmanship, the Hangzhou G20 summit 
approved two significant policy documents. One is the G20 Strategy for Global Trade Growth 
that aims to reduce trade costs, promote trade and investment policy coordination, sponsor the 
development of trade in service, strengthen trade financing, support the development of e-
commerce, and set an example in dealing with trade and development issues. Another is the 
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G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking that aims to create an open, 
transparent, and favorable global policy environment for investment and integrates the 
investment issue into the G20 agenda for the first time. On the basis of suggestions from and 
discussions between all parties, the Principles document was agreed by the members at the 2016 
G20 Conference of Trade Ministers in Shanghai, and it became the first multilateral document 
on the formulation of investment policies on a global scale (X. Ren, 2016b). In addition, as the 
world’s two largest economies and the top two greenhouse gas-emitting countries, the United 
States and China announced their ratification of the Paris Climate Change Agreement and 
submitted their ratification documents to the United Nations during the Hangzhou G20 summit. 
Given that China is still a developing country which has insisted on the principle of “common 
but differentiated responsibilities” for a long time, its ratification of this agreement seems even 
more valuable. Against the backdrop of Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, 
China’s role of exemplary leadership is further strengthened on the basis of the fact that China 
has vowed to defend the agreement. 
Fourth, from the ideational perspective, China made an ideational contribution to the G20 in 
terms of its proposal of Toward an Innovative, Invigorated, Interconnected and Inclusive World 
Economy as the theme of the 2016 Hangzhou G20 summit. Specifically, (1) innovation 
emphasizes the innovation of a development mode and the exploration of new opportunities for 
driving growth. In the post-crisis era, the world is facing bottlenecks to economic development. 
Thus, innovation is a key factor for the revitalization of the world economy, and this includes 
policy innovation, technology innovation, and human capital innovation, etc.; (2) invigorate is 
a critical element for building a healthy, dynamic, and sustainable world economy. Trade and 
investment are two sources of the potential dynamics for economic growth. To this end, it is 
essential for the G20 members to reduce barriers to global trade and investment and construct 
a conducive environment for global trade and investment; (3) interconnectedness refers to the 
unprecedented interdependence between countries across the world. It not only obliges the 
major powers to coordinate their policies, but also it emphasizes the North-South Dialogue and 
South-South Cooperation. The G20 provides a platform for the major established powers and 
emerging powers to realize policy communication and coordination. The G20 members are 
responsible for contributing to the world economy by providing global public goods; (4) 
inclusiveness consists of inclusive institutions and inclusive development. The former fights 
against the side effects brought about by the exclusive, discriminatory, and non-neutral rules of 
the existing trade and investment system. The latter emphasizes the interests of the developing 
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countries. Developing countries will be significant players in the global community of the 
future. The G20’s agenda-setting highlights the urgent need to address the development issues 
of the developing countries and to promote their sustainable development. 
4.4. SUMMARY 
4.4.1. THE GENERALIZATION OF THE ILCC IN THE G20 
In the light of the above empirical analysis, the first section of the summary interprets the 
generalization of the ILCC in the G20 on the basis of the three stages of the G20.  
During the first two stages detailed above – counter-crisis management (2008-2009) and 
consolidating cooperation (2010-2012) – the ILCC was mainly constructed and implemented 
by China in institutional, material, policy dimensions. From an institutional perspective, China 
constructed and practised its constructive leadership by proposing several institutional 
arrangements and measures conducive to addressing the immediate effects of the crisis. From 
the material perspective, China actively practised its facilitative leadership by empowering the 
troubled European countries (as the major members of the G20) by purchasing their euro debt, 
and its exemplary leadership is highlighted in the light of the United States’ absence from the 
US$430 billion recapitalization of the IMF during that period. From the policy perspective, 
China also constructed and practised its facilitative leadership by consolidating the G20’s 
achievements to counter the crisis and strengthen international cooperation between the G20 
members in a collective manner. However, during these two stages, China did not make 
prominent ideational contributions to the G20 due to the nature of these stages and China’s 
limited discourse power. 
During the third stage of global steering (2013-2018), we can see the framework of the ILCC 
being constructed and implemented to a greater extent. This is attributed to two major causes: 
China has begun to adopt a more proactive foreign strategy, and China has obtained stronger 
discourse power by hosting the 2016 Hangzhou G20 summit. Unlike the two previous stages, 
at this stage, the ILCC is not only manifested in the institutional, material, and policy 
dimensions, but can also be viewed as being constructed and practised by China in the 
ideational dimension. Specifically, on the one hand, China exhibited and practised its 
facilitative leadership and constructive leadership by persuading the G20 members to obtain a 
number of institutional and policy achievements, such as the establishment of the G20 Trade & 
Investment Working Group (TIWG) and the G20 Network Working Group, strengthening the 
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G20’s executive power, the proposition of the G20 Initiative on Supporting Industrialization in 
Africa and Least Developed Countries, aimed to empower the capacity building of the least 
developed countries, and the approval of the G20 Strategy for Global Trade Growth the G20 
and the Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking. On the other hand, by virtue 
of being the host of the Hangzhou G20 summit, China practised its constructive leadership and 
exemplary leadership by making ideational contributions to the development of the G20. For 
instance, China identified four key factors – innovation, invigorate, interconnectedness and 
inclusiveness – as the development trends and major driving forces of the G20. 
Above all, this thesis argues that, in the G20, the relationship between China’s NRC and NRP 
embedded in the ILCC was generally consistent across the three stages during the post-crisis 
era, but it does not deny that there are still several deviations between China’s NRC and NRP, 
and that these deviations were mainly caused by the multilevel and multidimensional challenges 
faced by the ILCC, as will be discussed in the final section of the summary. Moreover, China’s 
construction and practice of facilitative leadership and constructive leadership in the G20 is 
more prominent than China’s exemplary leadership, which has largely been constrained by the 
fact that the G20 is co-dominated by the established and emerging powers. 
4.4.2. THE ILCC IN THE G20 AS A REFLECTION OF THE MAJOR 
FEATURES OF CHINA’S ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF IR 
This second and important section of the summary interprets the ILCC in the G20 as a reflection 
of the major features of Chinese ontological assumptions of IR.  
First of all, China constructed and practised the ILCC in the G20 by promoting the 
complementary relationship between the established G8 countries and major representative 
emerging powers, which can be regarded as the most prominent reflection of the feature of 
relationality. Although the G20 has replaced the G8 as the most significant platform for 
international economic cooperation and governance, the existing global financial institutions 
are still dominated by the major developed countries, and the emerging powers do not yet have 
the capability and willingness to overthrow the existing Western-based international order. 
Against this backdrop, China has played an active role in bridging the existing and emerging 
powers in the G20 and it has also created opportunities for cooperation between the G20 and 
the G8. By managing the complex relations inside and outside the G20, China has helped to 
promote relational stability among the member states, maintain the operation of the G20, and 
preserve the legitimacy of the G20, even though the validity of this mechanism has been 
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challenged. These China’s contributions are conducive to the preservation of the emerging 
countries’ speaking rights and the construction of a favorable environment for China in global 
economic governance. 
Second, China has practised its constructive leadership by promoting the reform of international 
economic order through its participation in the G20 and by proposing the idea of inclusive 
development at the 2016 G20 summit, which can be interpreted as a reflection of the feature of 
inclusiveness. In order to preserve the legitimacy and representativeness of the G20 in the world 
economy, China has devoted itself to leading the achievement of the inclusive trade and 
investment mechanism and policy under the G20 framework. For instance, China approved two 
milestone policy documents, the G20 Strategy for Global Trade Growth and the G20 Guiding 
Principles for Global Investment Policymaking, by accepting the different national conditions 
of the G20 members. The two documents are conducive to the participation of emerging powers 
in the process of contributing to the formation and development of trade and investment regimes 
under the G20 framework. In the context of the G20, China has also repeatedly emphasized the 
significance of inclusive development over the last decade, since China believes that (inclusive) 
development is the foundation stone for achieving stability within both its domestic and 
international society. The release of the G20 Initiative on Supporting Industrialization in Africa 
and Least Developed Countries at Hangzhou G20 summit demonstrated that inclusive 
development has been gradually converted from an idea to reality. 
Third, as mentioned above, through its participation in the G20, China has practised its 
constructive leadership by continuously striving for the reform of the international order of 
financial governance in a relatively moderate and processual manner, which can be considered 
as a reflection of the feature of processuality. The start of this process can be identified as the 
publication of Zhou Xiaochuan’s article “Reform the International Monetary System” at the 
London G20 summit in 2009. In his article, Zhou pointed out the inherent weakness of the 
current international monetary system and made a public policy proposal that “called for a 
gradual move towards using IMF special drawing rights (SDRs) as a centrally managed global 
reserve currency” (Zhou, 2009). In the post-crisis era, characterized by the decreasing 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the existing international financial organizations, Zhou’s 
proposal was in line with the existing trends in the development of international society. 
However, China has never sought to achieve radical reform, rather it looked for step-by-step 
reform, manifested in various stages. In the first stage, China practised its constructive 
leadership by strengthening the existing mechanisms in order to counter the immediate negative 
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effects of the global financial crisis, such as its contribution to the establishment of the G20’s 
Financial Stability Board (FSB); during the second stage, China practised its facilitative 
leadership by assisting in the transfer of G20 hosting rights from the advanced member states 
to an emerging and Asian country – South Korea – for the first time, which enhanced the 
representativeness of the non-Western countries in the G20; during the third stage, by hosting 
the 2016 G20 summit, China played a larger role in the reform of international economic 
governance by virtue of having a G20 platform. For instance, China practised its constructive 
leadership by strengthening the effectiveness of the G20 by leading the establishment of a 
number of new working groups, such as the G20 Trade & Investment Working Group (TIWG) 
and the G20 Network Working Group; moreover, China started to shape the rules of the game 
by approving key documents in the fields of trade and investment under the G20 framework. 
4.4.3. THE CHALLENGES FACED BY THE ILCC IN THE G20 
Although the ILCC in the G20 has generated significant benefits through China’s institutional, 
material, policy, and ideational contributions to the G20, it cannot be denied that the ILCC in 
the G20 is also facing a number of challenges, from multilevel and multidimensional 
perspectives, as follows. 
At the global level, the United States, as the largest economy and the dominant power in the 
global political economy, has a major influence over the construction and implementation of 
the ILCC in the G20. Although the United States promoted the G20 as the most critical 
international cooperation mechanism, replacing the G7, in order to address the GFC, the United 
States is generally considered to be reluctant to take action under its policy of pragmatic 
diplomacy. With the gradual lessening of the influence of the financial crisis, the increase of 
the emerging powers’ status in international society, and the decreasing ability of the United 
States’ to shape the agenda of the G20, the United States has revealed a passive attitude towards 
the institutionalization processes of the G20. After winning the presidential election, under the 
the slogan “America First”, Donald Trump has released a number of protectionist policies in 
the fields of trade, exchange rates, and climate change, etc. These policies run counter to the 
fundamental principles of the G20 in terms of fighting against trade protectionism and 
preventing competitive currency devaluation. In June 2017, the Trump Administration 
officially withdrew from the Paris Agreement on climate change. This action has overturned 
the significant political achievement reached by China and the United States at the Hangzhou 
G20 summit in 2016. The United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement not only led to 
 142 
widespread condemnation, but also it was also a big challenge to China’s facilitative and 
constructive leadership. 
Furthermore, the United States’ “China containment policy” intensified the strategic 
competition between these two economic superpowers in the G20 and has limited the 
construction and implementation of the ILCC. Since 2015, with the promotion of the United 
States’ strategy of “Pivot to Asia” and the upgrading of the maritime dispute in the South China 
Sea, the structural contradictions in the relationship between China and the United States have 
been highlighted. In April 2015, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) released a report of 
“Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”. The report suggests that “a long-term strategic 
rivalry between Beijing and Washington is high…thus making the need to balance its (China’s) 
rising power important” (Blackwill & Tellis, 2015: 5). In addition, in August 2017, the Trump 
Administration launched an investigation into China’s actions under Section 301 of the Trade 
Act of 1974. The investigation aimed to “determine whether acts, policies, and practices of the 
Government of China related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation are 
unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce” (Office of the United 
States Trade Representative, 2017). This investigation cast a shadow over the sound 
development of the China-U.S. trade relationship. On the basis of these events, it is predicted 
that the China-U.S. relationship will become ever more complicated, given the narrowing gap 
between the two countries’ comprehensive national strengths. In this respect, it is not difficult 
to foresee that the G20, as the most significant international cooperation mechanism, will 
become one of the major arenas for China-U.S. strategic wrestling. The United States is unlikely 
to allow China and the other emerging powers to shape the institutional development of the 
G20 according to their wishes, and it will inevitably take all sorts of measures to preserve its 
influence and contain the ILCC in the G20. 
At the regional level, China’s construction and implementation of the ILCC in the G20 is 
challenged by a number of regional economic cooperation mechanisms. As a multilateral 
platform, the G20 “is being overshadowed by mega-regional deals such as TPP and TTIP, to 
which China’s own initiatives on AIIB and One Belt, One Road might be seen as competing 
platforms” (Greenberg, 2016). More specifically, Greenberg identifies these mega-regional 
collaborations as posing a threat to the geopolitical systematic characterized by regulatory 
divergence, murky protectionism, and discrimination, etc.  
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At the domestic level, the ILCC also faces challenges from China itself in two aspects. On the 
one hand, China needs to deal with the arduous task of promoting its economic development in 
an innovative, balanced, inclusive, and sustainable way. As shown above, China’s 
strengthening economic capability and its increasing influence in the global economy constitute 
a critical foundation for the ILCC in the G20. Although, since 2010, China has become the 
second largest economy, its economy still faces serious challenges in terms of multiple 
contradictions and latent risks. The realization of sustainable economic development requires 
that China does its best to transform its economic development pattern, optimize its industrial 
structure, and accelerate technology- and innovation-driven economic development, etc. On the 
other hand, China is clearly lacking in discourse content innovation and discourse 
representation experience. Although, in recent years, China has made a breakthrough in 
discourse innovation, it has not made substantial progress in breaking the Western discourse 
hegemony, which constrains China’s discourse power in in the G20. As a result, in the post-
Hangzhou summit era, it is an important and pressing issue for Chinese leaders and elites to 
think seriously about ways of preserving and strengthening China’s discourse power in relation 
to the construction and implementation of the ILCC in the G20. 
Finally, the ILCC is constrained by the institutional character of the G20. As an informal 
mechanism, the G20 was not established on the basis of a formal legal structure, and its 
achievements are therefore not implemented by legally-binding institutions. This means that 
the G20 is highly flexible due to its informal character, helping member states to reach 
consensus without intervention from their domestic politics and laws. However, consensus, 
international agreements, and international commitments achieved under the G20 are not 
legally binding. Declarations, communiques, and action plans can only play a guiding role, with 
no legal obligation to comply. This largely constrains the execution of decisions of the G20. 
The informality and weakness of decision implementation of the G20 implies that, although 
China practises the ILCC in terms of constructing common interests and achieving consensus 
and agreement with other G20 members, the efficacy of practising its achievements is largely 
limited (Lv, 2017: 82). In addition, the G20 has also faced a number of problems in terms of 
divergent internal interests, a lack of cohesion caused by its asymmetric power distribution, the 
expanding scope of its agenda, the increasing difficulties of policy coordination, etc. Moreover, 
the G20 summit is hosted in rotation by member states, and the host country may dominate 
certain key aspects of the summit in terms of issue selection, agenda shaping, and communique 
drafting, etc. In this respect, no one member state can exert continuous and direct influence on 
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the G20 on these aspects. As a result, the G20’s institutional constraints would influence the 
realization of the ILCC.  
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CHAPTER 5. CASE II: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE ILCC IN THE BRICS 
5.1. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, a number of emerging powers, such as China and India, 
have demonstrated rapid economic development. In the meanwhile, Russia and Brazil have 
gradually strived to escape their economic woes of the 1990s, and they have progressively 
enjoyed an economic recovery. In addition, these four countries have 26% of the total land area 
of the world and 43% of the world population. In this respect, they show their enormous 
potential and bright prospects for trade, investment, and economic contributions to the rest of 
the world. Against this background, Jim O’Neill, the then Goldman Sachs economist, coined 
the term “BRIC” in 2001 to denote these four countries. This grouping was proposed as a 
business concept, aimed to explore potential investment destinations for investors. In 2003, 
Goldman Sachs published a research report Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050 and 
predicted that the total GDP of the BRIC countries would account for over half the GDP of the 
G6 (United States, Japan, Germany, Britain, France, and Italy) by 2025 and their economies 
together would be larger than the G6 in US dollar terms (O’Neill, Lawson, & Pearson, 2003: 
2). 
In 2002, the BRIC countries established a number of new multilateral cooperative mechanisms, 
including the RIC Trilateral Meeting and IBSA Dialogue Forum. The former is a meeting of 
foreign ministers from Russia, India, and China and it focuses on the issues of regional security, 
counter-terror, the arms race, etc. The latter was formed as an international tripartite grouping, 
between India, Brazil, and South Africa, for promoting their international cooperation and 
South-South cooperation in a broader sense. Foreign ministers from China, Russia, India, and 
Brazil held their first meeting during the 2006 UN General Assembly, which is considered to 
be the beginning of cooperation between the BRICs. By 2008, the BRICs leaders had held 
multiple meetings by virtue of the North-South Dialogue under the framework of the G8 
summit and the UN General Assembly. 
The 2008 global financial crisis promoted a rethinking of the international economic order. As 
the most representative emerging powers, Brazil, Russia, India, and China had the greatest 
desire to reform the Western-based international economic order. In May 2008, foreign 
ministers from these four countries held a meeting in Yekaterinburg and determined to 
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cooperate with each other on the world stage. In November and December of that year, Russian 
President Medvedev visited Brazil and India and issued a joint statement with the two countries’ 
presidents respectively. During the visits, they decided to hold the first BRICs summit in June 
2009, aiming to exchange different viewpoints on several key issues to address the global 
financial crisis, to promote the reform of international financial system, and to deal with a 
number of non-traditional security problems such as food security, energy security, and climate 
change, etc. 
Against this background, in June 2009, in order to jointly cope with the global financial crisis, 
leaders from China, Russia, India, and Brazil gathered at the first BRIC’s summit in 
Yekaterinburg, transforming the loose concept into a leader-level cooperation mechanism. In 
April 2011, at the third BRIC’s summit held in China, South Africa became a new member of 
this consortium, and the BRICS came into being. In April 2014, with the establishment of the 
BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA), the 
BRICS group has enhanced its level of institutionalization and become a cooperative grouping 
of emerging powers with significant regional and global influence. Since then, it has begun to 
play more important role in changing the pattern of global institutional and discourse power in 
terms of enhancing the voice and representativeness of the emerging powers in global 
governance. In this respect, the BRICS group is seen as a major challenge to the United States’ 
hegemony and Western-based international order.  
On the basis of the above evidence, a number of scholars have pointed out the major impetus 
and major implications of the BRICS’ cooperation and development as follows: (1) the common 
international strategic consideration is a huge driving force for cooperation between the BRICS 
members. All five BRICS countries are great regional powers and leaders, and they also aspire 
to become critical global players. They hope to establish a global governance structure, based 
on the multipolar principle, which can reflect new world political and economic development. 
As Quiliconi and Kingah argue, the BRICS countries have shown their willingness to be unified 
to exert greater global impact by “following the established rules in traditional institutions to 
push reforms on one hand, and building their own intra-BRICS’ dynamic in the BRICS summits 
on the other hand” (Quiliconi & Kingah 2016: 252). As a consequence, although there are many 
discrepancies between BRICS members, they have fully acknowledged that “the collaborative 
efforts of the BRICS nations will likely have a significant and enduring impact on global 
governance and economics” (Petropoulos, 2013); (2) the common tasks of economic 
development and the complementarity of economic structures give the BRICS countries great 
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potential for achieving economic cooperation. As major emerging countries, BRICS members 
generally face the common task of developing their economies. In the process of seeking 
economic development, due to the high isomorphism of their economic growth models and 
economic structures, the BRICS countries’ economic development has shown strong 
coordinated features. In the meanwhile, the uneven distribution of productive factors between 
BRICS members has also produced significant complementarities and comparative advantages 
in their economic relationships (Tang, Ouyang and Huang, 2014). In this respect, the BRICS 
countries have great potential for cooperation in the field of economics; (3) the achievements 
made in the construction of the cooperation mechanism have further promoted cooperation 
between the BRICS countries. Since the first BRICS foreign ministry meeting held in 2006, 
cooperation between the BRICS countries has progressed smoothly and the areas and levels of 
cooperation have continued to expand for more than a decade. In recent years, the BRICS 
countries have made great efforts to participate in the process of political multipolarization, and 
their influence and discourse power have continued to rise on major issues such as global trade 
liberalization, greenhouse gas emissions, and anti-terrorism. At the same time, the 
establishment of the BRICs cooperation mechanism and network relations have been steadily 
advancing, and cross-sector cooperation mechanisms in the areas of security and law 
enforcement, and humanitarian and economic development have been continuously established 
and improved. Notably, the BRICS New Development Bank and contingent reserve 
arrangements have been established. Institutionalized cooperation has helped the BRIC 
countries to continue to deepen their strategic partnership in a series of issue-areas (Sadiki, 
2016); (4) the formation of the BRIC consensus has become an important boost to the 
cooperation between the BRICS countries. “BRICS” has been transformed from an exogenous 
identity label to an endogenous consensus (Ren and Yin, 2015). In particular, BRICS members 
have gradually formulated a shared vision of a new global order (Coning, Mandrup and 
Odgaard, 2014), which contributes to the further solidarity and cooperation between the BRICS 
countries. The solidarity demonstrated by the BRICS countries in the Ukrainian events of 2014 
indicates that the group has a strong sense of political alliance. 
More specifically, as the largest economy and emerging power among the member states, China 
is naturally seen as the major driving force behind the development of the BRICS. Thus, in 
order to better conduct an historical analysis of the BRICS, it is essential to interpret China’s 
motivations for being involved in this emerging power consortium from international and 
domestic perspectives (Gao, 2015). 
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On the one hand, from the perspective of the international environment, since the reform and 
opening-up period began, China has been increasingly engaged with and benefitted from the 
existing international order. However, for a long time, the major Western powers (especially 
the United States) have been reluctant to promote the reform of the existing mechanisms. Thus, 
China has little discourse power, which is not equal to its contribution to the world economy, 
and it cannot play its due role in terms of implementing innovative practice, shaping 
institutional rules, and influencing the distribution of rights and obligations within these 
organizations. This awkward situation not only fails to reflect China’s growing status as a major 
power in the international system, but it has also greatly restricted China’s room for seeking 
further development. Therefore, China urgently needs to find a new path to building its 
international governance mechanism in a timely manner. Against this background, China has 
paid a lot of attention to the concept of BRICS and has devoted itself to transforming this 
concept into a substantial cooperation mechanism based on the emerging powers through a 
series of innovative practices.  
On the other hand, China also has solid domestic foundations for its involvement in the BRICS, 
which can be observed in two aspects. First, China has the institutional advantage of being able 
to concentrate relevant domestic forces on accomplishing specific major issues. In this respect, 
China provides sufficient domestic resources to unify the BRICS members and to promote the 
construction of the BRICS mechanism. Second, China’s involvement in the BRICS also favors 
the implementation of its peaceful development strategy, the promotion of coordinated 
cooperation between BRICS members, and the enhancement of its international status. In this 
regard, China’s proactive engagement in the BRICS is in compliance with China’s national 
interests and is quite readily accepted by its domestic audience. In addition, through its 
participation in the establishment of the BRICS, China can ensure compatibility between its 
domestic norms and the norms of the BRICS mechanism. By doing so, it can facilitate China’s 
internalization of the BRICS norms. In sum, China has the necessary domestic dynamics for 
constructing the BRICS cooperation mechanism. 
Based on interpretations of China’s motivations and implications regarding the BRICS, the 
nexus between China and the BRICS has triggered extensive debate in political and academic 
circles. Most pundits and observers have recognized China’s critical role in the BRICS in terms 
of trade, investment, and global governance. Assessing China’s role in promoting the 
emergence and development of the BRICs, David Rothkopf argued, “without China, the BRICs 
are just the BRI, a bland, soft cheese that is primarily known for the whine that goes with it” 
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(Rothkopf, 2009). Examining the trade and investment relationships between China and other 
BRICS countries, Kenneth Rapoza went even further, noting that China has already deployed 
the BRICS as its own political tool, as he contended that “China totally owns the BRICS and 
South Africa, Russia and Brazil are particularly at its mercy” (Rapoza, 2017). However, there 
are also some relatively moderate voices. According to Li Jinzhang, in addition to enhancing 
their strategic partnership, China and Brazil are “playing a guiding role in the development of 
the BRICS cooperative mechanism” (Jinzhang Li, 2017). Moreover, according to Sun Yun’s 
analysis, China has always been willing to “strengthen its identity as an emerging economy and 
a developing country by enhancing its contribution to the BRICS nations and their international 
status” (Sun, 2013). 
Having reviewed the debate regarding the relationship between China and the BRICS, this 
thesis argues that China has indeed played a significant role in promoting the development of 
the BRICS. Seemingly, China has no intention or requirement to become the sole hegemon in 
this club. Therefore, the ILCC is considered as an appropriate concept for interpreting China’s 
role in the BRICS. According to the research design (see chapter 2), China’s NRC and NRP 
embedded in the ILCC can be analyzed to be correlated with the division of stage of the 
development of the BRICS that is identified as the establishment of an emerging power 
platform (2009-2010), the expansion of the political center (2011-2012), and the deepening 
institutionalization of the governance mechanism (2013-2018). These three stages are discussed 
in more detail in the following section. 
5.2. THE INTERPRETATION OF CHINA’S NRC EMBEDDED IN 
THE ILCC IN THE BRICS 
5.2.1. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EMERGING POWER GROUP 
(2009-2010) 
One significant landmark of this stage was the first BRICs leaders’ summit held by Russia in 
2009. Since then, the BRICS group has transformed from an economic concept to “the epicenter 
of world politics”. As Oliver Stuenkel argues, this summit’s timing occurred “at the high point 
of a general sense of crisis in the United States, and with it of global order in general” and “it 
was thus an important part of its success at institutionalizing an emerging power platform” 
(Stuenkel, 2015: 30). In this respect, by examining Chinese decision-makers’ speeches and 
Chinese policy-related articles, it is possible to interpret China’s NRC embedded in the ILCC 
in shaping and strengthening this new platform as follows. 
 150 
At the beginning of his speech at the first BRIC summit in 2009, the then Chinese President Hu 
Jintao made a comprehensive analysis of the then international situation from two perspective. 
First, he described the general trend in international relations as “a multi-polar world and 
economic globalization is gaining momentum. Enhanced dialogue and deeper cooperation for 
win-win progress has become the main approach in handling international affairs” [世界多极
化和经济全球化深入发展，加强对话、深化合作、实现共赢已成为处理国际事务的主
旋律] (Hu, 2009d). Second, Hu also pointed out a number of pressing problems such as “the 
international financial crisis is still spreading and deepening, protectionism of various kinds is 
on the rise, the world economy has slid into recession, and the North-South gap is widening” 
[国际金融危机仍在蔓延深化，形形色色的保护主义抬头，世界经济陷入衰退，南北差
距持续扩大] (Hu, 2009d). On the basis of this judgment, Hu emphasized the significance of 
the BRIC countries in the world economy and was aware of the urgency of promoting 
cooperation between emerging powers in terms of identifying common targets and addressing 
emerging issues in a collective manner. As he said: 
As major emerging markets, BRIC countries account for 42% of the world’s population, 14.6% 
of the world’s GDP and 12.8% of global trade. Our combined contribution in PPP terms to 
world economic growth exceeds 50%. The four countries have different national conditions, 
but we all shoulder the important mission of maintaining world peace and jointly managing 
traditional and non-traditional security threats. We all have the heavy responsibility of 
accelerating economic and social development and improving people’s livelihood. And we all 
face the major task of safeguarding the rights and interests of developing countries and 
advancing reform of international financial system. 
[作为主要新兴市场国家，“金砖国家”人口占世界总人口的 42%，国内生产总值占世界
总量的 14.6%，贸易额占全球贸易额的 12.8%，按购买力平价计算对世界经济增长的贡
献率超过 50%。我们四国国情不同，但都肩负着维护世界和平、携手应对传统和非传
统安全威胁的重大使命，都承载着加快经济社会发展、提高人民生活水平的重大责任，
都面临和维护发展中国家权益、推动国际金融体系改革的重大课题] (Hu, 2009d) 
As a consequence, China contributed to the establishment of the BRIC as “a new international 
cooperation platform and an important force in the international community” [一个新的国际
合作平台，国际社会中一支重要力量] (Hu, 2009d). In this respect, it is argued that this 
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upgrading of the BRIC reflects the development of China’s constructive leadership through 
Chinese leaders’ rhetoric. Specifically, China’s constructive leadership is also constructed 
through China’s concrete propositions for strengthening this newly-established platform in 
terms of “enhancing political mutual trust, deepening economic cooperation, intensifying 
people-to-people and cultural exchanges, and promoting mutual learning of experience” [增强
政治互信，深化经济合作，推进人文交流，提倡经验互鉴] (Hu, 2009d). 
In addition, China constructed its facilitative leadership in terms of inclusively bridging the 
BRIC and other mechanisms. For instance, China encouraged the BRIC members to promote 
the effective implementation of the achievements gained under the G20 and UN framework. 
To this end, Hu made several propositions, such as “we should be committed to an early 
recovery of the world economy; we should be committed to reform of the international financial 
system; we should be committed to the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); we 
should be committed to food security, energy and resource security, and public health security” 
[致力于推动世界经济尽快复苏；致力于推动国际金融体系改革；致力于落实联合国千
年发展目标；致力于确保粮食安全、能源资源安全、公共卫生安全] (Hu, 2009d). 
In addition to making concrete propositions regarding the BRIC’s functions and targets, with 
the purpose of strengthening this nascent emerging power platform, China’s facilitative 
leadership is likewise constructed through its emphasis on shaping collective identity and 
mutual recognition among the BRIC countries. Thus, Chinese decision-makers continuously 
stressed the significance of lessening the differences and strengthening the common ground 
between the BRIC countries as follows: 
Despite the differences in political systems, development modes, religious beliefs, and cultural 
traditions, our four countries have become good friends and good partners, which fully proves 
that countries with different social systems can be mutually inclusive, countries with different 
modes of development can cooperate with each other, countries with different histories and 
civilizations can learn from each other, and countries with different cultural traditions can 
interact with each other. 
[我们四国政治体制、发展方式、宗教信仰、文化传统不尽相同，却能成为好朋友、好
伙伴，这充分证明了不同社会制度可以相互包容，不同发展模式可以相互合作，不同
历史文明可以相互借鉴，不同文化传统可以互相交流] (Hu, 2010c). 
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To achieve the above targets, China strives to construct its exemplary leadership through its 
morally-oriented definition of its development as “peaceful development, open and win-win 
development, and responsible development” [和平发展，开放共赢发展，负责任的发展] 
(Hu, 2010c). Specifically, on the basis of its experience of the “Century of Humiliation”, China 
has consistently insisted on its old aphorism of “one should not impose on others what he 
himself does not desire” [己所不欲、勿施于人], and this belief largely contributes to China’s 
understanding and pursuance of peaceful development. In this respect, China has always sought 
a peaceful and harmonious way of dealing with the relationship between itself and other 
countries. In terms of its open and win-win development, China repeatedly stresses the 
significance of its reforming and opening-up policy. As Hu argues, “China pursues an opening-
up strategy featuring mutual benefit and win-win results, and always seeks common 
development through mutually beneficial cooperation” [中国奉行互利共赢的开放战略，始
终通过互利合作促进各国共同发展] (Hu, 2010c). In terms of its responsible development, as 
the largest emerging power with a huge economic volume, China’s influence is felt in every 
corner of the world and its development and policy are closely associated with other economies. 
China constructed its exemplary leadership by attaching great importance to “maintaining 
steady and robust economic development as the primary task” [坚持把保持经济平稳较快发
展作为经济工作的首要任务] (Hu, 2010c) as a significant means of transforming itself into 
the stabilizer and driver of the world economy. In addition, China’s empowering leadership is 
also constructed through adopting several essential measures in terms of “promoting the 
coordinated growth among consumption, export, and investment, providing more opportunities 
for foreign products and services, and maintaining the stability of the RMB exchange rate, etc.” 
[推动消费、出口、投资协调增长；为外国产品和服务提供了大量机遇；保持了人民币
汇率基本稳定] (Hu, 2010c). 
5.2.2. THE EXPANSION OF THE POLITICAL CENTER (2011-2013) 
The most critical event marking this stage is the inclusion of South Africa in the BRICS group 
at the end of 2010. In April 2011, the then South African President Jacob Zuma attended the 
third BRICS summit for the first time. The inclusion of South Africa indicated the group’s 
formal transformation from the BRIC to the BRICS. According to Stuenkel Oliver, South 
Africa’s inclusion “fundamentally altered the nature of the BRICS group and gave it a more 
global structure” (Oliver, 2013: 310). Since then, the BRICS has become more representative 
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of the emerging powers and developing countries, covering the three continents of “Asia, Africa, 
Latin America” (亚非拉). In Mao’s era, the three continents were collectively regarded as a 
political, ideological, and diplomatic union in world politics. 
The inclusion of South Africa and the expansion of the BRICS was largely attributed to China’s 
influence when, as the then rotating chair of the BRIC, China constructed its constructive 
leadership by expanding this grouping by inviting South Africa to participate in the BRICS. 
According to the then Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi, “we believe that the 
inclusion of the South Africa is conducive to the development of the BRICS mechanism and 
promotes the cooperation among emerging markets and emerging countries” [我们相信，南
非的加入将有利于金砖国家合作机制的发展，促进新兴市场国家之间的合作] (China 
News, 2010). 
The first summit of this stage was held in Sanya, China in April 2011, and it was the first BRICS 
summit under China’s presidency. At that summit, the then Chinese President Hu made a 
speech of “Broad Vision, Share Prosperity” and presented a detailed plan for the development 
of the expanded BRICS. First, China constructed its facilitative leadership through its emphasis 
on empowerment of the five members. As Hu argued, “we should respect the sovereignty of all 
countries and their right to choose their development paths and models in keeping with the 
principle of seeking common ground while shelving differences” [我们应当本着求同存异的
原则，尊重各国主权和选择发展道路和发展模式的权利] (Hu, 2011a). Second, China’s 
constructive leadership is shaped by its perception and strong advocacy of “establishing fair, 
just, inclusive and well-managed international monetary and financial systems to support global 
economic development and increasing the say and representation of emerging markets and 
developing countries in these systems” [建设公平、公正、包容、有序的国际货币金融体
系，支持全球经济发展，增加新兴市场国家和发展中国家在国际货币金融体系中的发
言权和代表权] (Hu, 2011a). Third, China also devoted itself to building its constructive 
leadership, manifested in its interest, identity, and vision construction, by stressing the 
significance of the BRICS partnership in terms of “sticking to the basic principles of solidarity, 
mutual trust, openness, transparency and common development, and enhancing mutual trust 
through cooperation and always be good friends and good partners.” [我们应该立足当前、着
眼长远，坚持团结互信、开放透明、共谋发展的基本原则，通过合作加强互信，永远
做好朋友、好伙伴] (Hu, 2011a). Finally, China showed its great willingness to construct its 
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exemplary leadership by demonstrating that “we will share development opportunities with 
other countries, promote the regional and global development by developing China’s economy, 
and share prosperity with people around the world” [中国欢迎世界各国参与中国发展、分
享中国发展机遇，以自己的发展促进地区和世界发展，同世界各国人民共享繁荣] (Hu, 
2011a). 
The hosting of the 2013 BRICS summit by South Africa further confirmed the expansion of 
this political consortium, and that was the first BRICS summit held in the African continent. 
Therefore, the issue of development in Africa was a focus at that summit. Against this backdrop, 
by analyzing Chinese President Xi’s speech, we can see that China actively constructed its 
facilitative leadership by demonstrating that “we should jointly support Africa’s efforts in 
seeking robust growth, speeding up integration and realizing industrialization” [我们要共同支
持非洲在谋求强劲增长、加快一体化、实现工业化方面作出的努力，促进非洲经济成
为世界经济的新亮点] (Xi, 2013c).  
Another significant issue at the Durban BRICS summit was the final decision to set up the New 
Development Bank (NDB) and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). Originally, the 
consensus to establish the NDB and CRA had been reached at the fourth BRICS summit in 
New Delhi. In Durban, China exhibited its role conception of constructive leadership by 
appealing that “we should convert our consensus into concrete actions in terms of actively 
pushing ahead with the establishment of the BRICS Development and Contingent Reserve 
Arrangement and accelerating practical cooperation in various fields” [我们要把各国的政治
共识转化为具体行动，积极推进金砖国家开发银行、外汇储备库等项目，加快各领域
务实合作] (Xi, 2013c). 
5.2.3. THE DEEPENING INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE 
GOVERNANCE MECHANISM (2014-2018) 
Having been initiated at the New Delhi summit in 2012 and set up at the Durban summit in 
2013, the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) was formally established at the Fortaleza 
summit in 2014, and this event signals the beginning of the stage of the deepening 
institutionalization of the cooperation mechanism. China clearly recognized the significance of 
the establishment of the NDB, as Xi noted in his speech “New Departure, New Vision and New 
Impetus” at the Fortaleza summit: 
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With concerted efforts, we agreed on the establishment of the New BRICS Development Bank, 
an important outcome of far-reaching significance in the BRICS cooperation. It embodies the 
political will of BRICS for solidarity, cooperation and common development. It will not only 
help increase the voice of BRICS in international financial affairs, but more importantly, it will 
bring great benefit to the people of our countries and other developing countries. I appreciate 
your support in making Shanghai the headquarters of the bank. We stand ready to work with 
all parties to make every preparation for its early launch. 
[在各方共同努力下，我们今天就建立金砖国家开发银行达成共识。这是金砖国家合作
进程中具有重要和深远意义的成果，体现了金砖国家团结合作、共同发展的政治意愿，
不但有助于提高金砖国家在国际金融事务中的话语权，而且更重要的是能够造福我们
和发展中国家人民。感谢大家支持金砖国家开发银行落户中国上海。我们愿同各方密
切合作，做好充分准备，确保银行尽快启动] (Xi, 2014e). 
In addition to China’s role conception of constructive leadership in the area of institutional 
construction, China also placed emphasis on interest construction. For instance, at the Ufa 
BRICS summit in 2015, Xi proposed that “the BRICS countries should build the community of 
common interest. We should build a more favorable economic partnership with the goal of 
constructing a benefit-sharing value chain and a large market with interest integration” [金砖
国家要利益共同体，我们要以建设利益共享的价值链和利益融合的大市场为目标，共
同构建更紧密经济伙伴关系 ] (Xi, 2015c). Moreover, at the same summit, China also 
constructed its facilitative leadership by encouraging the collective efforts of the BRICS 
members to achieve common targets and by emphasizing the empowerment of the developing 
and African countries, as Xi contended:  
We need to stay committed to promoting common development and common prosperity of all 
developing nations. International development and climate change are among the top priorities 
of this year. The BRICS countries ought to step up their coordination and cooperation by 
upholding the common interest of emerging markets and developing countries on such major 
issues as the post-2015 development agenda and climate change, and by focusing on the 
difficulties and challenges of developing countries, African countries and the least developed 
countries in particular. 
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[我们要继续致力于促进发展中国家共同发展繁荣。今年是国际发展年和气候变化年，
金砖国家应该加强协调和配合，在 2015 年后发展议程、气候变化等重大国际发展议题
上，维护新兴市场国家和发展中国家共同利益，引导 2015 年后发展议程谈判重点关注
解决发展中国家特别是非洲国家和 不发达国家面临的困难和挑战] (Xi, 2015c). 
This thesis argues that China’s hosting of the 2017 Xiamen BRICS summit was one of the most 
significant events for interpreting the construction of the ILCC through Chinese decision-
makers’ rhetoric during this stage. Specifically, at this summit, China’s emphasis on a 
comprehensive BRICS partnership provides a lens for understanding China’s role conception 
of the ILCC from the perspectives of deepening institutionalization, strengthening strategic 
coordination, the building of international order, and the promotion of people-to-people 
exchanges. 
First of all, from the perspective of deepening institutionalization, China’s role conception of 
constructive leadership was witnessed in China’s confirmation and promotion of a number of 
the BRICS institutionalized arrangements. As Xi argued: 
This year, we have formulated the BRICS Trade in Services Cooperation Roadmap, 
the Outlines for BRICS Investment Facilitation, the BRICS E-Commerce Cooperation Initiative, 
the BRICS Action Plan for Innovation Cooperation and the Action Plan for Deepening 
Industrial Cooperation Among BRICS Countries. We have launched the African Regional 
Center of the New Development Bank (NDB), decided to set up the BRICS Model E-Port 
Network and reached extensive agreement on taxation, e-commerce, local currency bond, 
public-private partnership, and the network of financial institutions and services. Our practical 
cooperation has become more institutionalized and substantive, and delivered more tangible 
results. 
[今年，我们制定了《金砖国家服务贸易合作路线图》、《金砖国家投资便利化纲要》、
《金砖国家电子商务合作倡议》、《金砖国家创新合作行动计划》、《金砖国家深化
工业领域合作行动计划》，成立了新开发银行非洲区域中心，决定建立金砖国家示范
电子口岸网络，在税收、电子商务、本币债券、政府和社会资本合作、金融机构和服
务网络化布局等方面达成积极共识，各领域务实合作不断机制化、实心化，含金量不
断提升] (Xi, 2017c). 
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Second, from the perspective of strengthening strategic coordination, China constructed its 
facilitative leadership by emphasizing the collective feature of the BRICS cooperation. More 
precisely, China proactively advocates that the BRICS countries should “act in the spirit of 
extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits, we need to identify those areas 
where our development policies and priorities converge” [本着共商、共建、共享原则，寻
找发展政策和优先领域的契合点] (Xi, 2017c). Moreover, Xi also pointed out that “we should 
speak with one voice and jointly present our solutions to issues concerning international peace 
and development. This meets the expectation of the international community, and will help 
safeguard our common interests” [我们就事关国际和平发展的问题共同发声，共提方案，
既符合国际社会期待，也有助于维护我们的共同利益] (Xi, 2017c). 
Third, from the perspective of building international order, China’s role conception of 
facilitative leadership was also constructed by the stress it placed on the significance of the 
BRICS in building an inclusive international order, as Xi contended, “we need to make 
economic globalization open, inclusive, balanced and beneficial to all, build an open world 
economy, support the multilateral trading regime and oppose protectionism” [我们要推动开
放、包容、普惠、平衡、共赢的经济全球化，建设开放型世界经济，支持多边贸易体
制，反对保护主义] (Xi, 2017c). In the meanwhile, with respect to the issue of international 
order, China’s role conception of constructive leadership was also highlighted by its appeal to 
the other BRICS “to advance the reform of global economic governance, increase the 
representation and voice of emerging market and developing countries” [我们要推进全球经
济治理改革，提高新兴市场国家和发展中国家的代表性和发言权] (Xi, 2017c). 
Fourth, from the perspective of promoting people-to-people exchanges, China’s role conception 
of constructive leadership is embodied in the emphasis Chinese leaders placed on emotional 
construction in shaping the common interests and a common vision between the BRICS 
members. As Xi insisted, “amity between the people holds the key to sound state-to-state 
relations. Only with intensive care can the tree of friendship and cooperation grow luxuriant” 
[国之交在于民相亲。只有深耕厚植，友谊与合作之树才能枝繁叶茂] (Xi, 2017c). 
Moreover, confirming a number of activities and outcomes achieved in the area of people-to-
people exchanges between the BRICS members, Xi highlighted that “we hope that through our 
joint efforts, these activities will take place regularly and be institutionalized. We need to 
expand our outreach to get the public more involved and encourage more lively exchanges of 
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diverse cultures” [希望在我们共同关心和推动下，这些活动能够经常化、机制化，并努
力深入基层，面向广大民众，营造百花齐放的生动局面] (Xi, 2017c). 
5.3. THE INTERPRETATION OF CHINA’S NRP EMBEDDED IN 
THE ILCC IN THE BRICS 
5.3.1. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EMERGING POWER GROUP 
(2009-2010) 
As mentioned above, the first BRIC summit in 2009 transformed the group from a business 
notion into an entity in world politics and economies, and it signaled the launch of an emerging 
power group in the existing international system. Against this background, at this stage, China’s 
practice of ILCC can be interpreted from institutional, material, policy, and ideational 
perspectives. 
First, from the institutional perspective, although the first BRIC summit was proposed and 
hosted by Russia, and was recognized as “the epicenter of world politics” (Stuenkel, 2015: 25) 
by the then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, it cannot be denied that China played an 
equally critical role of constructive leadership in the development of the BRIC as an emerging 
power group. Since China was the largest developing country and the largest emerging power, 
its accession was seen as the great impetus to the formation of this political group. As Jagannath 
Panda noted, “the eagerness of clubbing themselves within the framework of BRIC is a 
developmental outcome of the constructive Chinese foreign policy patterns since many years” 
(Panda, 2011: 46).  
Second, from the material perspective, although at this stage the four members’ investment and 
trade activities were greater with the non-BRIC countries than the intra-BRIC ones  (Lye & 
Zhang, 2010: 59), China’s growing national strength gave it the material capability of being a 
facilitative leadership in the BRICs. China’s population and GDP were equivalent to the sum 
of those of Russia, India, and Brazil. The level of China’s foreign trade exceeded that of the 
three countries combined, and its foreign exchange reserves were three times theirs. More 
precisely, China practised its facilitative leadership by increasing its emphasis on the 
development of intra-BRIC economic relationships. For instance, at this stage, China’s trade 
with the other BRIC members witnessed a dramatic average increase of 40% , well above the 
30% increase in China’s overall trade. As a result, China became the economic magnet within 
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the BRIC group: China was the third largest trade partner of Russia, and it was the largest trade 
partner of India and Brazil (Lin, 2009).  
Against the backdrop of China’s role as a central trade hub for the BRICs and the world’s 
largest exporter, two competing viewpoints emerged regarding China’s economic relationship 
with the other BRIC countries. On the one hand, some argued that “the BRIC was firmly in 
charge by China” (Anderlini, 2011); on the other hand, others contended that, since trade 
between China and the other BRIC members was mutually beneficial and complementary,  
China’s position was not dominant within the framework of intra-BRIC economic exchanges 
(Ross, 2011). However, in sum, China’s proactive involvement endowed the BRICs with great 
value in the world economy and allowed the BRICs to become an influential group with 
economic significance. 
Third, from the policy perspective, China practised its facilitative leadership in promoting the 
BRIC members to act as a political group. For example, with the purpose of maximizing the 
BRIC’s leverage before its engagement with the Western countries at the G20 Pittsburgh 
summit, China persuaded the member states to coordinate their positions and policies at the 
first BRIC summit in 2009 (Xue, 2009). As Lye and Zhang pointed out, “The BRIC members 
met separately and issued joint statements prior to the Pittsburgh G20 meetings so as to attempt 
to speak with one voice especially on economic and financial issues” (Lye & Zhang, 2010: 70). 
As a consequence, as a result of these joint appeals and substantial pressure from the BRICs 
and other developing countries, the joint communique of the Pittsburgh G20 summit was 
successfully revised from the initial draft to the final version that acknowledged that the 
emerging countries should be given more opportunities to have a greater voice and calling for 
the expansion of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). As the then Russian Deputy Finance 
Minister Dmitry Pankin argued, the G20 summit showed that the BRICs could act in concert to 
have their voices heard (Glosny, 2010). 
Fourth, from the ideational perspective, China exhibited its exemplary leadership in terms of 
shaping a common vision and strengthening a common identity for the BRICs as representative 
of emerging and developing countries. For instance, although it had achieved astonishing 
development and economic growth by 2009, China emphasized the self-restraint of its 
increasing power by officially refusing the concept of the G2 that had been advanced by a 
number of U.S.-based scholars and politicians, such as Fred Bergsten, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
Niall Ferguson, and Robert Zoellick. In 2009, Zbigniew Brzezinski published an article entitled 
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The Group of Two that could Change the World, arguing that “the U.S. and Chinese leaders 
should meet informally on a regular schedule for personal in-depth discussions not just about 
our bilateral relations but about the world in general” (Brzezinski, 2009). Brzezinski’s proposal 
suggested that China should not be seen as an emerging power or a developing country and the 
world should be co-governed by the United States and China. 
However, the then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Chinese scholars “criticized the concept 
of G2 as inappropriate and infeasible, arguing that it would harm China’s diplomacy and isolate 
it from the developing world” (Chu and Chen, 2009). In this respect, China was eager to be a 
significant member of a larger “developing” club and prevent itself from falling into the G2 
trap. In other words, rather than a world led and managed by the G2, China’s leaders were 
inclined to maintain a world co-governed by the established and emerging powers. Thus, China 
continue to be “low profile as a developing country, cooperate with other emerging developing 
countries, and benefit from this cooperation while not being seen as confronting the United 
States” (Glosny, 2010: 129). As the then Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo expressed, “the 
BRIC countries need to come up with more initiatives to compel the global community to 
introduce adequate reform at the ground level” (Sun, 2009). Nevertheless, according to Panda, 
“neither China nor the other BRIC countries have any specific goal or vision to reconstruct the 
current world order; but the process is already started as far as the Chinese are concerned” 
(Panda, 2011: 48).  
5.3.2. THE EXPANSION OF THE POLITICAL CENTER (2011-2013) 
The inclusion of South Africa into the BRIC marked the official expansion of the political 
center to the African continent, which is characterized by a vast number of developing countries. 
Thus, this expansion enhanced the legitimacy of the group in world politics and the global 
economy. Since then, the transformation from the BRICs to the BRICS indicates that this 
emerging power group will be able to play a bigger role in coordinating regional and global 
affairs and in shaping a more representative vision for emerging powers and developing 
countries. During this stage, the ILCC was clearly observed in this expansion process and the 
strengthening of the BRICS as an indispensable power in economic development and global 
governance. 
First, from the institutional perspective, with respect to the group’s expansion, China’s 
facilitative leadership (inclusiveness) and constructive leadership (institutional construction) 
were prominent manifestations of its implementation of the ILCC. In other words, China 
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practised its constructive leadership by inviting South Africa in the BRIC, which was seen as a 
landmark of the institutional construction of this group. As Oliver Stuenkel argued, “South 
Africa’s inclusion has been continuously described as a Chinese initiative, even though 
negotiators from Russia, India, and Brazil have always been supportive of the move” (Stuenkel, 
2013: 315).  
Moreover, the inclusiveness feature of the ILCC was also observed in China’s efforts to lead 
the BRICS “away from being a closed, inward-looking club designed to benefit only its 
members, into an outward-looking one oriented to assisting developing countries” (Kirton, 
2013). In this respect, with the purpose of protecting the interests of developing countries, 
China’s invitation of South Africa into the BRIC could also be seen as its implementation of 
facilitative leadership in promoting adequate cooperation between BRIC and BASIC (Wang, 
2010). From this evidence, it is argued that “there is also great interest within the Chinese 
strategic communities to merge together BRIC, IBSA and BASIC to have a greater view from 
the developing world for countering the Western and European supremacy in global politics” 
(Panda, 2011: 24).  
Second, from the material perspective, China is seen as the primus inter pares power among the 
BRICS members. One significant evidence of China’s implementation of its facilitative 
leadership was its material empowerment of the establishment of the BRICS New Development 
Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Agreement (CRA). As John Kirton argued, “China 
alone has the financial capacity in its foreign exchange reserves or elsewhere to determine if 
the BRICS bank will be launched with sufficient capital” (Kirton, 2013). In addition, the 
establishment of the CRA aims to construct a financial safety net for the BRICS, since the five 
countries agreed that the existing Western-based financial institutions cannot really protect the 
interests of the emerging powers. According to the agreement between the BRICS members, 
the total committed resources of the CRA are US$100 billion, of which China decided to 
contribute US$41 billion, as the largest portion (Huang, 2013: 21). In this respect, it is deemed 
that China’s abundant material capital ensured the successful founding of this key financial 
mechanism. 
Third, from the policy perspective, since the inclusion of the South Africa, the BRICS countries 
have placed a great deal of emphasis on the economic development of the African countries. 
During the Durban summit, the BRICS countries held a dialogue with 12 African countries 
under the theme of “Unlocking Africa’s Potential: BRICS and Africa Cooperation on 
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Infrastructure” and achieved the “Multilateral Agreement on Cooperation and Co-financing for 
Sustainable Development”. In the eThekwini Declaration, the BRICS countries, under the 
framework of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), committed to support 
the industrialization process of the African countries in terms of stimulating foreign direct 
investment (FDI), knowledge exchange, capacity-building, and diversification of imports from 
Africa (Huang, 2013: 22). 
These policy achievements made at the Durban summit partly profited from China’s newly 
elected leadership under Xi Jinping. After he became the President of China at the end of 2012, 
Xi Jinping placed special emphasis on cooperation with Africa. For instance, with the exception 
of Russia, Xi decided to take his first trip abroad to Tanzania, South Africa, and the Republic 
of the Congo. During the visit, Xi argued that the BRICS was a significant force for promoting 
the development of African countries. The unprecedented level of emphasis the new Chinese 
leader attached to the cooperation between the BRICS and Africa reflected China’s constructive 
leadership in making the BRICS club more inclusive and representative. 
Fourth, from the ideational perspective, by hosting the third BRICS summit in Sanya, China 
practised its constructive leadership in promoting the idea of “inclusive development”, which 
was to be agreed in the Sanya Declaration by the BRICS members. China’s advocacy of 
“inclusive development” aimed to provide impetus for shaping common value between the 
BRICS countries and explore a new path for BRICS members’ cooperation and development 
(Yang, 2011). In this respect, the construction of the idea of “inclusive development” is 
conducive to the institutionalization of international economic cooperation and a development 
model characterized by win-win cooperation and interest sharing. 
5.3.3. THE DEEPENING INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE 
GOVERNANCE MECHANISM (2014-2018) 
The formal establishment of the New Development Bank at the 2014 Fortaleza summit was a 
prominent symbol for the institutionalization of the BRICS and a substantial step for the BRICS 
to participate in global economic/financial governance. In other words, at this stage, the BRICS 
has gradually transformed from a loose political group to an important force in global 
governance. In this transformation, the most conspicuous implementation of the ILCC was 
manifested in China’s hosting of the Xiamen BRICS summit in 2017. 
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First, from the institutional perspective, at this stage, the establishment of the BRICS New 
Development Bank has made substantial progress. In 2014, the BRICS countries signed the 
constituent agreements of the NDB; in July 2015, this first multilateral financial bank backed 
by the emerging powers officially opened. As the largest economy in the BRICS, China 
practised its facilitative leadership (collectiveness) by shaping the structure and code of conduct 
of the NDB. From the early establishment of the BRICS as an emerging power grouping, China 
had strongly advocated “democratic consultation” as the culture of the group and that was 
gradually assimilated into in the development of the BRICS. For instance, despite existing 
tensions between China and India – the two giants in the group  – the BRICS countries followed 
the principle of “democratic consultation”, collectively coordinated their stances, and having 
“led to the finalization of the New Development Bank with its headquarters in Shanghai and its 
first president an Indian national, appeared to consolidate the club culture among the BRICS 
members” (Cooper, 2016: 84). Moreover, the NDB initial authorized capital of US$100 billion 
was equally contributed by the five members, which also reflected their equality and the 
democratic nature of the BRICS. 
In addition, China’s practice of constructive leadership in the institutionalization of the BRICS 
was also manifested in its promotion of cultural/people-to-people exchanges. During China’s 
presidency of BRICS in 2017, China hosted a large number of meaningful cultural/people-to-
people exchange activities, including the BRICS International Film Festival, the Fifth Meeting 
of BRICS Education Ministers, the BRICS Political Parties, Think-tanks and Civil Society 
Organizations Forum, the BRICS Media Summit, the BRICS High-level Meeting on 
Traditional Medicine and the BRICS Health Ministers Meeting, etc. These activities aimed to 
“encourage people from all walks of life in BRICS countries to carry out friendly exchanges 
and promote cultural cooperation at a deeper and more concrete level. These efforts will 
consolidate public support and provide a strong impetus for the BRICS cooperation in every 
realm” (Jinzhang Li, 2017).  
Second, from the policy perspective, during this stage, the increasing institutionalization of the 
BRICS group was also manifested in the achievement of a vast number of policy agreements 
between the five countries. In July 2015, the BRICS countries launched the Strategy for BRICS 
Economic Partnership, identifying eight major cooperation areas. In October 2016, the BRICS 
published the BRICS Roadmap for Trade, Economic and Investment Cooperation until 2020, 
aiming to enhance levels of trade and investment. Against this backdrop, the BRICS countries 
also released the BRICS Trade and Investment Facilitation Plan, the BRICS Guidelines for 
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Intellectual Property Cooperation, and the BRICS Framework for Trade and Investment 
Cooperation, etc. These policy agreements reflected the BRICS’ consensus to support a 
multilateral trade and investment system and to fight against the protectionism. 
Moreover, during China’s BRICS presidency in 2017, China identified several new economic 
growth points for the BRICS and practised its constructive leadership in achieving a number of 
relevant policy agreements. For instance, during the ninth BRICS summit in Xiamen, the 
BRICS leaders ratified the BRICS Trade in Services Cooperation Roadmap and the Framework 
on Strengthening the Economic and Technical Cooperation for BRICS Countries, indicating 
that the BRICS countries agreed to a code of conduct in the areas of trade in services and 
technological cooperation. In addition, with the growing e-commerce trade between the BRICS 
countries, in 2017, the Meeting of the BRICS Trade Ministers ratified the BRICS E-Commerce 
Cooperation Initiative, launching a comprehensive process of e-commerce cooperation. As the 
statistics show, in 2016, the number of netizens from the BRICS countries surpassed 1.46 
billion, and the online retail sales of the BRICS was US$876.1 billion, accounting for 47% of 
the global figure (Xu, 2018). 
Third, from the material perspective, the last ten years have witnessed an increasing degree of 
economic and trade cooperation between the BRICS countries, and China’s role of facilitative 
leadership can be observed in the coupling effects of China’s trade with and investment in the 
other BRICS countries. In terms of trade, from January to October 2017, China’s trade in goods 
with other BRICS countries (Brazil, India, Russia, and South Africa) reached US$235.79 
billion, a rise of 22.5% on the previous year. The increasing rate was 11.7% higher than that of 
China’s total trade in goods with the world. In terms of exports, China’s exports to the BRICS 
countries accounted for US$126.16 billion, up 16.9% over the same period in the previous year, 
and this increasing rate was 11.3% higher than that of China’s total exports to the world. In 
terms of imports, China’s imports from the BRICS countries was US$109.62 billion, up 29.7% 
year on year, and this increasing rate was 11.6% higher than that of China’s total imports from 
the rest of the world (Xu, 2018). 
In addition to trade, China’s investment in the other BRICS countries was another critical 
manifestation of their cooperation. By 2015, China’s direct investment stock in Brazil 
amounted to US$2.257 billion, which was 42 times greater than in 2003; its direct investment 
stock in Russia was US$14.02 billion, which was 226 times greater than in 2003; and its direct 
investment stock in India was US$3.77 billion, which was 3,926 times greater than in 2003. On 
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the basis of these statistics, Lin and Chen argued, although China’s direct investments in the 
other BRICS countries were still limited, it shows a dramatic increase year on year, and there 
is still plenty of scope for them to cooperate. They also contended that China’s direct 
investments had significant coupling effects on the other BRICS countries and had important 
implications for their economic development (L. Lin & Chen, 2017: 101). 
Fourth, from the ideational perspective, another significant implementation of the ILCC in the 
institutionalization of the BRICS was China’s proposition of the “BRICS Plus” idea during the 
Xiamen summit in 2017. The “BRICS Plus” idea is not limited to cooperation between the 
BRICS members, rather it is an attempt or exploration of how to construct a wider partnership 
between the developing countries and emerging powers (Ding, 2018). By inviting more non-
BRICS countries to participate in the BRICS in terms of establishing bilateral, trilateral, 
multilateral, and regional cooperation, the “BRICS Plus” idea aims to make an innovative 
contribution to the new model and new norms of the BRICS mechanism. Specifically, the 
“BRICS Plus” idea provides intellectual guidance for the BRICS on how to (1) promote a 
dialogue mechanism with regional organizations and international mechanisms; (2) explore 
possible ways of strengthening coordination with the middle powers; (3) to safeguard the 
outcomes of global governance and consolidate cooperation between the BRICS and the G20. 
In sum, the “BRICS Plus” can not only provide dynamics for the long-term development of the 
BRICS, but also it is conducive to the new modality of international relations characterized by 
mutual respect, fairness and justice, and win-win cooperation, etc. 
In practice, China invited five countries – Tajikistan, Egypt, Kenya, Mexico, and Thailand – to 
attend the Xiamen summit. Although it was not the first time that a host country had invited 
other countries, the Chinese invitation gave rise to talk about a “BRICS plus” – that is, a bloc 
which could add new permanent members. Egypt and Tajikistan are important countries for 
China’s New Silk Road megaproject – the Belt and Road Initiative. As for Mexico, its 
attendance at the summit took place in a context where the renegotiation of NAFTA threatens 
nearly 75% of its exports. In this respect, “diversifying its external economic links is a way of 
counteracting its overwhelming dependence on the US market” (Frenkel, 2017). 
5.4. SUMMARY 
5.4.1. THE GENERALIZATION OF THE ILCC IN THE BRICS  
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By conducting an empirical analysis of China’s NRC and NRP embedded in the ILCC in the 
BRICS, the first section of the summary interprets the generalization of the ILCC in the BRICS 
through the above-mentioned three stages. 
During the first two stages of the establishment of the BRIC (2009-2010) and the expansion of 
this group (2011-2013), the construction and implementation of the ILCC can be observed in 
institutional, material, policy, and ideational dimensions. First of all, under the framework of 
the ILCC, China’s institutional contribution to the BRICS was manifested in the formation and 
expansion of this emerging power consortium, but not really displayed in the 
institutionalization of this group. Second, during the first two stages, one of the most significant 
events was China’s proposal and ratification of the move to include South Africa in the BRICS 
by exhibiting its constructive leadership. As a result, through the inclusion of the most 
representative African country, the legitimacy and representativeness of the BRICS was 
accordingly enhanced. Since then, China has practised its facilitative leadership by shaping the 
BRICS to establish greater cooperation with Africa and provide more policy and material 
support to empower this continent. For instance, during the Durban summit, the BRICS and 12 
other African countries achieved the “Multilateral Agreement on Cooperation and Co-financing 
for Sustainable Development”. Third, unlike the ILCC in the G20, since the establishment of 
the BRIC, China has practised its constructive leadership by making ideational contributions to 
this group. Over the last decade, China has successfully injected the idea of “democratic 
consultation” into the BRICS, and this idea has influenced several critical BRICS events, such 
as the inclusion of South Africa and the establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank 
(NDB), etc. 
During the third stage, China practised its facilitative leadership and constructive leadership by 
leading and supporting the BRICS to realize substantial progress by formally establishing the 
BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), 
which verifies China’s institutional contribution to the BRICS to a greater extent than that 
which occurred during the first two stages. According to the agreement made between the 
BRICS members, the total committed resources of the CRA are US$100 billion, of which China 
decided to contribute US$41 billion as the largest portion (Huang, 2013: 21). In this respect, it 
is deemed that China’s abundant material capital ensured the successful founding of this key 
financial mechanism. Since then, the BRICS has no longer been regarded as a loose political 
group, rather it has obtained certain institutional discourse power and has played an 
indispensable role in global governance. Another significant manifestation of the ILCC was 
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China’s ideational contribution of the “BRICS Plus”, which provides the dynamics for the long-
term development of the BRICS and is conducive to the new modality of international relations 
characterized by mutual respect, fairness and justice, and win-win cooperation, etc. 
Above all, this thesis argues that, in the BRICS, the relationship between China’s NRC and 
NRP embedded in the ILCC was generally consistent throughout the three stages in the post-
crisis era. However, because of a number of challenges at different levels and dimensions, there 
are certain differences between the NRC and NRP. In addition, since China is seen as the primus 
inter pares power among the BRICS members and China is keen to promote the BRICS as a 
significant force in global governance, all of the three dimensions of the ILCC – facilitative 
leadership, constructive leadership, and exemplary leadership – are largely constructed and 
practised by China. 
5.4.2. THE ILCC IN THE BRICS AS A REFLECTION OF THE MAJOR 
FEATURES OF CHINESE ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF IR 
Having reviewed China’s NRC and NRP embedded in the ILCC in the BRICS at the beginning 
of the summary, the ILCC in the BRICS can be interpreted as a reflection of the major features 
of Chinese ontological assumptions of IR. First of all, since the establishment of the BRIC(S), 
China has continuously practised its constructive leadership by shaping a common identity 
among the BRICS members, which can be regarded as a reflection of the feature of relationality. 
In the post-crisis era, the rise of the BRICS, as a new epicenter of world politics, has helped the 
member states obtain their international reputations and recognition as representative of 
emerging powers. This recognition not only strengthened the political stability of the BRICS 
as an emerging power consortium, but it was also conductive to solidarity between the large 
number of developing countries. Moreover, as the largest economy of the five countries, China 
practised its facilitative leadership by leading the development of intra-BRICS trade and 
investment, which has strengthened economic cooperation between the BRICS members. 
Although the intra-BRICS trade and investment structure has been criticized as a sort of 
“dependency relationship” by a number of Western and Latin American scholars, the increasing 
level of intra-BRICS economic interdependency cannot be ignored, and it has played a 
significant role in shaping a close relational network between the five countries. However, 
although the BRICS is seen as representative of emerging powers and developing countries and 
is considered to be at the vanguard of appeals for the reform of the existing Western-based 
global governance system, China has no intention of shaping the BRICS as a rival group to the 
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established powers. Rather, in order to manage the complex relations in contemporary IR and 
preserve the stability of international order, China practised its constructive leadership by 
establishing cooperation between the BRICS and other existing mechanisms such as the G20 
and the UN. This cooperation has provided opportunities for the BRICS members to engage 
with the Western countries on several key issues. 
Second, as mentioned above, China constructed and practised its constructive leadership by 
seeking common ground between the BRICS members while preserving their differences, 
which can be interpreted as a reflection of the feature of inclusiveness. Although there are a 
number of divergences between the five inter-continental members in terms of political systems, 
development modes, religious beliefs, and cultural traditions, Chinese decision-makers have 
repeatedly, at the BRICS summits, highlighted their common political and economic desire to 
reform the existing Western-based international order and to construct a more representative 
pattern of global governance. Given the increasing criticisms of the fading BRICS and the 
structural contradiction of the intra-BRICS trade, China’s emphasis on common political and 
economic demands demonstrated its inclusive attitude towards this representative emerging 
power consortium, and this inclusiveness is conducive to the resilience and stability of the 
BRICS against the background of global economic stagnation. Moreover, China’s proposal and 
approval of the inclusion of South Africa in the BRICS has also clearly displayed the feature 
of inclusiveness. The inclusion of South Africa in the BRICS marked the official expansion of 
the political center to the African continent, which is characterized by a vast number of 
developing countries, thereby enhancing the legitimacy and representativeness of the BRICS 
in world politics. In addition to the political implications, the inclusion of South Africa has also 
exerted significant economic implications on the development of Africa. In eThekwini 
Declaration, the BRICS countries, under the framework of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), committed to support the African countries’ industrialization process 
in terms of stimulating foreign direct investment (FDI), knowledge exchange, capacity-building, 
and diversification of imports from Africa (Huang, 2013: 22). Moreover, the feature of 
inclusiveness was also observed in China’s efforts to lead the BRICS “away from being a closed, 
inward-looking club designed to benefit only its members, into an outward-looking one 
oriented to assisting developing countries” (Kirton, 2013). For instance, China practised its 
constructive leadership by promoting adequate cooperation between the BRICS and BASIC 
and IBSA in order to have a more representative view from the developing world (Panda, 2011: 
24).  
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Third, the construction and implementation of the ILCC in the BRICS can also be considered 
as a reflection of the feature of processuality of Chinese ontological assumptions of IR. The 
feature of processuality is mainly verified in China’s contribution to the development of the 
BRICS from a concept to a group to an institutionalized mechanism over the last decade. As 
mentioned above, although the first BRIC summit was proposed and hosted by Russia, it cannot 
be denied that China played an equally critical role of facilitative leadership in the emergence 
of the BRIC as an emerging power group. As Jagannath Panda argued, “the eagerness of 
clubbing themselves within the framework of BRIC is a developmental outcome of the 
constructive Chinese foreign policy patterns since many years” (Panda, 2011: 46). Since then, 
as the representative of the emerging powers and developing countries, the BRIC has 
transformed from an economic concept to a political group that has begun to play a critical role 
in international relations. This thesis contends that the BRIC’s transformation followed the 
grand tendency (the rise of the emerging powers) of the international situation in the post-crisis 
era. Moreover, through its proactive participation in the BRICS, China has gradually injected 
the principle of “democratic consultation” into this emerging power grouping, and this principle 
has further evolved into the club culture (Cooper, 2016) of the BRICS. Guided by this club 
culture, the establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) can be viewed as a 
manageable and balanced process. Following the initiative proposed at the Durban summit, the 
NDB has been established through a process of continuous coordination and on the basis of 
consensus achieved by member states. More importantly, given the existing tension between 
China and India – the two giants in the BRICS – the member states collectively coordinated 
their stances and, having “led to the finalization of the New Development Bank with its 
headquarters in Shanghai and its first president an Indian national, appeared to consolidate the 
club culture among the BRICS members” (Cooper, 2016: 84).  
5.4.3. THE CHALLENGES FACED BY THE ILCC IN THE BRICS 
This final section of the summary points out the major challenges faced by the construction and 
implementation of the ILCC in the BRICS. Specifically, the major challenges are identified in 
terms of the internal heterogeneity and competitiveness of the BRICS, the immature 
cooperation mechanism of the BRICS, the lack of a collective identity of the BRICS, and the 
unsustainable development model of the BRICS countries. (J. Lu, 2017). 
First of all, the obvious heterogeneity of and competitiveness between the BRICS countries are 
regarded as a major hindrance to cooperation between them. A number of Western scholars 
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tend to routinely describe the BRICS countries as a “disparate quartet” (The Economist, 2009) 
or a “motley crew” (Saran and Sharan, 2012). The “BRICS” itself is a flawed concept, and the 
“BRICS member countries were too diverse to ever form a coherent group” (Wilson and 
Purushothaman, 2003). Potential conflict deriving from BRICS’ internal heterogeneity and 
competitiveness are concentrated in the following aspects. (1) The first consists of the 
ideological divergences and different political systems. On the one hand, China and Russia are 
authoritarian countries, and on the other hand, India, Brazil, and South Africa are immature 
democracies. As a result, for certain diplomatic issues, the latter three countries rely more on 
their tripartite forum – IBSA – to promote coordination and dialogue (Mottet, 2013). This could 
lead to the divisions between the BRICS members. (2) The second relates to the 
competitiveness embedded in their economic relationships. The BRICS countries are all at a 
similar development stage, which indicates that these countries share some common ground in 
terms of their production structure, trade structure, and their positions within international 
industrial chains. With a background of industrialization and economic transformation, the 
BRICS countries focus on the same targeted industries, and all of them are keen to take the 
initiative in when it comes to international competition. This situation will surely lead to 
internal trade competition within the BRICS (Lai and Wu, 2012). (3) The third aspect relates 
to bilateral mistrust, contradictions, and even potential policy conflicts. In particular, there is 
mutual distrust between China and Russia due to their historical interactions, and the potential 
conflicts between China and India on the Tibet-related issue and other border issues. 
Second, the immature and imperfect BRICS cooperation mechanism has created an insufficient 
incentive for cooperation between BRICS members. The objectives and functions of the BRICS 
cooperation mechanism were not made sufficiently clear from its inception. The mechanism is 
more like a passive response to Western pressures or a temporary solution to specific issues. 
Moreover, political enthusiasm for the BRICS cooperation mechanism has waned since being 
hit by its members’ economic slowdown. The BRICS mechanism has always been embodied 
by a forum-style cooperation without being developed into a formal, hierarchical international 
organization. Although the forum-style cooperation mechanism is relatively flexible, due to the 
lack of programmatic and procedural systems documentation, the procedures, contents, and 
achievements of leaders’ meetings have failed to reflect the restrictive principle. This has 
resulted in a lack of stability in the cooperation between the BRICS, and it is only the leaders’ 
personal will that influences the process of cooperation. In addition, the BRICS members are 
also perplexed by problems such as functional overlap and an unclear division of labor between 
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the different BRICS cooperation mechanisms. Thus, it is a pressing issue for the BRICS 
countries to figure out ways of integrating BRICS cooperation mechanisms into a more 
coordinated and cooperative format. 
Third, the lack of collective identity has hindered cooperation between the BRICS countries. 
The BRICS’ internal heterogeneity and its lack of clear group standards mean that it faces the 
problem of a lack of collective identity. Although the BRICS is generally considered as an 
economic concept, with its two key indicators being economic performance and economic 
influence, it still lacks several organizational features for defining a specific group from an 
economic perspective. In terms of economic performance, it remains far-fetched to classify 
these five countries as one group. Their significant economic heterogeneity and their superficial 
economic complementarities do not give the group a stronger identity than other economic 
group (X. Pang, 2016, p. 17). Although there are political consistencies among the BRICS 
countries in terms of principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, their ideological 
divergences and different political systems have made it more difficult for BRICS members to 
form a collective identity (Jorgensen and Strube, 2014). 
Finally, the unsustainable development model of the BRICS countries also has an adverse effect 
on cooperation within the group. In recent years, given their sluggish economies and 
decelerated growth, the BRICS concept, representing a group of emerging powers, has 
undergone a substantive change. Without sustained and considerable international economic 
contributions, a strong BRICS mechanism cannot truly exist. 
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CHAPTER 6. CASE III: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE ILCC IN THE SCO 
6.1. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a regional organization that was initiated by 
China and is characterized by comprehensive multilateral cooperation. The foundation of the 
SCO experienced transitional stages, such as the negotiations on the border issue between China 
and the former Soviet Union and the “Shanghai Five” summit. After the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – 
separated from the Soviet Union and became independent countries. Since these newly-
independent countries are bordered by China, in order to resolve the border issue, China had to 
negotiate continuously and cooperate with the new Central Asian countries and Russia. At that 
time, the five countries’ major concern was the identification of their respective borders and 
the resolution of the security problems in the border areas. Since then, bilateral cooperation on 
the border issue between the five countries has deepened, and the issue of territorial boundaries 
between these countries was basically agreed by 1996. From 1996, the five countries started to 
hold the “Shanghai Five” summit annually. 
It is worth noting that the Shanghai Five summit held in 1996 was a continuation of the 
settlement of territorial boundaries negotiations held since 1989. However, at the third Shanghai 
Five summit held in Almaty in 1998, the five countries raised new issues, from the previous 
military negotiations in the border areas to multilateral security cooperation based on regional 
security. Specifically, fighting against the “Three Evil Forces” of terrorism, separatism, and 
extremism became the main cooperation areas between the five countries. In other words, the 
third Shanghai Five summit created the possibility of multilateral cooperation and ultimately 
promoted the establishment of the SCO as a regional cooperation organization. Thus, the 
mechanism of the Shanghai Five summit was upgraded to be a multilevel, multi-disciplinary 
multilateral cooperation system between the five countries – the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization – in 2001. This indicates that it was gradually institutionalized from a looser 
conference mechanism merely focused on security issues to a more positive and comprehensive 
cooperation organization. 
More specifically, before the establishment of the SCO, during the period from 1989 to 2001, 
the nature of the cooperation between these countries underwent two major transformations. 
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First, in the official documents published during the period of the Shanghai Five summits, there 
was a change in the name given to the cooperative relationship. During the Shanghai Five 
summits held in 1996 and 1997, the official documents used “two parties” to describe the 
relationship between the five countries, i.e., China on one side of the relationship, and the other 
four countries on the other side. However, at the third Shanghai Five summit held in Almaty in 
1998, the name of the cooperative relationship between the five countries shifted from “two 
parties” to “all parties”. This indicates that the leaders of the five countries recognized the 
nature of the Shanghai Five cooperation had changed from a bilateral to a multilateral 
cooperative relationship. 
The second major change to the Shanghai Five cooperation before the construction of the SCO 
was the shift in the contents of the negotiations. During that period, the focus shifted from 
military cooperation in the border area to non-traditional cooperation in terms of fighting 
against terrorism, ethnic separatism, and religious extremism. In 2001, all parties issued the 
Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Shanghai 
Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. On the basis of the two 
documents, in 2002, all parties announced the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization in which they outlined their fundamental principles and goals as follows: 
Development of multifaceted cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, 
security and stability in the region; joint combating terrorism, separatism and extremism in all 
their manifestations; encouraging efficient regional cooperation in such areas as politics, trade 
and economy, etc.; facilitating comprehensive and balanced economic growth, social and 
cultural development in the region; and promoting enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, etc. (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2002). 
Although the bilateral border issues were largely resolved during the first three Shanghai Five 
summits from 1996 to 1998, cooperation between the five countries did not come to an end. 
Rather, as shown above, the group experienced increasing institutionalization characterized by 
the establishment of the SCO in 2001. According to Lin Minjing and Liu Jiangyong’s (2009) 
analysis, this institutionalization was driven by three major factors. First, the historical 
evolution of cooperation between the countries and the benign interactions in the resolution of 
the border issues deepened mutual trust and established good relationships between the five 
countries; second, the five countries shared common security interests in terms of fighting 
against the three forces of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and common economic 
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interests based on their economic complementarities; third, China–Russia had the great 
aspiration to jointly counter the US hegemony in the Post-Cold War era (M. Lin & Liu, 2009: 
4-8).  
Nowadays, the SCO is the world’s largest and most populous comprehensive regional 
cooperation organization. All of the member states together account for 20% of the world’s 
economy and 40% of the world’s population. In addition to the member states, the SCO has 
four observer countries and six dialogue partners. It has also established extensive cooperative 
relations with other international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, the 
IMF, and the World Bank, and its international influence has continuously increased. 
According to the prediction of the World Trade Organization Secretariat, China, Russia, and 
India, three of the SCO members, would account for 25% to 33% of the global economy by 
2035, and become a critical force driving the development of the global economy. In this regard, 
it is argued that the SCO’s member states, all of which are developing countries, are the most 
dynamic economies in the current pattern of global development and provide a strong impetus 
for boosting the global economy. 
Moreover, the world is facing a number of global challenges, and global governance 
mechanisms and multilateral mechanisms are being challenged by unilateralism and 
protectionism. The SCO devotes itself to constructing a more balanced international order based 
on an equal, shared, comprehensive, and sustainable security. In this regard, it has made a 
significant contribution to global governance, especially in its critical role in regional security 
governance which is observed in the following two aspects. 
First, the SCO member states have been working actively to put the new security concept into 
practice. The SCO is a new type of regional cooperation mechanism which emerged after the 
Cold War. Like its predecessor, the Shanghai Five, it is committed to eliminating the security 
risks left over from the Cold War period and establishing a new type of security thinking 
characterized by the promotion of security through cooperation and the resolution of disputes 
through dialogue between countries. The SCO has always adhered to the principles of openness, 
transparency, and not targeting any third party. It emphasizes that member states are not aligned 
with each other and do not seek to establish military and political alliances. In the past 17 years 
(2001 to 2018), the SCO resolutely opposed the Cold War mentality and power politics and 
became a significant force for maintaining regional stability. In this respect, the SCO provides 
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a new regional cooperation model characterized by joint advocacy, security first, and mutual 
benefit. 
Second, the SCO member states have done their utmost to construct an efficient security 
cooperation platform. At one time, traditional and non-traditional security issues were 
interwoven in Central Asia. In this region, the three forces of terrorism, separatism, and 
extremism were rampant, and drug trafficking and transnational crime were extremely serious. 
In 2001, during the first SCO summit, the member states signed the Shanghai Convention on 
Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism in which they prioritized the combating of 
these three forces as one of the most important tasks of the SCO. In addition, the SCO member 
states agreed to establish a number of security meeting mechanisms such as the Defense 
Ministers’ Meeting, the SCO security council secretaries’ meeting, and Minister of Public 
Security Meeting, etc. The SCO is one of the first international organizations to define anti-
terrorism measures. In 2004, the SCO’s regional anti-terrorist agency was established in 
Tashkent, and member states conducted multiple exchanges of intelligence. In addition, since 
2005, a joint military exercise, the “Peace Mission”, has occurred at least ten times. It creates a 
powerful deterrent against terrorist forces and extremist organizations inside and outside the 
region. 
Of the five SCO member states, China is an indispensable actor in the development of this 
regional cooperation mechanism. First of all, China was the primary initiator and a founding 
member of the SCO. As mentioned above, China has always played a leading role in the 
development of this mechanism since the negotiations that took place during the period of the 
Shanghai Five summit on the border issue to the establishment and increasing 
institutionalization of the SCO since the beginning of the 21st century. Second, China has made 
a great impact on regional economic cooperation. According to Duan Xiufang and Huang Xi, 
China is the largest economy of the SCO member states. In 2011, China’s economic scale was 
around 3.5 times as large as the aggregation of the other member states (M. Lin & Liu, 2009: 
26). On the basis of its material capabilities, China has become the active driver of the SCO’s 
regional, practical cooperation in the areas of trade, finance, energy, transport, telecoms, and 
agriculture, etc. Specifically, China has played a leading role in the SCO in terms of jointly 
resisting the international financial crisis, addressing the challenges derived from globalization, 
and facilitating intra-regional trade and investment, etc. 
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Given China’s critical role in the SCO, this chapter will conduct an empirical analysis of 
Chinese leaders’ rhetoric and China’s practice in relation to the SCO that verify the proposed 
framework of “international leadership with Chinese characteristics”. As in the previous two 
cases, this chapter interprets China’s NRC and NRP embedded in the ILCC in three stages: the 
stage of diversifying cooperative areas (2008-2012), the stage of steady progress and deepening 
cooperation (2013-2016), the stage of organizational expansion and increasing engagement 
with global governance (2017-2018). 
6.2. THE INTERPRETATION OF CHINA’S NRC EMBEDDED IN 
THE ILCC IN THE SCO 
6.2.1. THE DIVERSIFICATION OF COOPERATIVE AREAS (2008-2012) 
The 2008 financial crisis that first occurred in the United States led to sluggish economic growth 
across the world. In addition, the Urumqi riots broke out on 5th July 2009, and there was an 
outbreak of clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in 2010. These serious events 
threatened Central Asia’s regional economic development and stability. Against this backdrop, 
the SCO member states strengthened their bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and since then, 
the SCO has shifted its focus onto the “two wheels” (security collaboration and economic 
cooperation) with an emphasis on diversified cooperative areas. By examining Chinese 
decision-makers’ speeches delivered at the annual SCO summits from 2008 to 2012, it is clear 
that China’s conceptional construction of the ILCC was prominent in this transformation. 
First of all, by analyzing the speeches delivered by the then Chinese President Hu Jintao, we 
can see Chinese decision-makers’ overall assessment of the international situation at this stage 
as “the international situation is experiencing unprecedentedly complex and profound changes, 
and the international financial crisis continues spreading, which has posed serious impact on 
the global economy” [国际形势正在经历着前所未有的复杂深刻变化，国际金融危机仍在
蔓延深化，对全球经济冲击日益显现] (Hu, 2009c). In the meanwhile, Chinese elites also 
noticed the rise of a large number of non-traditional issues, as Hu noted, “food security, energy 
and resources safety and public health security remain serious, terrorism, drug production and 
traffic and cross-border organized crimes are rampant and pirates are still unscrupulous” [粮食
安全、能源资源安全、公共卫生安全问题突出，恐怖主义、毒品生产走私、跨国有组
织犯罪猖獗，海盗肆虐] (Hu, 2009c). 
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In addition, with respect to the regional situation in particular, Chinese decision-makers 
contended that “unstable and uncertain factors in this region are clearly on the rise. The negative 
effects of the international financial crisis are obvious, and the issues of ‘three evil forces’ 
(terrorism, separatism and extremism) and organized transnational crimes (drug trafficking) are 
prominent” [本地区形势中的不稳定不确定因素明显增多，国际金融危机影响继续显现，
“三股势力 ”、毒品走私等问题日益突出 ] (Hu, 2010a). On the basis of the above 
understanding of the regional and global situation, Chinese decision-makers constructed its 
ILCC by steering the direction of the SCO towards “tapping cooperation potential and 
deepening the cooperation in the issue-areas of transportation, communication, disaster relief, 
environmental protection, customs, agriculture, technology, and culture, etc.” [不断挖掘合作
潜力，深入开展交通、通信、救灾、环保、海关、农业、科技、文化等领域合作] (Hu, 
2008b). From this statement, it could be argued that China was proactively promoting the 
transformation of the function of the SCO from “two wheels” to a more diversified range of 
issues.  
Specifically, with the purpose of addressing the above-mentioned traditional and non-
traditional security issues, during this stage, China’s constructive leadership was manifested in 
Chinese decision-makers’ proposal of the New Security Concept. According to Hu’s 
interpretation, in a written interview:  
The New Security Concept aims to firmly safeguard the sovereignty, security and development 
interests of member states, to firmly support the member states to choose their own 
development path according to their national condition, and to firmly support the regional 
countries to be in charge of the regional issues. This concept emphasizes the opposition of all 
sorts of interventionism and the prevention of turbulent shocks outside the region. It ultimately 
attempts to build a conducive environment for the development of member states. 
[上海合作组织倡导的新安全观，就是要坚定维护成员国主权、安全、发展利益，坚定
支持成员国根据本国国情选择的发展道路，坚定支持地区事务由地区各国作主，反对
形形色色的干涉主义，防范区域外动荡冲击，为成员国发展创造良好外部环境] (Hu, 
2012a) 
The China-proposed New Security Concept was conducive to the construction of the 
Comprehensive Security System. In this system, security cooperation is characterized by 
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“common and collective security” and “mutual benefit”, and it should be “diversified and open” 
and based on the principle of “equal consultation” (Jinfeng Li, 2017b). In addition, this thesis 
argues that China’s facilitative leadership (collectiveness and empowerment) was also 
constructed in line with the principles of the New Security Concept and the Comprehensive 
Security System. 
Moreover, at this stage, China’s constructive leadership can also be observed in Chinese 
decision-makers’ efforts to explore cooperation potential and expanding cooperation areas 
among the SCO member states. Chinese decision-makers pointed out that “the SCO member 
states consist of economic great power, large grain-producing countries, energy-rich countries 
and countries with huge market. This diversified constituent provides conditions for deepening 
economic cooperation and preventing international economic fluctuations” [本组织内既有经
济大国、产粮大国，也有能源资源富集国和巨大消费市场，深化经济合作、防范国际
经济波动冲击的条件得天独厚] (Hu, 2008b). Based on this understanding, at the 11th SCO 
summit in Astana, the then Chinese President Hu emphasized that “the SCO members should 
further expand economic cooperation, facilitate trade and investment, promote connectivity in 
transportation, energy and telecommunication infrastructure and construct the regional energy 
security, financial security and food security cooperation mechanisms” [我们应该拓展合作领
域，推动贸易和投资便利化，推进域内交通、能源、通信基础设施互联互通，加快构
建本地区能源安全、金融安全、粮食安全合作机制] (Hu, 2011c). 
Last but not least, in addition to security and economic cooperation, during each summit that 
took place during this stage, Chinese decision-makers repeatedly emphasized the significance 
of people-to-people exchange. As Hu insisted, “the SCO members should expand people-to-
people exchanges in such fields as culture, education, health and tourism, deepen mutual 
understanding between the peoples and thus consolidate public support for the SCO's future 
development” [我们应当坚持不懈扩大人文交流，拓宽民间和社会交流渠道，建设教育、
医疗服务网络，开展旅游和体育合作，促进人民相互了解，夯实上海合作组织未来发
展的社会基础] (Hu, 2011c). In other words, seen from the Chinese perspective, people-to-
people exchange was the key factor in the interest construction and vision construction that 
were the fundamentals of the transformation and long-term development of the SCO. 
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6.2.2. THE STEADY PROGRESS AND DEEPENING COOPERATION 
(2013-2016) 
With the election of the new Chinese leadership under President Xi, China adopted a more 
proactive strategy in international relations and paid more attention to the China-led SCO in 
particular. Having diversified the cooperative areas of the SCO during the last stage, the ILCC 
during this stage was constructed by strengthening the SCO mechanism and promoting it to 
play a larger role in regional and global governance. 
First and foremost, by evaluating the then regional and international situations, Chinese 
decision-makers argued that “the SCO is entering a critical period of inheriting the past and 
ushering in the future. It is our common responsibility and mission to ensure that the SCO 
always develops along the established track and brings more security and greater well-being to 
its member states and their peoples” [上海合作组织发展正在进入继往开来的关键时期。
确保本组织始终沿着既定轨道向前发展，为成员国和成员国人民带来更多安全、更大
福祉，是我们肩负的共同责任和使命] (Xi, 2014d). Based on these perceptions, China’s 
constructive leadership was embodied by Chinese decision-makers’ emphasis on strengthening 
the mechanism of the SCO and consolidating the existing levels of cooperation between the 
member states. For instance, during the 13th SCO summit in Bishkek, Chinese President Xi 
proposed that: 
The SCO members should strengthen cooperation in the financial sector, establish SCO 
Development Bank and SCO special account; set up energy club and establish stable supply-
demand relationship to ensure energy security; establish food security cooperation mechanism, 
and strengthen cooperation in agricultural production, trade of agricultural products, food safety 
and other fields. 
[上合组织各成员国应当加强金融领域合作，推动建立上海合作组织开发银行，尽快设
立上海合作组织专门账户；成立能源俱乐部，协调本组织框架内能源合作，建立稳定
供求关系，确保能源安全；建立粮食安全合作机制，在农业生产、农产品贸易、食品
安全等领域加强合作，确保粮食安全] (Xi, 2013d). 
Moreover, building on the inclusion of people-to-people exchanges as a cooperative area during 
the previous stage, Chinese decision-makers put more emphasis on this area and proposed two 
major concepts – “community of shared destiny” and “community of shared interests” – to 
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consolidate the SCO’s outcomes and achievements. During the 14th SCO summit in Dushanbe, 
Xi argued that “we must see each other in a common endeavor and a community of shared 
destiny and interests. We must work together with sincerity and dedication to build the SCO 
into an organization of better institutions, comprehensive cooperation, seamless coordination 
and greater openness” [牢固树立同舟共济、荣辱与共的命运共同体、利益共同体意识，
凝心聚力，精诚协作，全力推动上海合作组织朝着机制更加完善、合作更加全面、协
调更加顺畅、对外更加开放的方向发展] (Xi, 2014d).  
During this stage, another significant manifestation of China’s conceptional construction of the 
ILCC was to highlight the role of the China-proposed “Belt and Road Initiative” in the 
development of the SCO. In September 2013, during his visit to Kazakhstan, Chinese President 
Xi displayed the vision/idea of the “One Belt One Road” (the predecessor of the “Belt and Road 
Initiative”), which received a positive response from the SCO member states. With the 
progressive maturity of this vision/idea, during the 16th SCO summit in Tashkent, Xi proposed 
that “China will promote the SCO to play an active role in integrating the ‘Belt and Road 
initiative’ with the development strategies of all member states. China welcomes the member 
states concerned to keep promoting cooperation in production capacity, trade and investment 
facilitation” [中方大力推动“一带一路”建设同各国发展战略对接，希望上海合作组织为
此发挥积极作用并创造更多合作机遇。中方也愿同有关成员国继续推进产能合作以及
贸易和投资便利化合作] (Xi, 2016b). 
Last but not least, China constructed its facilitative leadership by announcing its material 
support to the SCO members. For instance, during the 14th SCO summit in Dushanbe, Chinese 
President Xi said that “with the purpose of consolidating and strengthening the SCO regional 
economic cooperation, China decided to provide $5 billions loan to the SCO member states for 
financing the cooperative project” (Xi, 2014d). In addition, at the 15th SCO summit in Ufa, 
China also announced a “push for the completion of 4,000 kilometers of railway and over 
10,000 kilometers of highway within the region, so that a layout of regional interconnected 
transportation will be basically in place” [推动建成 4000公里铁路、超过 10000公里公路，
基本形成区域内互联互通格局] (Xi, 2015b). 
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6.2.3. THE ORGANIZATIONAL EXPANSION AND ITS INCREASING 
ENGAGEMENT WITH GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2017-2018) 
On the 15th anniversary of the SCO, the inclusion of India and Pakistan, the first expansion of 
this organization, marked a new stage. It is widely perceived that the mutual trust between 
China and Russia was fundamental to this move. In other words, through cooperation with 
Russia, China constructed its facilitative leadership (collectiveness and inclusiveness) by 
including new member states. This organizational expansion reflected the inclusiveness and 
openness of the SCO, as Chinese President Xi emphasized, “openness and inclusiveness are the 
basic principles since the establishment of the SCO. China supports the SCO in carrying out 
cooperation with its observer states, dialogue partners and other countries” [开放包容是上合
组织成立之初就确立的基本原则。中国支持上合组织同观察员国、对话伙伴以及其他
国家开展多形式、宽领域合作] (Xi, 2017d). 
There are, however, a number of risks inherent to the inclusion of these two major nations in 
the SCO. First and foremost, from a political perspective, the troubled relationship between 
India and Pakistan may bring uncertainty to and threaten the stability of the SCO. For instance, 
the conflict between the two new members may lead to divergence between China and Russia 
and even split the organization into two opposing sides. This situation might further challenge 
the principle of consultation-based consensus and lead to disagreements on some issues 
(Jinfeng Li, 2017a). Against this backdrop, during the 17th SCO summit in Astana, China 
constructed its facilitative leadership by emphasizing that the “‘Shanghai Spirit’ is the 
foundation of the SCO. All member states, old and new, should maintain the good tradition of 
solidarity and cooperation, deepen political mutual trust, increase mutual support, and build a 
community of shared destiny featuring equal treatment, mutual support, and sharing of wealth 
and woe as well as safety and danger” [“上海精神”产生的强大凝聚力是本组织发展的保证。
我们要保持团结协作的良好传统，新老成员国密切融合，深化政治互信，加大相互支
持，构建平等相待、守望相助、休戚与共、安危共担的命运共同体] (Xi, 2017d). 
Second, from the security perspective, the simultaneous inclusion of India and Pakistan may 
endanger the operation of the SCO. Theoretically, India and Pakistan do not meet the 
requirement of membership to “have no armed conflict with another state or states” (SCO, 
2002). Although both countries committed to the Treaty of Long-term Good-neighborliness, 
Friendship and Cooperation between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation 
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Organization, their long-standing security situation cannot be easily overcome. Under these 
circumstances, at the Astana summit, China constructed its exemplary leadership by stressing 
that “we should continue to give priority to the SCO’s commitment to maintain regional 
security and stability” [我们要一如既往将维护地区安全稳定作为上海合作组织工作的优
先方向] (Xi, 2017d). Specifically, with the purpose of strengthening the coordination between 
member states and supporting the SCO by speaking with one voice, China exhibited its 
constructive leadership by calling for the SCO “to strengthen regional counter-terrorism 
institutional building. China is willing to host again the SCO joint counter-terrorism cyber 
exercise, and it proposes to hold a defense security forum” [中方主张加强地区反恐怖机制建
设，愿再次主办上海合作组织网络反恐联合演习，倡议举办防务安全论坛] (Xi, 2017d). 
Moreover, at the 18th SCO summit in Qingdao, Chinese decision-makers advocated that the 
SCO member states “should pursue common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable 
security. We should reject the Cold War mentality and confrontation between blocs and oppose 
the practices of seeking absolute security of oneself at the expense of others” [我们要践行共
同、综合、合作、可持续的安全观，摒弃冷战思维、集团对抗，反对以牺牲别国安全
换取自身绝对安全的做法] (Xi, 2018). 
Third, from the economic perspective, with the increasing number of members in the SCO, the 
demands for daily budget and project funds will also increase, given that, with the exception of 
China, the other SCO members are experiencing difficulties in their economic development. In 
addition, SCO-based regional economic integration will become harder to be achieve due to its 
expansion (Li and Zeng, 2017). To deal with the issue of development, China constructed its 
constructive leadership (interest construction) by proposing that “the SCO may well serve as 
an important platform for synergizing the Belt and Road Initiative with regional cooperation 
initiatives like the Eurasian Economic Union and national development strategies” [中方正和
有关各方积极推动“一带一路”建设同欧亚经济联盟建设等区域合作倡议以及各国发展
战略对接，上合组织可以为此发挥重要平台作用] (Xi, 2017d). In addition, Chinese 
President Xi suggested that the SCO members “should uphold innovative, coordinated, green, 
open and inclusive development, achieve coordinated social and economic progress of various 
countries and resolve issues caused by unbalanced development. We should bridge the gap in 
development and promote shared prosperity” [我们要提倡创新、协调、绿色、开放、共享
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的发展观，实现各国经济社会协同进步，解决发展不平衡带来的问题，缩小发展差距，
促进共同繁荣] (Xi, 2018). 
Fourth, from the social perspective, the inclusion of new members may have negative effects 
on the collective identity of the SCO and lead to a decrease in the SCO’s internal coherence. 
The inclusion of India and Pakistan may bring more diversified political and cultural factors to 
this Central Asia-based organization, diluting the (not so cohesive) collective identity of the 
SCO. Faced with these difficulties, China emphasized the significance of and constructed its 
constructive leadership (vision construction) by enhancing people-to-people bonds. As Xi said 
at the 17th SCO summit in Astana, “It is important for SCO countries to bring our people, youth 
in particular, closer to each other, so that the good-neighborliness and cooperation between us 
will be carried forward by the future generations” [我们要促进各国民众特别是青年一代心
灵相通，使睦邻友好合作事业永葆活力] (Xi, 2017d). Furthermore, at the 18th SCO summit 
in Qingdao, with the purpose of dealing with the political and cultural diversity of the SCO 
after the expansion, China further suggested that “we should champion equality, mutual 
learning, dialogue and inclusiveness between civilizations. It is important that we overcome 
cultural misunderstanding, clash and supremacy through exchanges, mutual learning and 
coexistence” [我们要树立平等、互鉴、对话、包容的文明观，以文明交流超越文明隔阂，
以文明互鉴超越文明冲突，以文明共存超越文明优越] (Xi, 2018). 
6.3. THE INTERPRETATION OF CHINA’S NRP EMBEDDED IN 
THE ILCC IN THE SCO 
6.3.1. THE DIVERSIFICATION OF COOPERATIVE AREAS (2008-2012) 
Since 2001, Shanghai Cooperation Organization has established a wide range of cooperative 
efforts in political, economic, and security areas, manifested in their fight against the “Three 
Evils”; transnational crimes, drugs, and arms trafficking. As cooperation between the SCO 
members deepened, especially after the 2008 financial crisis, they extended their efforts into 
the areas of trade, culture, technology, education, agriculture, environmental protection, 
transportation, and finance, etc. This diversification of cooperative areas not only helps the 
member states to achieve their separate comprehensive and balanced economic and social 
development, but it also enhances their populations’ living standards and strengthens the 
communication between people and states. The following paragraphs interpret the 
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implementation of the ILCC in the diversification of cooperative areas from institutional, policy, 
material, and ideational perspectives. 
First, from the institutional perspective, during this stage, China practised its constructive 
leadership in two aspects. On the one hand, as the major founding state, by virtue of its own 
diplomacy within the partnership, China and other SCO members promoted institutional 
innovation within the SCO and reached agreement over the Regulation on SCO Dialogue 
Partner Status in 2008, aiming to provide a platform for the states and international 
organizations that are interested in collaborating with the SCO. This agreement granted the 
SCO more space to increase its international communication and expand its cooperative areas 
(Xu, 2011). On the other hand, China practised its facilitative leadership (collectiveness and 
inclusiveness) in the institutional cooperation between the SCO and other competing regional 
organizations. For instance, the SCO, led by China, and the Eurasian Economic Community, 
dominated by Russia, objectively formed a competing relationship with each other in terms of 
member states, geography, and institutional functions. However, during this stage, the two 
organizations made more cooperative progress rather than establishing competing policies 
against each other. This situation was largely due to the collective leadership practised by China 
and Russia in this region (Wang and Wan, 2012). In other words, on the basis of the “Shanghai 
Spirit”, China’s facilitative leadership was practised by collectively cooperating with another 
regional great power – Russia – and its leading organizations, being conducive to a favorable 
environment for peace and the development of the SCO members and other regional states. 
Second, from the policy perspective, under the Outline for the Multilateral Economic and Trade 
Cooperation of the SCO Member States, China practised its constructive leadership (interest 
construction) and facilitative leadership (collectiveness) in order to achieve policy agreement 
with other SCO members on several emerging issue-areas. For instance, in October 2008, the 
meeting between the Chinese and Russian prime ministers saw a breakthrough in their energy 
cooperation, involving policies for the construction of a Russian far eastern pipeline in China, 
the supply of natural gas, and exploitation and marketing cooperation between the two countries’ 
oil companies. These achievements in energy cooperation within the SCO provided 
opportunities for dialogue and coordination between the regional energy-producing, consuming 
and transiting countries (Yu and Dai, 2009). In October 2009, the Meeting of the Council of 
Heads of Government of the Member States of the SCO released the Joint Initiatives of the 
SCO Members in Strengthening Multilateral Economic Cooperation, Responding to the Global 
Financial Crisis, and Ensuring Sustainable Economic Development, identifying 17 major 
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cooperation areas in terms of information exchange, customs facilitation, technology 
application, economic and trade cooperation, agricultural development, etc. (Sun and Zhang, 
2011). Moreover, at the Beijing SCO summit in 2012, under China’s leadership, the SCO 
granted Afghanistan with observer status, placing the issue of Afghanistan’s reconstruction 
within the framework of the SCO. By releasing the Declaration of the Heads of State of the 
Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Building a Region of Lasting 
Peace and Common Prosperity, the SCO, for the first time, officially announced its assistance 
in the reconstruction of this war-weary country (He, 2012). 
Third, from the material perspective, China practised its facilitative leadership (empowerment) 
by helping the SCO members to address the 2008 financial crisis. In 2009, China agreed to 
respectively lend Russia and Kazakhstan US$25 billion and US$10 billion as an oil-for-loan. 
In the same year, via cooperation-for-loan, China lent US$100 million to Tajikistan, and it also 
provided a concessional loan of $200 million and an interest-free loan worth 80 million RMB 
to Kyrgyzstan. More importantly, China decided to provide $10 billion credit to the SCO’s 
bilateral and multilateral economic and technological cooperation projects. China’s material 
support largely helped the SCO members to overcome the crisis (Gao, 2011). China’s material 
contribution to the SCO was also evidenced in its trade with the SCO members. From 2001 to 
2011, China’s trade volume with the SCO members increased by almost 10 times, from 
US$12.1 billion to US$113.4 billion. This rate of increase was higher than that of China’s total 
global trade volume. By 2011, China became Russia’s largest trading partner, the second largest 
trading partner of Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, and the third largest trading partner of 
Uzbekistan. As an economic center, China’s close economic ties with these SCO members 
shaped the organization’s cohesiveness (Cheng, 2012). Moreover, in the area of people-to-
people exchange, by the end of 2008, China had invested a lot in training over 1,500 experts 
and managers from the SCO members, and had devoted itself to collaborating with the SCO 
states in human resources. In addition to making institutional and policy contributions to the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan, in 2012, China announced free assistance of 150 million RMB 
to this troubled country, aiming to stabilize the Central Asian situation (He, 2012). 
Fourth, from the ideational perspective, with the strongest economic capability among the SCO 
members, China was the active driver of the multilateral economic and trade cooperation of this 
organization. At this stage, China initiated the idea of the “Three Steps” that was recognized by 
other SCO member states. Specifically, the “Three Steps” is interpreted as: (1) to improve the 
cooperation environment by promoting trade and investment facilitation as the first step; (2) to 
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strengthen economic and technological cooperation to benefit the participants as the second 
step; and (3) to realize the regional free flows of goods, capital, technology, and services as the 
third step (Sun and Zhang, 2011). Moreover, at the SCO Beijing summit in 2012, leaders from 
the SCO member states issued the first political document with the theme of “constructing 
harmonious region”, indicating that the ideas proposed by China idea of a “Harmonious World”, 
characterized by lasting peace and common prosperity, was echoed and practised in the 
development of the SCO (Gao, 2012). 
6.3.2. THE STEADY PROGRESS AND DEEPENING COOPERATION 
(2013-2016) 
Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, China has adjusted its 
peripheral diplomatic policies. In October 2013, Chinese newly-elected President Xi Jinping 
delivered a significant speech in China’s Periphery Diplomacy Work Forum that was the 
highest-level diplomatic meeting since 1949 and was the first special meeting on peripheral 
diplomacy held by the Central Committee of CPC. In this respect, it is argued that the new 
Chinese leadership attaches greater importance to China’s peripheral diplomacy than the 
previous leadership. As one of the most vital pillars underpinning China’s peripheral diplomacy, 
the SCO naturally attracted more attention and investment from China. At this stage, the ILCC 
was practised by China in terms of constructing the SCO mechanism, coordinating the 
relationship between the SCO and other regional organizations, setting an agenda for regional 
cooperation, and initiating ideas of regional order. Moreover, the China-proposed “Belt and 
Road Initiative” was seen as a boost for the development of the SCO at this stage. 
First, from the institutional perspective, China practised its facilitative leadership in 
coordinating the relationship between the SCO and other regional and international 
organizations. Central Asia is an arena of great power politics: in this region, except for the 
China-led SCO, there exist a number of regional institutions, such as the Russia-led Collective 
Security Treaty Organization and Eurasian Economic Union, the NATO-led Partnership for 
Peace, and the EU-led “Partnership and Cooperation Agreements”, etc. These institutions and 
organizations objectively pose great challenges to the development of the SCO (Ma, 2016). 
Against this background, the China-proposed “Belt and Road Initiative” played a positive role 
in managing the complicated situation. For instance, in December 2015, China and Russia 
signed the Joint Communique of the 20th Regular Meeting between Chinese and Russian Prime 
Ministers, indicating that both sides (China and Russia) saw the SCO as the most effective 
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platform to connect the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union. In this 
respect, the SCO was granted more institutional significance in regional bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation (Xin Li, 2016). 
Moreover, at this stage, the SCO obtained certain achievements in promoting financial 
cooperation and constructing financial architecture. The SCO members agreed the Medium-
term Development Strategy of the SCO Interbank Consortium (2012-2016), identifying that the 
SCO priorities of “joint activities in the context of current economic development goals of the 
SCO member states, widen the scope of activities by involving the financial institutions 
of observer states and dialogue partners and monitor the implementation of joint regional 
investment projects” (SCO, 2017). In this regard, it is argued that the SCO Interbank 
Consortium (IBC), as a critical financing platform of the SCO, played an active role in 
providing funds to regional cooperation programs among the SCO members and put these 
programs into practice (Guo, 2015). 
On the basis of the existing SCO financial cooperation represented by the SCO IBC, China 
practised its constructive leadership by deepening the SCO’s financial institutionalization. In 
December 2014, at the 13th Meeting of Council of Heads of Government of SCO Member States, 
Chinese Premier Minister Li Keqiang emphasized the necessity of promoting the establishment 
of the SCO Development Bank as a long-term stable financing platform. China insisted that the 
SCO Development Bank and the SCO Development Fund, if they could be successfully 
established, would bring positive implications for regional economic cooperation, regional 
infrastructure programs, trade facilitation, internationalization of Chinese RMB, and the 
institutionalization of financial crisis prevention (Jiang, 2016). 
Second, from the policy perspective, by promoting the connection between the SCO and “Belt 
and Road Initiative”, China was proactively involved in the agenda setting of the SCO. China 
implemented its constructive leadership (interest construction) by setting and extending the 
SCO’s cooperation agenda from traditional and non-traditional security issues to economic and 
trade issue-areas. Guided by the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic 
Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road issued in 2015, China enriched the cooperation 
agenda under the framework of the SCO. On the basis of economic, trade, and raw material 
cooperation between the SCO members, China further deepened cooperation within the SCO 
and extended the cooperative areas on infrastructure construction and interconnectivity (Ma, 
2016). 
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For instance, in December 2015, at the 14th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government of 
SCO Member States in Zhengzhou, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang highlighted regional 
economic cooperation by establishing a connection between the SCO’s economic cooperation 
and the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt. According to the Joint Communique 
released at this meeting, the SCO member states confirmed their support for the Silk Road 
Economic Belt. They were convinced that the joint work of the SCO member states on the 
implementation framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative would promote gradual 
sustainable economic growth in the interests of keeping and supporting peace and stability in 
the region. In other words, by issuing the Statement on Regional Economic Cooperation, the 
SCO confirmed that the Silk Road Economic Belt conformed to the SCO’s development 
objectives and would be conducive to regional infrastructure construction, capacity investment, 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and the regional industrialization and modernization of 
the SCO countries. (Xin Li, 2016). 
Third, from the material perspective, during this stage, the majority of emerging economies, 
including the SCO member states and observers, experienced an economic downturn. 
Consequently, the SCO members adopted measures to address this problem. For instance, in 
2014 and 2015, Kazakhstan consecutively announced its Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy, “Bright 
Road” Initiative, State Program for Industrial and Innovative Development (2015-2019), and 
the “100 Concrete Steps to Implement Five Institutional Reforms”. In 2014, Uzbekistan 
launched its long-term strategy, “Uzbekistan Towards 2030”, emphasizing the construction of 
transportation infrastructure and aiming to achieve a transition to a resource-efficient growth 
model and to improve the institutional conditions for social development. In 2016, Tajikistan 
released its National Development Strategy for the period up to 2030. By examining these 
countries’ development strategies, we can see that they were seeking opportunities to connect 
their national development with the China-led Silk Road Economic Belt. Against this 
background, in March 2015, China and Kazakhstan signed the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) on Strengthening Bilateral Production Capacity and Investment Cooperation and more 
than 30 cooperation documents, amounting to funding of US$23.6 billion. China-Kazakhstan 
cooperation was seen as a model of capacity cooperation between the Silk Road Economic Belt 
and the SCO (Xin Li, 2016). 
In addition, since 2013, by virtue of its capacity advantages and economic capabilities, China 
practised its facilitative leadership (empowerment) by establishing a number of cooperation 
agreements with the other SCO member states. In September 2013, during Chinese President 
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Xi’s visit to Central Asia, China signed a series of cooperation agreements with SCO countries, 
including China’s US$7.7 billion investment in Uzbekistan and its US$3 billion of financing 
and investment in Kyrgyzstan for the development of bilateral investment programs. In May 
2014, China and Kazakhstan signed several financing agreements. For instance, the Chinese 
and Kazakhstan Development Bank signed a US$500 million general credit agreement that 
aimed to invest in Kazakhstan non-resources programs. In December 2014, during Chinese 
Prime Minster Li Keqiang’s Eurasia trip, China signed several big business deals with the SCO 
members. For example, China and Kazakhstan signed a business deal worth US$14 billion 
(Jiang, 2016). 
Fourth, from the ideational perspective, since the establishment of the SCO, China has always 
advanced the idea of a win-win form of cooperation, indicating that the relationship between 
the SCO members was not built on enforcement and coercive power, rather it was based on the 
member states’ consensus and shared interests. At this stage, with the launch of the “Belt and 
Road Initiative”, China has devoted itself to promoting the “community of shared destiny”, 
seen as a new comprehensive vision covering economic, political, security, and people-to-
people cooperation. In addition, China also highlighted the ideas of “wide consultation, joint 
contribution, shared benefits” in promoting cooperation within the SCO. These ideas, to some 
extent, helped to neutralize the side effects of and relieve the anxiety caused by arguments of 
“overcapacity export” and “China Threat” (Ma, 2016). 
One of the most prominent instances of China’s implementation of constructive leadership 
(vision construction) was China’s proposal of the “Asian Security Concept”. In 2016, for the 
first time, China hosted the CICA Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Beijing and Chinese President 
Xi Jinping proposed the “Asian Security Concept”, which was characterized by common, 
comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security. This idea was not only considered as a 
product of China’s “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and “New Security Concept”, but 
also it was regarded as an international extension of China’s Overall National Security Concept 
in the domestic context. More significantly, the China-proposed “Asian Security Concept” 
received recognition from the SCO member states and shared common grounds with the SCO’s 
core value – the “Shanghai Spirit” – in terms of the pattern of regional cooperation  (Zheng, 
2016). 
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6.3.3. THE ORGANIZATIONAL EXPANSION AND INCREASING 
ENGAGEMENT WITH GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2017-2018) 
During this stage, with the inclusion of India and Pakistan in 2017, the SCO expanded for the 
first time since its establishment. This act indicated that the diplomatic, economic, cultural, and 
security cooperation demonstrated by this Central Asia-based organization had extended its 
influence to South Asia, bringing about both opportunities and challenges for the SCO and its 
member states. Moreover, since 2016, the United States has withdrawn from a number of 
international organizations and treaties and abdicated its responsibility to the international 
community. Against this background, the implementation of the ILCC in the SCO, during this 
stage, was manifested in dealing with the expansion of the organization on the one hand and in 
promoting the SCO to play a more proactive role in global governance on the other hand. In 
this respect, the 2018 Qingdao SCO summit was seen as a platform for China to exhibit the 
ILCC. 
First, from the institutional perspective, China practised its facilitative leadership (inclusiveness) 
by ratifying the inclusion of India and Pakistan into the SCO at the Astana SCO summit in 2017. 
China’s decision showed that this China-led organization was “audacious and creative” and 
was seen as “a clear departure from the traditional reserve and caution of Chinese diplomacy” 
(Carrier, 2018). The SCO’s institutional expansion was not only seen as a creative attempt that 
brought the political and military rivalries into one regional group, but also it enhanced the 
representativeness of the SCO in terms of its increased political, economic, military weight. 
After this expansion, the SCO member states represented 40% of the world’s population and 
generated 20% of global GDP, and it now “stretches across a large part of the strategically 
critical Eurasia-South Asia landmass” (Carrier, 2018). In this respect, it is argued that China’s 
implementation of the ILCC granted the SCO with greater capability and opportunities to 
influence regional affairs and global governance. 
In addition, China practised its constructive leadership by advancing the institutional 
arrangements of regional economic cooperation. For instance, at the Astana summit in 2017, 
China suggested that the SCO members could begin by signing an SCO trade facilitation 
agreement. With the aim of building greater connectivity between the region’s countries, China 
supported the opening of the cross-border routes on schedule as prescribed in the Agreement 
between Governments of the Member States of the SCO on Creating Favorable Condition for 
International Road Transportation and initiated the establishment of economic think-tanks 
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cooperation and e-commerce cooperation, promoting cooperation between small and medium 
sized companies from the SCO members. 
At the Qingdao summit in 2018, with the aim of unifying existing and new members and 
preventing potential conflicts after the SCO’s expansion, China promoted the signing of the 
Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Between the Member 
States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, reconfirming a constructive partnership 
characterized by non-alliance, non-confrontation, and non-targeting of any third party. This 
move was conducive to the consolidation of its institutional principles and in the spirit of the 
mechanism of the SCO. In the meanwhile, in the field of economics and trade, given the rise of 
protectionism and anti-globalization sentiments in the West, China practised its exemplary 
leadership by encouraging the member states to uphold the multilateral trade system featuring 
openness, inclusiveness, transparence, non-discrimination, and which was rule-based. 
Moreover, with pressure from China, the SCO made a breakthrough in the area of global 
governance. At the Qingdao summit in 2018 – in addition to the participation of the UN delegate 
– senior representatives from the Eurasian Economic Alliance, International Monetary Fund, 
and the World Bank were, for the first time, invited to participate in this event. The SCO 
Secretariat also signed a cooperation document with UNESCO, in sharp contrast to the United 
States’ withdrawal from this organization in 2017. Institutional cooperation between the SCO 
and other significant international organizations not only endowed the SCO with greater 
recognition within the international community, but also it granted the SCO a broader platform 
on which to take an active role in contributing to global governance. 
Second, from the policy perspective, with China’s support, at the Qingdao summit the SCO 
jointly released several significant policy documents, notably the Qingdao Declaration of the 
Council of Heads of State of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Joint Declaration of the 
Council of Heads of State of Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Trade Facilitation, and 
China ratified a five-year outline for the implementation of the Treaty on Long-Term Good-
Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Between the Member States of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, setting the direction for cooperation between the SCO members in 
the next phase and approving a host of resolutions and cooperation deals in a myriad of issue-
areas. 
Moreover, the implementation of the ILCC was also manifested in a number of achievements 
at the Qingdao summits hosted by China. In the security area, the SCO members ratified the 
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2019-2021 Program of Cooperation for Combating “Three Evil Forces”, developed measures 
for preventing the participation of youth in terrorist, extremist, and separatist organizations, 
improving the system fighting against the exchange of information between terrorists. In terms 
of the economy, the Qingdao summit issued several documents relating to practical economic 
cooperation, covering the themes of trade facilitation, international road transportation 
facilitation, food security, and customs coordination, etc. In the meanwhile, the China-proposed 
“Belt and Road Initiative” received increasing support and was good for regional economic 
cooperation. In the people-to-people exchange area, the Qingdao summit reached consensus on 
respect for cultural diversity and differing values and promoted cooperation in the areas of 
cultural communication, education, technology, health care, tourism, youth, women, media, 
and sport. 
Third, from the material perspective, as the largest economy in the SCO, China has driven the 
dramatic growth of trade and investment among the SCO members. By 2017, the total trade 
volume of the SCO member states was US$4.9 trillion compared to US$672 billion in 2001, 
and it became US$5.71 trillion following the inclusion of India and Pakistan. In the meanwhile, 
China’s total trade volumes with the other SCO members amounted to US$217.6 billion, and 
it became the largest trading partner of Russia, Kyrgyzstan, India, and Pakistan and the second 
largest trading partner of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. By 2017, the total 
investments of the SCO members amounted to US$178.9 billion, which was 2.8 times the 
amount recorded in 2003. China’s total investment in other SCO members was US$83 billion, 
and it became the largest investment source country of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan 
and the fourth largest investment source country of Russia and Kazakhstan. From these 
statistics, this thesis argues that China practised its facilitative leadership in driving the dramatic 
development of regional economic cooperation. 
Moreover, in addition to bilateral cooperation with the SCO members, China also contributed 
a lot to multilateral cooperation under the framework of the SCO at this stage. At the Astana 
summit in 2017, China contributed 10 million RMB (US$1.47 million) to the SCO Secretariat 
in order to facilitate its maintenance and operation. In addition, at the Qingdao summit in 2018, 
China established a 30 million RMB (US$4.7 billion) equivalent special lending facility within 
the framework of the SCO Interbank Consortium (IBC). In the meanwhile, China also decided 
to provide human resources development training to 3,000 individuals from the SCO member 
states, aiming to enhance the understanding and recognition of the SCO as a unified body. 
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Fourth, from the ideational perspective, with the purpose of unifying the expanded SCO and 
contributing to global governance, on the basis of the “Shanghai Spirit”, China practised its 
constructive leadership (vision construction), at the Qingdao SCO summit, by innovatively 
proposing the common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable New Security Concept, 
the innovative, coordinated, green, open, and inclusive New Development Concept, the open, 
inclusive, and win-win New Cooperation Concept, and the New Civilization Concept featuring 
equality, mutual learning, dialogue, and inclusiveness. Moreover, China also developed a New 
Global Governance Concept characterized by the principle of achieving shared growth through 
discussion and collaboration and building a community with a shared future for humanity. 
These innovations not only laid the ideational foundations for the development trajectory of the 
expanded SCO, but they also provided guidelines for the SCO by which to engage in global 
governance. 
6.4. SUMMARY 
6.4.1. THE GENERALIZATION OF THE ILCC IN THE SCO 
On the basis of the above empirical analysis of China’s NRC and NRP embedded in the ILCC 
in the SCO, the generalization of the ILCC in the SCO can be interpreted as follows. 
During the first two stages described above – the diversification of cooperative areas of the 
SCO (2008-2012) and the steady progress of the SCO (2013-2016) – China made institutional, 
material, policy, and ideational contributions through its construction and implementation of 
the ILCC. During these two stages, with deepening cooperation between the member states, the 
most significant development of the SCO was its diversification of cooperative issue-areas, 
covering both its traditional cooperative areas of security and economy and its emerging 
cooperative areas of trade, culture, technology, education, agriculture, environmental protection, 
transportation, and finance. Since then, China has practised its facilitative leadership by 
establishing the SCO Interbank Consortium (IBC) with other member states and proposing the 
founding of the SCO Development Bank as a long-term stable financing platform. However, 
the functional diversification of the SCO has inevitably led to a competitive relationship 
between the SCO and other regional organizations. In this regard, by virtue of the China-
proposed “Belt and Road Initiative”, China practised its facilitative leadership by promoting 
cooperation between the SCO and other regional institutions, such as the Russia-led Eurasian 
Economic Union and the EU-led “Partnership and Cooperation Agreements”. Moreover, as 
with its role in the BRICS, China has practised its constructive leadership by shaping the 
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founding principle of the “Shanghai Spirit”, characterized by mutual trust, mutual benefit, 
equality, mutual consultations, respect for cultural diversity, and aspiration for common 
development, in the establishment and development of the SCO. By sticking to this principle, 
the SCO member states, especially China and Russia, have had opportunities to resolve their 
differences, coordinate their policies, and preserve regional stability. 
During the third stage of expansion and increasing engagement with global governance (2017-
2018), the most significant event was the inclusion of India and Pakistan into the SCO. This act 
demonstrated that this China-led organization was “audacious and creative” (Carrier, 2018) by 
bringing political and military rivals into one regional group and then enhancing the 
representativeness of the SCO in terms of its increased population and political, economic, and 
military weight. However, it is worth noting that the inclusion of these countries was based on 
the founding principle of the “Shanghai Spirit”, as India and Pakistan agreed that they would 
not use the SCO as a third-party resolution platform for their bilateral conflicts. Moreover, 
during this stage, another momentous development was the SCO’s engagement with global 
governance. Against the backdrop of the United States’ withdrawal from UNESCO, China 
practised its facilitative leadership by persuading the SCO Secretariat to sign a cooperation 
document with this key international organization, and this endowed the SCO with greater 
recognition within the international community. China also practised its constructive leadership 
and exemplary leadership at the Qingdao summit by contributing several innovative concepts, 
such as the New Security Concept, the New Development Concept, the New Cooperation 
Concept, and the New Civilization Concept, which provided guidelines for the SCO to take part 
in global governance. 
In sum, by generalizing the ILCC in the SCO during these three stages, this thesis argues that 
the relationship between China’s NRC and NRP embedded in the ILCC in the SCO was 
generally consistent, even though it cannot be denied that there were deviations between 
China’s NRC and NRP because of a number of challenges at various levels and dimensions. 
Similar to the situation in the BRICS, China and Russia are widely recognized as joint leaders 
in the SCO. In this regard, this thesis contends that the ILCC has been fully constructed and 
implemented by China in the SCO in the fields of security, economic development, and global 
governance. 
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6.4.2. THE ILCC IN THE SCO AS A REFLECTION OF THE MAJOR 
FEATURES OF CHINESE ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF IR 
By interpreting the manifestation of the ILCC in the SCO, this thesis argues that the 
construction and implementation of the ILCC in the SCO generally reflects the three features 
of Chinese ontological assumptions of IR. First of all, the ILCC in the SCO can be interpreted 
as a reflection of the feature of relationality. As the first China-led multilateral security 
organization, the SCO has played a significant role in fighting against the “Three Evils” 
(terrorism, separatism, and extremism) and contributed a great deal to the regional stability of 
Central Asia, which has enhanced China’s reputation and recognition by the SCO members and 
the international anti-terrorism community. Moreover, Central Asia is seen as traditionally a 
Russian sphere of influence, and the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) are the key regional mechanisms that are 
considered as challengers to the development of the SCO. Thus, by insistently upholding the 
“Shanghai Spirit”, China has demonstrated its constructive leadership and devoted itself to 
managing the complex relations in order to maintain regional stability. For instance, in 
December 2015, China and Russia signed the Joint Communique of the 20th Regular Meeting 
between Chinese and Russian Prime Ministers, indicating that both sides (China and Russia) 
see the SCO as the most effective platform for connecting the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 
Eurasian Economic Union. This joint communique demonstrated the common ground between 
the China-led and Russia-led EEU, remedying the tensions and disputes between the two 
regional powers and preserving social and political stability in Central Asia. As a result, it was 
conducive to a favorable environment for peace and the development of the SCO members and 
other regional states. 
Second, China has constructed and practised its facilitative leadership and constructive 
leadership by shaping an open and inclusive SCO, being considered as a reflection of the feature 
of inclusiveness. The most prominent example demonstrating this feature was China’s 
ratification of the inclusion of new members – India and Pakistan – into the SCO. Given that 
the inclusion of India and Pakistan brings more diversified political and cultural aspects to this 
Central Asia-based organization, which could dilute the collective identity of the SCO, China 
has repeatedly emphasized the significance of the “Shanghai Spirit” as the fundamental 
principle of the SCO, in order to consolidate the outcome of the organization’s expansion. By 
complying with this principle, India and Pakistan have agreed that they will not bring their 
bilateral disputes into the SCO and will not seek to resolve their conflict through the SCO as a 
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third-party platform. In this respect, this act of expansion was seen as a creative and inclusive 
attempt that brought political and military rivalries into one regional group. Another example 
that displays the feature of inclusiveness of Chinese ontological assumptions of IR was China’s 
invitation of a number of delegates from other international organizations to attend the Qingdao 
summit in 2018. In addition to the delegate from the UN, senior representatives of the Eurasian 
Economic Alliance, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank were, for the first time, 
invited to participate in this summit. Moreover, during the China-hosted Qingdao summit, the 
SCO Secretariat also signed a cooperation document with UNESCO, in sharp contrast to the 
United States’ withdrawal from this organization in 2017. The institutional cooperation 
between the SCO and other significant international organizations not only endowed the SCO 
with a high profile in the international community, but it also granted the SCO a broader 
platform on which to take an active role in contributing to global governance. 
Third, over the past decade, through its construction and implementation of the ILCC, China 
has played a critical role in promoting the development and diversifying the functions of the 
SCO during three major stages in the post-crisis era, which can be interpreted as a reflection of 
the feature of processuality. Against the background of the outbreak of the global financial 
crisis and the decreasing legitimacy of the existing international economic institutions, China 
has practised its constructive leadership by extending the major focus of the SCO from the 
issue-area of regional security to regional economic cooperation and development. Moreover, 
the inclusion of India and Pakistan has also strengthened the political, economic, and security 
weight of the SCO in international relations. This thesis argues that this functional 
diversification and organizational expansion followed the grand tendency of the post-crisis 
world economy, characterized by the increasing significance of the emerging powers and 
developing countries in governing the regional economy. However, the transformation of the 
SCO was not achieved in a radical manner, rather it was realized via a manageable and balanced 
process manifested in two major aspects. On the one hand, the organization’s expansion, i.e. 
the inclusion of India and Pakistan, was achieved through a step-by-step process and was 
perceived as the outcome of mutual trust between China and Russia – the two major great 
powers of the SCO. On the other hand, the functional diversification of the SCO, mainly 
manifested in its economic function, has the potential to generate competition with other 
regional economic organizations. Consequently, China practised its facilitative leadership by 
promoting cooperation between the SCO and the Russia-led CSTO and EEU, shaping the 
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development of the SCO in a cautious manner, with respect for the interests of other member 
states in the region. 
6.4.3. THE CHALLENGES FACED BY THE ILCC IN THE SCO 
In the third example above, the summary points out the major challenges faced in the 
construction and implementation of the ILCC in the SCO. These challenges were examined 
from both the multilevel and multidimensional perspective, as designed in the case study 
process. Specifically, the challenges were as follows.  
First, competition between China and Russia is a major challenge to the construction and 
implementation of the ILCC in the SCO. Although China and Russia are seen as joint drivers 
of the SCO, it cannot be denied that these two countries also have divergences in their 
geopolitical and economic concerns.  
From the geopolitical perspective, Russia has, for a long time, considered Central Asia as its 
sphere of influence, and has always aimed to restore Russia to glory on the basis of this region. 
In the meanwhile, China has also invested a lot in this region, as a significant component of its 
neighborhood diplomacy. In this circumstance, the Central Asian countries are able to strike a 
balance between China and Russia. They intend to lose their excessive reliance on Russia and 
to use China to counterbalance the dominance of Russia in the region. This inevitably leads to 
Russian concerns about the growing influence of China in the Central Asian countries (Stronski 
and Ng, 2018). In addition, the Central Asian member states of the SCO are simultaneously 
members of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EAEC). As a result, for Russia, the SCO is just seen as a supplement 
to these two institutions. Moreover, a number of supposed “China Threats”, such as the “the 
imbalance of power between China and Russia”, “Chinese immigrants in the Far East of 
Russia”, “China requests for territory from Russia”, have the potential to have a negative impact 
on the China-Russia relationship and to lead to a defensive Russian mentality towards China 
(Alexseev, 2018). 
From the economic perspective, the SCO is China’s only multilateral mechanism in Central 
Asia. However, other SCO member states participate in the Russia-led multilateral mechanisms, 
such as the Eurasian Economic Community. Russia and other Central Asian countries have 
naturally inherited the economic relationships of the former Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union 
era, Russia was the leading country in the region and established extensive economic, industrial, 
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and trade relationships with the Central Asian countries. In other words, historically, the 
economic ties between Russia and the Central Asian countries were seen as a “core-periphery” 
relationship (Menon, 1995). For Russia, the SCO is merely one of its multilateral groupings in 
this region and it poses certain challenges for Russia by diluting its economic dominance in this 
region. Therefore, it is reasonable for Russia to pay more attention to the development of the 
Eurasian Economic Community and Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Area 
and to emphasize its leading role in regional economic cooperation rather than to the China-led 
SCO. As a consequence, this situation inevitably has an impact on the construction and 
implementation of the ILCC in the SCO and in Central Asia.  
Second, following the expansion of the SCO, the inclusion of India and Pakistan may bring 
uncertainties to the development of the SCO and the ILCC. The most prominent uncertainty is 
the conflict between India and Pakistan. Although the two new members have stated that they 
will not bring their bilateral conflicts into the SCO and will not seek to resolve their conflict 
through a third-party platform (such as the SCO), their increasing engagement with the SCO 
will inevitably lead to disagreements between China and Russia and even, possibly, to the split 
of the SCO. The conflict between India and Pakistan may also threaten the SCO’s principle of 
“reaching consensus through consultation” and may weaken the organization’s ability to reach 
agreement and implement decisions. As a consequence, the construction and implementation 
of the ILCC will unquestionably be challenged. 
Third, economic issues among the SCO member states also pose a great challenge to the ILCC. 
First, trade facilitation between the SCO members faces a number of barriers in terms of 
different customs procedures, divergent regulatory policies, and various business environments, 
etc. Second, varying development levels among the SCO member states lead to a divergence 
of interests. China, Russia, and India are the leading economies in the SCO, and the other five 
members are lagging behind in terms of economic development. Thus, it is not easy to make a 
unified plan for regional economic development and integration. Third, an imbalance between 
the cooperation areas of the member states can also provide a potential threat to the 
development of the SCO. For a long time, SCO members have focused on cooperation in the 
resources industry and have paid less attention to the agriculture and service industries. This 
situation impedes the further expansion of regional economic cooperation. Fourth, the co-
existence of a number of overlapping economic cooperation mechanisms has a negative impact 
on the development of the ILCC in the SCO. In this region, in addition to the China-led SCO, 
the Eurasian Economic Community, Commonwealth of Independent States, and Central Asian 
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Cooperation Organization are also significant cooperation mechanisms. This situation 
predictably dilutes the ILCC in terms of regional economic cooperation. 
Last but not least, since 9/11, the United States has increasingly engaged with the geopolitical 
and economic issues of Central Asia. The presence of the United States in this region applies 
great strategic pressure on the regional great powers – China and Russia. In the name of fighting 
against terrorism, the United States has extended its military force to Central Asia and has 
dramatically changed the geopolitical reality of this region. The presence of a U.S. military 
force in this region poses a challenge to China and has a huge impact on the role of the China-
led SCO in regional security. The Central Asian countries seeking a security balance between 
China and the United States will certainly decrease the influence of China in this region. 
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CHAPTER 7. CASE IV: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE ILCC IN THE BRI 
7.1. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
In September and October 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping respectively proposed the “Silk 
Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” during his visit to Kazakhstan 
and Indonesia. Since then, the two initiatives have attracted enormous international attention in 
political, business, and academic circles. In November 2013, the Third Plenary Session of the 
18th CPC Central Committee approved the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, 
explicitly proposing that China will endeavor to build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road in order to form a new pattern of all-round opening-up. In March 
2015, with State Council authorization, China’s National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of People’s 
Republic of China jointly issued their Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road 
Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, identifying the principles, framework, 
cooperation priorities, and cooperation mechanisms for these projects and indicating the top-
level design of the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). In March 2016, in the 13th Five-Year Plan 
for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (2016-2020), the BRI, 
identified as the major objective of this period, is projected to develop “a new picture of all-
around opening up in which China is opened to the world through eastward and westward links 
and across land and sea” (NDRC, 2016). In this respect, the BRI was designed to unite China’s 
domestic development with international economic cooperation. In May 2017, China 
successfully hosted the first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, during which 
a great deal of progress was made and significant consensus was reached among the participants. 
Since it was first proposed, China’s motivations and the implications arising from the launch 
of the BRI have been extensively studied by a large number of scholars from multiple 
perspectives, as follows. 
China’s motivations for proposing the BRI have been examined from historical and 
contemporary perspectives. From a historical perspective, historians and cultural scholars have 
interpreted the background and China’s motivations on the basis of the historical and cultural 
heritage of the ancient silk road, and they have argued that the ancient silk road laid solid 
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historical and cultural foundation for the form and development of the BRI in terms of following 
the ancient economic corridor and connecting diverse cultures – Chinese culture, Indian culture, 
Persian culture, Arabic culture, and the ancient Greek and Roman culture. In other words, 
according to the historians and cultural scholars, the BRI is regarded as the best example of 
inheriting the spirit of “peaceful cooperation” and “open and inclusive culture” embedded in 
the ancient silk road (Han, 2015). 
From the contemporary perspective, economics and politicians have attributed the BRI 
initiative to two major motivations: internal and external. From the internal perspective, 
economic and political scientists have interpreted China’s motivations for proposing the BRI 
on the basis of the Chinese domestic economic situation characterized by the New Normal 
Economy, the middle-income trap threat, and the divergence in regional development. They 
argue that the construction and implementation of the BRI is an effective way of promoting 
domestic reform, achieving sustainable development, and coordinating development between 
the eastern and western regions (T. Wang, 2015; Zheng, 2015). From the external perspective, 
scholars of international relations and political science argue that China’s response to 
geopolitical factors is the motivation for China’s proposal of the BRI. They apply Nicholas 
John Spykma’s “Rimland Theory” (1942) and Halford John Mackinder’s “Heartland Theory” 
(1902) to interpret the Obama Administration’s proposal of the “Pivot to Asia Strategy” and 
“New Silk Road Strategy”, arguing that these strategies may dilute China’s influence in Asia 
and help the United States to build its dominance in this area. In the meantime, Russia launched 
the Eurasian Economic Union to consolidate its relationship with the other Commonwealth of 
Independent States. Influenced by these geopolitical factors, China proposed the BRI in order 
to maintain regional stability and achieve its peaceful development and cooperation with 
regional countries (J. Wang, 2015). 
Moreover, scholars have also conducted extensive research on the implications of the BRI from 
economic, political, cultural, and international perspectives. (1) From the economic perspective, 
the implementation of the BRI promises great value for the achievement of the sustainable 
development of China’s national economy in terms of exploring emerging markets, relieving 
China’s excess capacity, and by promoting economic and trade cooperation between China and 
the countries along the routes. By strengthening the economic connections between China and 
other participants, China will be able to explore new strategic development spaces and construct 
China’s all-round opening-up in the new era. (2) From the political perspective, the launch of 
the BRI has positive implications for China’s political stability and the construction of a sound 
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international environment for China. One major objective of the BRI is to establish a 
community of shared destiny between China and other participants. In this respect, the 
implementation of the BRI laid a solid political foundation for realizing China’s objective of 
“Two Centenaries”. (3) From the cultural perspective, the BRI is seen as an important platform 
for strengthening cultural communication between China and the other participants. Both the 
“Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” contain rich cultural 
connotations. The promotion of the BRI will reinforce communication between diverse ideas 
and religions along the routes, paving the way for the peaceful co-existence of various cultures. 
The BRI appreciates the divergence of development models and strategies among different 
countries and emphasizes dialogue between various civilizations, exerting a positive influence 
on China’s involvement in international communication and people-to-people exchanges. (4) 
From the international perspective, as a regional cooperation program, the BRI has a great deal 
of international significance. On the one hand, the BRI serves China’s periphery diplomacy 
well, providing opportunities for the development of the SCO member states and the SCO as a 
China-led regional organization. On the other hand, more broadly, the BRI helps to demonstrate 
China’s new ideas and new models for developing regional cooperation through constructing 
an economic corridor and providing foreign development assistance. By doing so, the BRI 
spells out China’s plan for the achievement of regional development and the promotion of world 
peace. 
In sum, having reviewed the research on China’s multiple motivations for proposing the BRI 
and the multidimensional implications brought about by the BRI for China and its other 
participants, this thesis argues that the construction and implementation of the ILCC in the BRI 
can be interpreted through an examination of the development process of this China-initiated 
project. Unlike the previous three cases, the BRI was proposed and developed for five years 
only (2013-2018) and it is difficult to divide the development process of the BRI into specific 
stages. Thus, this chapter will not conduct an empirical analysis of the BRI on the basis of 
stages, unlike the cases of the G20, BRICS and SCO, rather it interprets China’s NRC and NRP 
embedded in ILCC in the BRI from the perspective of regional cooperation and global 
governance. 
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7.2. THE INTERPRETATION OF CHINA’S NRC EMBEDDED IN 
THE ILCC IN THE BRI 
7.2.1. CHINA’S CONSTRUCTION OF THE ILCC IN THE BRI FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION 
In September and October 2013, China constructed its constructive leadership (interest 
construction and vision construction) by respectively proposing the “Silk Road Economic Belt” 
and “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” in Kazakhstan and Indonesia. With the purpose of 
raising the profile of the China-initiated “Belt” and “Road” by the target countries, in his 
speeches in Astana and Jakarta, Chinese President Xi Jinping started by recounting the cultural 
and historical legacies embedded in the centuries-old connection and cooperation between 
China and countries along the ancient (maritime) silk road. For instance, in his speech delivered 
in Nazarbayev University, Xi said that “Kazakhstan, sitting on the ancient Silk Road, has made 
an important contribution to the exchanges between the Eastern and Western civilizations and 
the interactions and cooperation between various nations and cultures” [哈萨克斯坦这片土地，
是古丝绸之路经过的地方，曾经为沟通东西方文明，促进不同民族、不同文化相互交
流和合作作出过重要贡献] (Xi, 2013f). In the same vein, one month after Xi’s speech in 
Astana, he delivered another speech at the People’s Representative Council of Indonesia and 
argued that “As early as the Han Dynasty in China about 2,000 years ago, the people of the two 
countries opened the door to each other despite the sea between them. Over the centuries, the 
vast oceans have served as the bond of friendship connecting the two peoples, not a barrier 
between them” [早在 2000 多年前的中国汉代，两国人民就克服大海的阻隔，打开了往
来的大门。几百年来，遥远浩瀚的大海没有成为两国人民交往的阻碍，反而成为连接
两国人民的友好纽带] (Xi, 2013e). 
Moreover, in addition to its cultural and historical foundations, China’s proposals for the “Silk 
Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Maritime Silk Road” were also based on Chinese decision-
makers’ assessments of the opportunity to act. In Kazakhstan, the proposal of the “Belt” was in 
line with Chinese decision-makers’ perception that “both China and Central Asian countries 
are at a crucial stage of development with unprecedented opportunities and challenges. Our 
strategic goals are the same, which is to ensure sustained and stable economic development, 
build a prosperous and strong nation and achieve national revitalization” [中国和中亚国家都
处在关键发展阶段，面对前所未有的机遇和挑战。我们的战略目标是一致的，那就是
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确保经济长期稳定发展，实现国家繁荣富强和民族振兴] (Xi, 2013f). In Indonesia, China 
launched the “Road” initiative based on Chinese decision-makers’ understanding that “the 
growing mutual trust between the two countries has put our bilateral relations on a more solid 
political basis. Our practical cooperation has expanded from such traditional areas as economy, 
trade, finance, infrastructure, energy, resources and manufacturing to include new fields such 
as space and maritime affair” [我们两国互信不断加深，双边关系政治基础更加牢固。两
国务实合作领域更加广泛，既有经贸、金融、基础设施、能源资源、制造业等传统领
域，还拓展到航天、海上等新兴领域] (Xi, 2013e). 
On the basis of the this assessment, Chinese decision-makers had officially proposed the “One 
Belt One Road” (the predecessor of the Belt and Road Initiative) and explicitly highlighted its 
significance for regional cooperation. On the one hand, Chinese decision-makers pointed out 
that the “Silk Road Economic Belt” could promote Asian regional cooperation and inter-
regional cooperation between Asia and Europe, as Chinese President Xi argued in Kazakhstan 
that “to forge closer economic ties, deepen cooperation and expand development space in the 
Eurasian region, we should take an innovative approach and jointly build an ‘Silk Road 
Economic Belt’. We may start with work in individual areas and link them up over time to 
cover the whole region” [为了使我们欧亚各国经济联系更加紧密、相互合作更加深入、
发展空间更加广阔，我们可以用创新的合作模式，共同建设“丝绸之路经济带”。以点
带面，从线到片，逐步形成区域大合作] (Xi, 2013f). On the other hand, Chinese decision-
makers identified that the “21st Maritime Silk Road” could bring positive impacts for regional 
development in Southeast Asia, especially regarding cooperation between China and ASEAN, 
the central player in regional cooperation. According to Xi, “China will strengthen maritime 
cooperation with ASEAN countries and jointly build the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’. 
China is ready to expand its practical cooperation with ASEAN countries across the board” [中
国愿同东盟国家加强海上合作，共同建设 21 世纪“海上丝绸之路”。中国愿通过扩大同
东盟国家各领域务实合作，互通有无、优势互补] (Xi, 2013e). 
To avoid the BRI becoming an empty talk-shop and in order to increase its operability, Chinese 
decision-makers further identified five issue-areas of the BRI for promoting regional 
cooperation, as Xi Jinping demonstrated as follows: 
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First, we need to step up policy communication. We should have full discussions on 
development strategies and policy response, work out plans and measures for advancing 
regional cooperation through consultation in the spirit of seeking common ground while 
reserving differences. Second, we need to improve road connectivity. We will actively discuss 
the best way to improve cross-border transportation infrastructure and work toward a 
transportation network connecting East Asia, West Asia and South Asia to facilitate economic 
development and travel in the region. Third, we need to promote unimpeded trade. We should 
discuss a proper arrangement for trade and investment facilitation, remove trade barriers, reduce 
trade and investment cost, increase the speed and quality of regional economic flows and 
achieve win-win progress in the region. Fourth, we need to enhance monetary circulation. If 
our region can realize local currency convertibility and settlement under current and capital 
accounts, it will significantly lower circulation cost, increase our ability to fend off financial 
risks and make our region more competitive economically in the world. Fifth, we need to 
increase understanding between our people. To have productive cooperation in the above-
mentioned areas, we need the support of our people. We should encourage more friendly 
exchanges between our people to enhance mutual understanding and traditional friendship and 
build strong public support and a solid social foundation for regional cooperation. 
[第一，加强政策沟通。各国可以就经济发展战略和对策进行充分交流，本着求同存异
原则，协商制定推进区域合作的规划和措施；第二，加强道路联通。各方积极探讨完
善跨境交通基础设施，逐步形成连接东亚、西亚、南亚的交通运输网络，为各国经济
发展和人员往来提供便利；第三，加强贸易畅通。各方应该就贸易和投资便利化问题
进行探讨并作出适当安排，消除贸易壁垒，降低贸易和投资成本，提高区域经济循环
速度和质量，实现互利共赢；第四，加强货币流通。各国在经常项下和资本项下实现
本币兑换和结算，就可以大大降低流通成本，增强抵御金融风险能力，提高本地区经
济国际竞争力；第五，加强民心相通。搞好上述领域合作，必须得到各国人民支持，
必须加强人民友好往来，增进相互了解和传统友谊，为开展区域合作奠定坚实民意基
础和社会基础] (Xi, 2013f) 
Xi’s identification of the five major cooperative areas of the BRI provided an overall guideline 
for achieving regional cooperation in a comprehensive way. According to Wang Yin, the five 
areas had the potential to strengthen political trust, economic integration, and cultural 
compatibility between the participants of the BRI, and are conducive to the formation of a 
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regional community of common interests, a regional community of common responsibility, and 
a regional community of common destiny (Wang, 2017). 
Furthermore, China constructed its facilitative leadership (inclusiveness) by not limiting the 
number of participants in the BRI and advocating the construction of open and inclusive 
regional cooperation, as Chinese President Xi argued: “Through implementing the ‘Belt and 
Road Initiative’, we will go for even broader, deeper and more sophisticated cooperation at the 
regional level and jointly foster a regional framework of open, inclusive, balanced and mutually 
beneficial cooperation” [通过“一带一路”建设，我们将开展更大范围、更高水平、更深层
次的区域合作，共同打造开放、包容、均衡、普惠的区域合作架构] (Xi, 2015a). At the 
Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation held in Beijing in May 2017, the idea of 
openness and inclusiveness was further strengthened by Xi’s speech during the opening 
ceremony. According to Xi, “In pursuing the Belt and Road Initiative, we will not resort to 
outdated geopolitical maneuvering. What we hope to achieve is a new model of win-win 
cooperation. We have no intention to form a small group detrimental to stability, what we hope 
to create is a big family of harmonious co-existence” [我们推进“一带一路”建设不会重复地
缘博弈的老套路，而将开创合作共赢的新模式；不会形成破坏稳定的小集团，而将建
设和谐共存的大家庭] (Xi, 2017b). 
In the meanwhile, in laying out the principles of constructing the BRI, China constructed its 
facilitative leadership from the collective perspective. The collectiveness of the BRI is not only 
manifested in the joint efforts between China and other participants, but also it is observed in 
the complementary relationship between the BRI and other regional cooperation mechanisms. 
As Xi contended, that “In promoting the BRI, China will follow the principle of wide 
consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits. It will be a real chorus comprising all 
countries along the routes, not a solo for China itself. The BRI is not to replace existing 
mechanisms or initiatives for regional cooperation. We will build on the existing basis to help 
countries align their development strategies and form complementarity” [“一带一路”建设秉
持的是共商、共建、共享原则，不是封闭的，而是开放包容的；不是中国一家的独奏，
而是沿线国家的合唱。“一带一路”建设不是要替代现有地区合作机制和倡议，而是要
在已有基础上，推动沿线国家实现发展战略相互对接、优势互补] (Xi, 2015d). 
China’s construction of its facilitative leadership in the BRI was also manifested in China’s 
empowerment of other participants’ domestic development and in the promotion of regional 
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cooperation. One of the most prominent examples was a series of material and financial 
programs announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in his speech at the 2017 Belt and Road 
Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing. First, China was committed to increasing its 
financial support for the construction of the BRI, “contributing an additional RMB 100 million 
to the Silk Road Fund” [向丝路基金新增资金 1000亿元人民币] and “the China Development 
Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China will set up special lending schemes respectively 
worth RMB 250 billion equivalent and RMB 130 billion equivalent to support Belt and Road 
cooperation on infrastructure, industrial capacity and financing” [中国国家开发银行、进出
口银行将分别提供 2500亿元和 1300亿元等值人民币专项贷款，用于支持“一带一路”基
础设施建设、产能、金融合作] (Xi, 2017b). Second, China decided to enhance cooperation 
on innovation with other participants along the routes, “offering 2,500 short-term research visits 
to China for young foreign scientists, training 5,000 foreign scientists, engineers and managers, 
setting up 50 joint laboratories in the coming five years” [我们将在未来 5年内安排 2500人
次青年科学家来华从事短期科研工作，培训 5000 人次科学技术和管理人员，投入运行
50家联合实验室] (Xi, 2017b). Third, China showed its great willingness to improve people’s 
living standards and strengthen the capacity building of other developing countries involved in 
the BRI, “providing assistance worth RMB 60 billion to developing countries and international 
organizations participating in the Belt and Road Initiative to launch more projects to improve 
people's well-being in the coming three years and providing emergency food aid worth RMB 2 
billion to developing countries along the Belt and Road and make an additional contribution of 
$1 billion to the Assistance Fund for South-South Cooperation” [中国将在未来 3年向参与
“一带一路”建设的发展中国家和国际组织提供 600 亿元人民币援助，建设更多民生项
目。我们将向“一带一路”沿线发展中国家提供 20 亿元人民币紧急粮食援助，向南南合
作援助基金增资 10亿美元] (Xi, 2017b). 
7.2.2. CHINA’S CONSTRUCTION OF THE ILCC IN THE BRI FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
China’s construction of the ILCC in the BRI was manifested in Chinese decision-makers’ 
initiatives and contributions to the process and architecture of global governance. Chinese 
decision-makers believe that the promotion of the BRI is necessary and feasible for the 
improvement of the existing global governance. This perception is based on Chinese elites’ 
assessment of the international situation, which was clearly demonstrated by Chinese President 
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Xi Jinping’s statement that “we find ourselves in a world fraught with challenges. Global 
growth requires new drivers, development needs to be more inclusive and balanced, and the 
gap between the rich and the poor needs to be narrowed. Hotspots in some regions are causing 
instability and terrorism is rampant. Deficit in peace, development and governance poses a 
daunting challenge to mankind” [我们正处在一个挑战频发的世界。世界经济增长需要新
动力，发展需要更加普惠平衡，贫富差距鸿沟有待弥合。地区热点持续动荡，恐怖主
义蔓延肆虐。和平赤字、发展赤字、治理赤字，是摆在全人类面前的严峻挑战] (Xi, 
2017b). Premised on this assessment, as a representative power in world politics and the global 
economy, China initiated the “Belt and Road” initiative in order to address the above-mentioned 
deficits and constructed the ILCC in the process of promoting the BRI  
First of all, by promoting the BRI, Chinese decision-makers constructed China’s constructive 
leadership (interest construction and vision construction) by representing China’s idea of global 
governance. In 2015, at the 27th Collective Study Session of the 18th CPC Politburo, Chinese 
President Xi Jinping highlighted China’s core principle of global governance – wide 
consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefit [共商、共建、共享]. Since then, Chinese 
decision-makers have repeatedly emphasized and consolidated this principle in the process of 
promoting the BRI. As Xi said at the Opening Ceremony of the Sixth Ministerial Conference 
of China-Arab States Cooperation Forum in 2014, “China and the Arab states are natural 
cooperative partners in jointly building the ‘One Belt One Road’. The two sides should adhere 
to the principle of discussion, co-construction and sharing, and build a community of common 
interests and a community of common destiny” [中国同阿拉伯国家是共建“一带一路”的天
然合作伙伴，中阿双方应该坚持共商、共建、共享原则，打造中阿利益共同体和命运
共同体] (Xi, 2014a). In 2016, during a symposium on the Belt and Road Initiative in Beijing, 
Xi delivered a speech and proposed eight critical requirements for constructing the BRI. The 
primary requirement was “to adhere to wide consultation, joint contribution and shared benefit 
among participants, to pursue equality and mutual benefit, and to firmly grasp the development 
direction and focus on key regions, countries and projects” [坚持各国共商、共建、共享，
追求平等和互利，把握重点方向，聚焦重点地区、重点国家、重点项目] (Xi, 2016c). In 
2017, at the Leaders Roundtable of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, Xi 
Jinping once again emphasized that “in the framework of the BRI, countries should work 
together to address the challenges facing the world economy, create new opportunities for 
development and move towards a community of common destiny on the basis of wide 
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consultation, joint contribution and shared benefit” [在“一带一路”建设国际合作框架内，各
方秉持共商、共建、共享原则，携手应对世界经济面临的挑战，开创发展新机遇，不
断朝着人类命运共同体方向迈进] (Xi, 2017a). It is worth mentioning that this China-
proposed idea/principle of global governance also helped China to construct its facilitative 
leadership, owing to the collectiveness and inclusiveness embedded in this idea/principle. 
Second, in order to implement the goal of the BRI to improve regional development and 
financial governance, China constructed its constructive leadership (institutional construction) 
by initiating and establishing several financial mechanisms among which the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is the most prominent achievement. For a long time, 
weak infrastructure has been a major hindrance to Asian economic development. It is estimated 
that, during the period from 2010 to 2020, the total infrastructure investment demand of the 
Asian developing countries will be as high as US$8 trillion, with an average annual investment 
of about US$730 billion. However, the annual investment volume of the existing multilateral 
development banks, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, is only US$10 
billion, being far from sufficient to meet the demand. Against this background, at the People’s 
Representative Council of Indonesia in 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping first initiated the 
construction of the AIIB in his speech, as he said, “China is committed to greater connectivity 
with ASEAN countries. China will propose the establishment of an Asian infrastructure 
investment bank that would give priority to ASEAN countries’ needs” [中国致力于加强同东
盟国家的互联互通建设。中国倡议筹建亚洲基础设施投资银行，愿支持本地区发展中
国家包括东盟国家开展基础设施互联互通建设] (Xi, 2013e). In 2014, with the increasing 
popularity of the AIIB, at the Dialogue on Strengthening Connectivity Partnership in Beijing, 
Xi delivered a speech on Connectivity Spearheads Development and Partnership Enables 
Cooperation that constructed China’s facilitative leadership by emphasizing the collective and 
inclusive relationship between the AIIB and the existing Western-based multilateral financial 
institutions. As Xi argued, “As a useful supplement to the World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank and other financial institutions, the AIIB will play a significant role in connectivity 
development in Asia” [亚洲基础设施投资银行对世界银行、亚洲开发银行等现有金融机
构是有益补充，将在亚洲互联互通建设中扮演重要角色] (Xi, 2014b). In 2016, at the 
Inauguration Ceremony of the AIIB, Chinese President Xi Jinping once again highlighted the 
significance of the AIIB for the improvement of regional and global economic governance. 
According to Xi, “The founding and opening of the AIIB also means a great deal to the reform 
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of the global economic governance system. It is consistent with the evolving trend of the global 
economic landscape and will help make the global economic governance system more just, 
equitable and effective” [亚投行正式成立并开业，对全球经济治理体系改革完善具有重
大意义，顺应了世界经济格局调整演变的趋势，有助于推动全球经济治理体系朝着更
加公正合理有效的方向发展] (Xi, 2016a). 
Third, through the process of consolidating the central role of the BRI in regional and global 
governance, Chinese decision-makers constructed China’s exemplary leadership by using its 
material power in a moral manner – sharing China’s development with other countries and 
providing public goods. In this respect, China’s facilitative leadership is also constructed 
through its empowerment of the developing countries in terms of strengthening their capacity 
building. In 2014, at the Dialogue on Strengthening Connectivity Partnership in Beijing, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping pointed out that “The ‘Belt and Road initiative’ represents a joint 
undertaking by China and its Asian neighbors. China gives top priority to countries in the 
neighborhood in its foreign policy and pursues amity, sincerity, mutual-benefit and 
inclusiveness in growing relations with them. China is ready to provide more public goods to 
its Asian neighbors through connectivity development and welcomes them to get on board the 
train of China's development” [一带一路”是中国和亚洲邻国的共同事业，中国将周边国
家作为外交政策的优先方向，践行亲、诚、惠、容的理念，愿意通过互联互通为亚洲
邻国提供更多公共产品，欢迎大家搭乘中国发展的列车] (Xi, 2014b). In addition, with the 
opening of the AIIB, Chinese decision-makers also showed their great willingness to share 
China’s achievements with potential partners and to contribute to regional and global 
development. As Xi emphasized, “The door of China's opening up will never shut and China 
welcomes all countries to ride on its development. China stands ready to work with other parties 
to make sure that the AIIB will start to operate and play its due role as soon as possible and 
contribute to economic growth and better livelihood in developing countries. And China 
continues to welcome AIIB and other international financial institutions to take part in the 
building of the ‘Belt and Road’” [中国开放的大门永远不会关上，欢迎各国搭乘中国发展
的“顺风车”。中国愿意同各方一道，推动亚投行早日投入运营、发挥作用，为发展中
国家经济增长和民生改善贡献力量。我们将继续欢迎包括亚投行在内的新老国际金融
机构共同参与“一带一路”建设] (Xi, 2016a). 
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7.3. THE INTERPRETATION OF CHINA’S NRP EMBEDDED IN 
THE ILCC IN THE BRI 
7.3.1. CHINA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ILCC IN THE BRI FROM 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION 
First, from the institutional perspective, China practised its constructive leadership (institutional 
construction) and facilitative leadership (collectiveness and inclusiveness) by promoting 
regional cooperation through establishing cooperation between the BRI and other significant 
international organizations and cooperation mechanisms along the routes, which laid an 
institutional foundation for regional cooperation. On the one hand, the “Silk Road Economic 
Belt” has established cooperative relationships with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the 
China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), the China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
Strategic Dialogue, the China-Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) Cooperation 
Forum (16+1 mechanism), and China-EU Summit, etc. On the other hand, the “21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road” has been involved in developing cooperative relationships with the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the China-ASEAN (10+1) Meeting, the ASEAN plus 
three (China, Japan and South Korea), the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation 
(GMS), the Pan-Beibu Gulf (PBG) Economic Cooperation Forum, the Indian Ocean Rim 
Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), the Western Pacific Naval Symposium 
(WPNS), and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). As a result of the above-
mentioned inter-institutional cooperation, the BRI has received increasing recognition from 
international society and has been responsible for exerting China’s influence on regional 
cooperation. 
As another China-led regional organization, the SCO has extensively engaged in the BRI in 
terms of promoting regional cooperation. Specifically, with the strengthening economic ties 
between the SCO members, the SCO has devoted itself to improving infrastructure construction 
and achieving interconnectivity in Central Asia, laying a realistic foundation for strategic 
alignment between the SCO and the BRI. Against this background, the AIIB, a major financing 
institution of the BRI, approved a number of loans for the projects in Central Asian countries 
such as Tajikistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. In this respect, the SCO has gradually evolved into 
a critical platform for cooperation with the BRI and has helped to transform the BRI from idea 
to action and from initiative to reality. 
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Second, from the policy perspective, China practised its facilitative leadership (collectiveness) 
and constructive leadership (interest construction) by coordinating polices with other regional 
organizations and countries along the BRI. At the regional level, in the process of promoting 
the BRI, China has achieved alignment with a number of regional policies and development 
strategies such as the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025, the Investment Plan for 
Europe (the Juncker Plan), the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa, and the 
APEC Connectivity Blueprint, etc. For instance, in May 2015, China and Russia signed a Joint 
Declaration on the Connection of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EEU) that was warmly received by the member states of the EEU and the SCO. In 
addition, the strategic alignment between the BRI and the ASEAN Community Blueprint has 
greatly enhanced the China-ASEAN relationship and been conducive to regional infrastructure 
development and economic growth in Southeast Asia. 
Moreover, at the national level, with the promotion of the BRI, China has co-formulated 
cooperation plans with a number of countries along the routes, such as Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Mongolia, Poland, and Laos. For instance, in May 2015, during a meeting between Chinese 
President Xi Jinping and his Kazakh counterpart Nursultan Nazarbayev, Xi commented that 
“we are ready to align the Silk Road Economic Belt to Kazakhstan’s new economic policy of 
the Bright Road, so as to achieve common development and prosperity on the basis of equality 
and reciprocity” (Rao, 2015). According to Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Erbolat 
Dossaev, policy and strategy coordination between the BRI and Kazakhstan’s “Bright Road” 
strategy “will promote the economic and social development of Kazakhstan and provide 
participating countries and regions with broader opportunities for development” (Chinatax, 
2018). In the same year, Chinese President Xi and Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj 
discussed the possibility of coordinating the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and Mongolia’s 
“Steppe Road” strategy, which is considered as “an indication of China’s efforts to promote the 
win-win nature of OBOR” (Grossman, 2017: 2). 
Third, from the material perspective, on the basis of its huge economic volume, China practised 
its facilitative leadership by empowering countries along the routes and promoting regional 
economic growth through trade and investment. By June 2018, China’s trade with other 
participants had exceeded US$5 trillion, with an annual growth rate of 1.1%, and China has 
become the largest trading partner of 25 countries along the routes. Since the proposition of the 
BRI, China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in the participants has surpassed US$70 billion, 
growing at 7.2% per year, and it has contracted foreign projects that are worth more than 
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US$500 billion, with an annual growth rate of 19.2%. Moreover, in the last five years, China 
has also actively devoted itself to building overseas economic and trade cooperation zones 
(OETCZ) along the routes. By 2018, China had invested US$28.9 billion in co-establishing 
more than 80 OETCZs with host countries and host companies. These OETCZs have 
accumulatively paid the host countries’ taxes and fees of US$2 billion and created over 244,000 
jobs for local communities. In addition, China has signed and upgraded five free trade 
agreements (FTA) with 13 countries along the routes, and China has been working hard to build 
a high-standard network of free trade areas that is “based on neighboring regions, covering the 
Belt and Road and facing the whole world” (SCIO, 2018). 
Fourth, from the ideational perspective, under the framework of the BRI, China practised its 
constructive leadership (vision construction) and exemplary leadership (intellectual guidance) 
by proposing a new pattern of development-oriented regional cooperation. In this new pattern, 
development does not refer to economic growth, but it emphasizes social and cultural 
development. In this respect, the China-proposed new pattern of development-oriented regional 
cooperation aims to promote the common development of regional countries, address the 
increasing regional inequality, and deal with environmental pollution, etc. Moreover, this 
China-initiated concept of regional cooperation also features “cooperative development” that 
advocates “wide consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits” between the regional 
countries. In this regard, under the framework of the BRI, the concept of “cooperative 
development” presents “a tremendous opportunity for fostering regulatory, economic and legal 
cooperation among regional countries” (Perera, 2018). 
7.3.2. CHINA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ILCC IN THE BRI FROM 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE  
First, from the institutional perspective, the “Belt and Road Initiative” is seen as an institutional 
public good. Generally speaking, the core of international public good is institutional and 
involves rule systems that regulates countries’ behavior. The failure of the traditional 
governance mechanism to provide efficient public good mainly results from a mismatch 
between the traditional rule system and emerging global issues (Xue and Yu, 2015). Against 
this background, the ILCC is practised by China through its promotion and implementation of 
the BRI in terms of providing a more open and inclusive public good. 
Under the framework of the BRI, China practised its constructive leadership (institutional 
construction) by setting up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road 
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Fund, which are considered to be China’s major institutional practices in regional and global 
governance. As the primary financial institution of the BRI, the AIIB, opened in January 2016, 
was a prominent manifestation of China’s contribution to the provision of an international 
public good and the improvement of the existing governance system. Nancy Birdsall and Scott 
Morris pointed out that the AIIB has contributed five institutional innovations to the 
Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) model, such as “(1) a single and singular focus on 
infrastructure; (2) a single governance structure with minimal use of special funds and funds 
directed by outside donors; (3) a single balance sheet; (4) a fresh experiment (for MDBs) in the 
challenge of what can be called good governance; (5) no graduation policy” (Birdsall and 
Morris, 2017). In addition, China also practised its facilitative leadership (collectiveness) by 
developing cooperative partnership between the AIIB and the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank. From this perspective, China has adopted flexible economic statecraft and 
showed its willingness to set a status-seeking AIIB agenda, which can “boost the legitimacy of 
Chinese international leadership claims” (Wilson, 2017: 1). 
The Silk Road Fund (SRF), established in December 2014, “follows a philosophy of openness, 
inclusiveness and mutual benefit and provides investment and financing support for trade and 
economic cooperation and connectivity under the framework of the BRI” (SRF, 2014). The 
inclusiveness and openness of the SRF is clearly manifested in its various inter-institutional 
relationships with other established and emerging financial organizations and mechanisms, 
such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the World Bank, the 
European Investment Bank (EIB), the African Development Bank (ADB), the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the SCO Interbank Consortium (IBC), etc.  
Second, from the policy perspective, China has actively practised its facilitative leadership 
(inclusiveness) and constructive leadership (interest construction) by coordinating and aligning 
policies and strategies between the BRI and a number of significant international organizations 
in the issue-areas of global development and economic governance, such as the G20, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), etc. 
Since its inception, the BRI has been committed to constructing an open world economy, which 
“echoes with the G20’s endeavor to reinforce global economic governance” (Y. Yang, 2017).  
Moreover, the BRI focuses on global development governance and it naturally aims to reach 
policy alignment with the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development set by the UNDP. At 
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the high-level symposium on “Belt and Road Initiative and 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development” in 2018, the President of the 72nd Session of the UN General Assembly Miroslav 
Lajčák pointed out that the BRI has the potential to bring about the kind of partnership needed 
for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and he also argued that the AIIB can “provide 
funding through its loan programme – which is another critical element for achieving our Goals” 
(Lajčák, 2018). In sum, the policy and strategy alignment between the BRI and the global 
initiative proposed by the existing global institutions is conducive to improvements in the 
established process and system of global development and economic governance. 
Third, from the material perspective, in respect of the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund, China is 
deeply involved in regional development governance and practises its facilitative leadership by 
empowering the participants along the Belt and the Road in terms of providing credit to their 
domestic projects and strengthening their capacity building. By June 2018, the AIIB had lent a 
total of over US$4.4 billion by approving nearly 30 projects in areas (countries) from North 
Africa (Egypt) to Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Bangladesh, Philippines, and Myanmar), from 
Central Asia (Turkey, Tajikistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan) to South Asia (India and Pakistan), 
and from East Asia (China) to the Gulf (Oman). 
These projects mainly focus on the improvement of infrastructure and the enhancement of 
people’s well-being in target countries and regions. For instance, in June 2016, the AIIB 
approved a loan of US$100 million for a Pakistani project that intends to “achieve an efficient 
and safer transport corridor between Islamabad, Faisalabad, and Multan, ensuring enhanced 
connectivity between the various parts of Pakistan” (AIIB, 2016). In March 2017, the AIIB lent 
US$125 million to an Indonesian project in terms of “increasing the safety and the functionality 
of the 63 short-listed prioritized large dams/reservoirs and developing the regulatory and 
administrative arrangements for dam and reservoir management and safety” (AIIB, 2017). In 
April 2018, the AIIB lent US$140 million to an Indian project that aims to “improve rural 
accessibility through resilient infrastructure and the primary beneficiaries are villagers, 
especially women and children, who use the rural roads daily for social and economic activities” 
(AIIB, 2018). 
Moreover, as another major financial institution in the framework of the BRI, the Silk Road 
Fund has approved 19 projects with the total value of US$7.4 billion, covering the BRI’s key 
regions of Central Asia, South Asia, West Asia, North Africa, and Central and East Europe. 
These projects are distributed across various fields, including energy, engineering machinery, 
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petrochemistry, communication network, shipbuilding, and financial cooperation. For instance, 
under the framework of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, the Karot Hydropower project 
was the first investment project to be funded by the Silk Road Fund. This project has power 
generating capacity up to 3,350 megawatts and will improve the power supply and benefit 
economic growth in Pakistan. In addition, the Silk Road Fund was involved in the Russian 
Yamal LNG project that was officially put into operation at the end of 2017. According to 
James Henderson, Director of the Natural Gas Programme at the Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies (OIES), “Yamal LNG is the key component in Russia’s North Sea Route and Arctic 
strategies, as it provides a commercial justification for new infrastructure development” 
(Humpert, 2017).  
Fourth, from the ideational perspective, through the implementation of the BRI, China practised 
its constructive leadership (vision construction) and exemplary leadership (intellectual 
guidance) by cultivating a bottom-up model of global governance. Compared to the traditional 
“one-size-fits-all” model of global governance represented by the Washington Consensus, 
China’s implementation of the BRI does not seek to build a top-down governance model that 
imposes the so-called omnipotent prescription with conditionality. On the contrary, China 
advocates a bottom-up model of global governance characterized by the idea of “wide 
consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits”. Specifically, “wide consultation” denotes 
that countries should seek common ground while preserving their differences on the basis of 
mutual respect and mutual trust; “joint contribution” highlights that participants should be fully 
involved in the efficient allocation of resources in the framework of the BRI; and “shared 
benefits” refers to the spirit of win-win cooperation and inclusive development shared by the 
participants. In sum, wide consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefit are seen as key 
components of an organic mechanism of new-modality global governance conducive to the 
establishment of equal and inclusive partnerships and the formation of a community of common 
destiny. 
With the impact of the BRI and China’s growing engagement in global governance, China-
proposed ideas and visions of global governance have received increasing attention and been 
acknowledged by the international community. For instance, in September 2016, the 71st 
Session of UN General Assembly incorporated the idea of “wide consultation, joint 
contribution, and shared benefits” into the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
resolution of “United Nations in Global Economic Governance”. In the meanwhile, at the same 
session, all 193 UN members agreed to incorporate the “Belt and Road Initiative” into the 
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UNGA resolution. One year later, at the 72nd Session of the UN General Assembly in September 
2017, the Chinese-proposed concept of building a “community of shared future for mankind” 
was incorporated into the relevant UNGA resolutions. These examples demonstrate how China-
initiated concepts of global governance in the framework of the BRI have been gradually 
translated into international consensus.  
7.4. SUMMARY 
7.4.1. THE GENERALIZATION OF THE ILCC IN THE BRI 
As discussed above, given that the BRI has only been in operation for five years, there are no 
clear-cut stages into which it might be divided, unlike the other three cases. Thus, on the basis 
of the author’s interpretation of China’s NRC and NRP embedded in the ILCC in the BRI, this 
section presents a generalization of the ILCC in the BRI from the perspectives of regional 
cooperation and global governance. 
From the perspective of regional cooperation, China constructed and practised its constructive 
leadership by proposing the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road” that together provide a vision for building regional cooperation in the post-crisis era. 
Specifically, with the purpose of promoting regional cooperation, first, China practised its 
constructive leadership and facilitative leadership by promoting cooperation between the BRI 
and other significant international organizations and cooperation mechanisms along the routes; 
second, at the regional and national level, China practised its facilitative leadership by achieving 
a number of policy alignment and development strategy alignments with other regional 
mechanisms and countries; third, China practised its facilitative leadership by empowering 
countries along the routes and promoting regional economic growth through trade and 
investment, becoming the largest trading partner of 25 countries along the routes; fourth, China 
practised its constructive leadership (vision construction) and exemplary leadership 
(intellectual guidance) by proposing a new pattern of development-oriented regional 
cooperation that aims to promote the “cooperative development” of regional countries. 
From the perspective of global governance, with the purpose of implementing the BRI, first, 
China practised its constructive leadership by leading the establishment of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund, which are considered as major  
institutional practices in regional and global governance; second, China has actively practised 
its facilitative leadership and constructive leadership by coordinating and aligning policies and 
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strategies between the BRI and a number of significant international organizations regarding 
the issue-areas of global economic governance and global development governance. For 
instance, the BRI has realized policy alignment with the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development set by the UNDP; third, through the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund, China practised 
its facilitative leadership by empowering participants along the Belt and the Road in terms of 
providing credit to their domestic projects and strengthening their capacity building; fourth, 
China practised its constructive leadership and exemplary leadership by cultivating a bottom-
up model of global governance that is characterized by the idea of “wide consultation, joint 
contribution, and shared benefits”. This idea was incorporated into the UNGA resolution 
“United Nations in Global Economic Governance” during the 71st Session of UN General 
Assembly. 
Above all, the ILCC in the BRI was mainly constructed and implemented by China in the two 
major areas of regional cooperation and global governance. As a China-initiated project, the 
BRI provides opportunities for China to inject its innovative ideas and visions into these two 
areas. According to Huang Rihan, executive director of the Belt and Road Institute at the Center 
for China and Globalization, the BRI, in the last five years, has achieved certain success in 
terms of strengthening diplomatic relationship, promoting economic cooperation, and shaping 
global academic agenda, etc. 4  In other words, the thesis contends, during the first five years 
of the BRI, the ILCC – facilitative leadership, constructive leadership, and exemplary 
leadership – was largely constructed and implemented in institutional, policy, material, and 
ideational dimensions. However, there has been increasing criticism of the BRI; for example, 
remarking on the fact that the BRI is solely dominated by China, that China’s ambitions in 
promoting the BRI are unclear, and that the BRI may cause potential geopolitical conflict.  
7.4.2. THE ILCC IN THE BRI AS A REFLECTION OF THE MAJOR 
FEATURES OF CHINESE ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF IR  
On the basis of the above summary, the ILCC in the BRI can be interpreted as a reflection of 
the major features of Chinese ontological assumptions of IR. First of all, China constructed and 
practised its constructive leadership by proposing and promoting the major mission of the BRI, 
which became known as the “five connectivity” (policy communication, road connectivity, 
unimpeded trade, monetary circulation, and people-to-people exchange); this mission can be 
                                                             
4 Interview with Dr. Huang Rihan from the Belt and Road Institute at the Center for China and Globalization. Date: 
24th May, 2018. 
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considered as a reflection of the feature of relationality. Since the BRI was designed as a grand 
inter-continental project that connects a vast number of countries and covers many areas with 
potential risks and conflicts, by advancing the “five connectivity”, China aims to manage 
complex regional and inter-regional relations under the framework of the BRI and construct a 
comprehensive relational network that is built upon institutional, material, and ideational 
foundations. Moreover, in order to assuage doubts from other participants and construct a 
favorable environment for the implementation of the BRI, China practised its facilitative 
leadership by establishing cooperation between the BRI and many other significant 
international organizations and cooperation mechanisms along the routes. For instance, the 
“Silk Road Economic Belt” now cooperates with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the 
China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), the China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
Strategic Dialogue, the China-Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) Cooperation 
Forum (16+1 mechanism), and the China-EU Summit. Similarly, the “21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road” has been involved in cooperation with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), the China-ASEAN (10+1) Meeting, the ASEAN plus three (China, Japan and South 
Korea), the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation (GMS), the Pan-Beibu Gulf 
(PBG) Economic Cooperation Forum, the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional 
Cooperation (IOR-ARC), the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), and the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). As a result of the above-mentioned associations, the BRI 
has gradually received increasing recognition from international society. 
Second, China constructed and practised its facilitative leadership by shaping open and 
inclusive regionalization and globalization through the BRI, which can be interpreted as a 
reflection of the feature of inclusiveness. Specifically, the feature of inclusiveness is mainly 
manifested in two aspects. On the one hand, during the early years, China’s government and 
Chinese scholars officially identified around 64 major participants along the Belt and Road 
routes. However, with the development of the BRI, China has explicitly stated that there is no 
limitation to the number of participants under the framework of the BRI, and China is keen to 
embrace any potential participant that wishes to be involved in the project. Although the United 
States and Japan have always been skeptical of and resistant to this China-led initiative, from 
China’s perspective, it is still possible for the United States and Japan to participate in and 
contribute to the BRI. Thus, it is argued that China’s BRI is fundamentally different from the 
post-war Marshall Plan that mainly served the U.S.’s geopolitical interests. On the other hand, 
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the feature of inclusiveness can also be observed in China’s promotion of an alternative mode 
of governance through the BRI. Compared to the traditional “one-size-fits-all” model of global 
governance represented by the Washington Consensus, China does not seek, via the BRI, to 
build a top-down governance model by imposing a so-called omnipotent prescription with 
conditionality. Rather, it advocates a bottom-up model of global governance characterized by 
the idea of “wide consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits”, which insists that 
countries seek common ground while preserving their differences on the basis of mutual respect 
and mutual trust. This also implies that participants are fully motivated to be involved in the 
efficient allocation of resources and encourages win-win cooperation between and inclusive 
development for participants. More importantly, in September 2016, the idea of “wide 
consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits” was incorporated into the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) resolution of “United Nations in Global Economic Governance” 
during the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly, indicating the recognition of the idea by 
the international community. 
Third, the construction and implementation of the ILCC can be regarded as a reflection of the 
feature of processuality of Chinese ontological assumptions of IR. Against the backdrop of 
global economic stagnation and the outbreak of a number of “Black Swan” events in the 
Western world, China’s proposal of the BRI followed the grand tendency of fighting against 
protectionism and preserving globalization. On many international occasions, Chinese 
decision-makers have expressed their willingness to maintain the existing international system 
characterized by free trade and open economy, and the BRI is considered as the first Chinese 
strategy to proactively achieve this target. Over the last five years, China has actively 
constructed and practised its facilitative leadership and constructive leadership by gradually 
transforming the BRI from idea to action and from initiative to reality. One of the most 
representative examples of this was the establishment and operation of the AIIB – the major 
financing institution of the BRI – which focuses on infrastructure development in its 
participants. Unlike the traditional development mode, which emphasizes the significance of a 
type of shock therapy for transforming economic systems and achieving economic growth, 
China advocates that one country’s economic development should follow a process in which 
its infrastructure development is one of the key components. In this regard, by June 2018, the 
AIIB had supported the implementation of the BRI by lending a total of over US$4.4 billion, 
by approving nearly 30 projects along the routes, covering areas (countries) from North Africa 
(Egypt) to Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Bangladesh, Philippines, and Myanmar), from Central 
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Asia (Turkey, Tajikistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan) to South Asia (India and Pakistan), and 
from East Asia (China) to the Gulf (Oman). Moreover, given its wide coverage and great 
ambition, the BRI is often marked with geopolitical tags and has attracted suspicion from other 
countries. Therefore, taking external feedback and expectations into account, Chinese decision-
makers adopted a prudent attitude to implementing the BRI as a more manageable and balanced 
process. For instance, China recognizes the significance of coordination between the BRI and 
other major international institutions. Thus, under the framework of the BRI, China has 
achieved a number of coordinating and aligning policies and strategies, on the issue-areas of 
global development and economic governance, with the G20, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), etc. 
7.4.3. THE CHALLENGES FACED BY THE ILCC IN THE BRI  
In the previous section, the author pointed out the major challenges faced in the construction 
and implementation of the ILCC in the BRI from multilevel and multi-dimensional perspectives 
as follows. 
In the first place, at the global level, since 2016, a series of “Black Swan” events occurred in 
the field of global politics and economy. Brexit, the election success of Donald Trump, and the 
rise of the right wing in Europe have together indicated a dramatic shift in the Western political 
ecology and the rise of populism, characterized by “the suspicion of and hostility toward elites, 
mainstream politics, and established institutions” (Zakaria, 2016). In the meantime, there has 
also been an upsurge of anti-globalization sentiments and policies in the economic issue-area. 
For example, the Trump Administration released its protectionist policy of “America First” and 
announced a presidential executive order to “Buy American and Hire American”. The great 
wave of anti-globalization and protectionism in the Western world will impact on the 
implementation of the BRI, which relies on open and inclusive regionalization and 
globalization. 
Moreover, at the global level, the China–U.S. great power game also poses a significant 
challenge to the construction and implementation of the ILCC in the BRI. As the largest global 
power, in line with the concept of the “Thucydides Trap”, the United States has always held a 
vigilant attitude toward the world’s largest emerging power and the second largest economy – 
China. Over the last decade, China’s dramatic growth and the transformation of China’s 
diplomatic strategy has imposed great pressure on the United States. Thus, with the purpose of 
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suppressing China and maintaining its regional and global hegemonic status, the United States 
identified China as a revisionist power. Following the initiation and implementation of the BRI, 
the U.S. mainstream media frequently reported this China-initiated project in a negative manner 
and described it as “bleak”, and U.S. officials both explicitly and implicitly boycotted the BRI 
on several occasions. In 2014, when the AIIB was being established, the U.S.’ boycott of and 
dissatisfaction with the BRI became much more prominent. Against this backdrop, some U.S. 
scholars even claimed that the BRI and the AIIB intended to divide the Western world.  
In the second place, at the regional level, the BRI faces several kinds of challenges as follows. 
First, the issue of the stability of political regimes may pose potential and unpredictable 
challenges to the implementation of the BRI. For many countries along the routes, their political 
systems are still not fully established and not in a stable condition. In these countries, complex 
relationships exist between the ruling party and opposition party and between central and local 
government. The rise of a new regime usually means that contracts and projects signed by the 
previous government are overturned. Second, social instability is another major factor that 
impedes the development of the BRI. Slow economic development, social inequality, 
government corruption, and external intervention often lead to social upheaval and even social 
revolution, such as the Arab Spring and the Color Revolution in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) region. Third, the “Three Evils”, terrorism, extremism, and separatism, 
are bringing about negative effects on the implementation of the BRI, especially the Silk Road 
Economic Belt. For instance, driven by economic factors, terrorist groups may attack BRI 
projects and personnel. This can threaten the personal security of project employees, and it can 
also lead to economic loss by increasing a project’s operating costs. 
In addition to the previous three regional challenges, the construction and implementation of 
the ILCC also faces challenges from other major regional powers, and India is one of the most 
prominent examples of this.  Since the BRI was first proposed, India has always been reluctant 
to fully embrace this China-initiated regional project. India’s hesitation and misgivings about 
the BRI result from the following factors: (1) India has strong great power consciousness and 
cultural self-esteem. Sharing similar experiences with China in modern history and being an 
ancient civilization, India also has an unshakeable determination to achieve a national revival 
characterized by national development and an independent foreign policy. The pursuit of 
national glory has motivated India to launch an India-led project and to increase its discourse 
power in international relations; (2) India’s hesitation to embrace the BRI and its pursuit of 
strategic autonomy are also derived from its unique, self-contained geographic system. Its 
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regional geographic characteristics shape the unique historical, cultural, and transportation 
system of the country. Compared to Northeast Asia, geographically, India has much closer 
natural ties with Central Asia, West Asia, and Southeast Asia. By virtue of this geographic 
factor and its national strengths, India has shaped an independent, self-contained “connectivity” 
system in the region of the Indian Ocean Rim; (3) from the perspective of geopolitics, India’s 
reluctance to accept the BRI is also caused by its misgivings about China’s increasing influence 
in the region of the Indian Ocean Rim, which is seen as India’s traditional sphere of influence. 
There is reportedly a consensus among the Indian elites, “India is the center of the region, so 
the region is India, and it is our job to protect it from outside” (Gill, 1992: 58). Guided by this 
understanding, India has always held a vigilante attitude toward cooperation between regional 
countries and outside powers, and it has devoted itself to maintaining its dominant positions in 
this region. Above all, as Emilian Kavalski argued, in terms of BRI, the three elements of the 
ILCC can be observed in some regions (such as Southeast Asia and Middle East), but they are 
not really constructed and implemented in some other regions.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
5 Interview with Professor Emilian Kavalski from the University of Nottingham. Date: 13th September, 2018. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
Generally speaking, the major function and significance of the conclusion is “to distill all the 
chapters into a single highly focused chapter…to tie up the ends from where they started…and 
to extract meaning from the research data” (Trafford & Leshem, 2008: 127-128). Inspired by 
Trafford and Leshem’s clarification, as shown in Figure 8.1 below, this chapter intends to 
summarize the conceptual conclusions of the ILCC, which are derived from the previous 
chapters, as shown in the upper half of the figure, and which consists of five major components, 
as shown in the bottom half of the figure.  
 
Figure 8.1 The conceptual conclusions of the ILCC 
(source: the author’s compilation) 
Specifically, this chapter generates the conceptual conclusions of the notion of the ILCC 
through a research process of ontological sources of reference, methodological design, 
theoretical construction of explanation, and empirical discussion and analysis. To summarize 
the thesis process in reverse order, it (1) empirically verifies the ILCC through the study of the 
four selected cases, (2) confirms the explanatory capacity of the chosen theories that are derived 
from Chinese ontological and epistemological sources of reference, (3) ontologically reflects 
the major features of Chinese culture and history that are heuristic in formulating concepts with 
Chinese characteristics, (4) answers the research questions, and (5) fills the knowledge gap by 
verifying and confirming the applicability of the ILCC. In addition to these five components, 
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the conclusion also identifies the limitations of the ILCC and proposes an agenda for further 
research.  
8.1. THE EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION OF THE ILCC THROUGH 
THE STUDY OF THE FOUR SELECTED CASES 
This section relates to the most important and foundational component of the conceptual 
conclusions of the ILCC, the empirical verification of the concept. In other words, the empirical 
verification of the ILCC, based on the empirical analysis of the four selected cases, is seen as 
critical for further discussion regarding the ontological, methodological, and theoretical 
considerations of the ILCC as a conceptual framework. The author suggests that the empirical 
verification of the ILCC can be observed in two major aspects: (1) the verification of ability-
based leadership in the conceptualization of the ILCC, and (2) the empirical assessment and 
ranking of the extent to which the ILCC applies to the four selected cases (G20, BRICS, SCO, 
and BRI). 
8.1.1. THE VERIFICATION OF THE ILCC AS ABILITY-BASED 
LEADERSHIP  
By setting the four cases in the context of the ILCC, the thesis demonstrates that all cases show 
the ability-based leadership role to be a common feature, rather than the status-based leadership 
role, although the ability is manifested in different ways in different cases. As mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, according to Chinese historical and contemporary experience, the 
legitimacy of leadership is mainly derived from the ability to lead and is manifested in the 
Chinese idea of meritocracy. Meritocracy is rooted in performance legitimacy suggesting that 
“the government has an obligation to improve the people’s material well-being and 
intellectual/moral development is a central part of the Confucian tradition” (Coicaud, 2017: 26). 
In line with Chinese understanding, a leader can be identified according to what he/she did 
rather than what he/she said. This is in accord with the fact that Chinese decision-makers have 
never explicitly claimed that China is or would become an international leader, as the U.S. 
decision-makers claimed for the United States. Rather, China has objectively fulfilled its 
leadership role by promoting the institutionalization of governance mechanisms, shaping 
common vision on critical issues, and setting examples for other states to accept and follow. 
Furthermore, the thesis verifies that an ability-based understanding of “leadership” helps to 
conceptualize the framework of the ILCC, which is applicable to conducting an empirical 
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analysis of China’s involvement in global governance. By interpreting China’s NRC embedded 
in the ILCC using Breuning’s role theory model and China’s NRP embedded in the ILCC from 
institutional, policy, material, and ideational perspectives, the major components of the ILCC 
– facilitative leadership, constructive leadership, and exemplary leadership – can be detected in 
Chinese decision-makers’ rhetoric and Chinese foreign policies and practices. The ability-based 
Chinese political culture can be elaborated in line with the various components of the ILCC 
concept. The applicability of the ILCC is further manifested in the assessment and ranking of 
the extent to which the ILCC was found in the selected cases (see the following section).  
8.1.2. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE STRENTHS AND 
WEAKNESS OF THE ILCC IN THE FOUR SELECTED CASES 
This section includes an assessment of and ranks the extent to which the ILCC was manifested 
in the four selected cases. This empirical assessment and ranking help to further verify the 
applicability of the ILCC as a conceptual framework. In other words, it implies that the ILCC, 
manifested in its three major components (seen as facilitative leadership, constructive 
leadership, exemplary leadership) in different cases, has been constructed and practised by 
China in diverse ways, shaped by various opportunities and challenges, and has distinct 
implications for global governance as follows. 
8.1.2.1 Facilitative leadership 
By interpreting the three features of facilitative leadership – collectiveness, inclusiveness, and 
empowerment – through the empirical analysis of China’s NRC and NRP embedded in the 
ILCC, first of all, the thesis concludes that China’s facilitative leadership is at its strongest in 
the SCO. In the SCO, the most prominent example showing China’s facilitative leadership is 
the China-proposed principle of “Shanghai Spirit”. Under this principle, the dual leadership 
exhibited by China and Russia in regional cooperation can be clearly detected. As the two major 
great powers in this region, while China and Russia share a number of common interests in 
terms of preserving regime security, fighting against terrorism, and promoting economic 
development, they also face several divergences including potential geopolitical and 
geoeconomic conflicts. However, the resilience of the SCO has been maintained and 
cooperation between the member states has been strengthened in the past few years. This 
situation benefitted from China and Russia’s emphasis on collective leadership on several 
regional issues. For instance, although they have their own regional economic strategies, such 
as the China-led Silk Road Economic Belt and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, they 
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have always proactively sought opportunities to align their projects and strategies through the 
platform of the SCO. In the meanwhile, in the SCO, China has also practised the inclusive 
feature of facilitative leadership in terms of inviting India and Pakistan, two political and 
military rivalries, into this regional organization. Their successful inclusion reflects the move 
by China’s decision-makers to emphasize cooperation between the SCO member states while 
respecting each other’s diverse political and economic systems. Moreover, in the past decade, 
as the largest economy in this organization, China actively promoted economic cooperation 
with the SCO member states in terms of signing financial agreements, reaching big business 
deals, and establishing economic parks, etc. 
Second, the thesis contends that China’s facilitative leadership in the BRI is weaker than in the 
SCO, and it ranks second out of the four cases on this basis. Inclusiveness is the most obvious 
feature of China’s facilitative leadership in the BRI, since Chinese decision-makers have 
repeatedly stressed that there is no limitation to the number of participants in the BRI and the 
BRI is open to all potential participants. For instance, although Northern Europe is not typically 
considered as a region on the two routes of the BRI, China and the Nordic countries have also 
extensively discussed the “Polar Silk Road” strategy, which should have positive implications 
for Nordic-China relations. However, compared to the dual collective leadership by China and 
Russia observed in the SCO, the collective feature of China’s facilitative leadership in the BRI 
is less obvious than the role it plays in the SCO, since China is the sole initiator and promotor 
of the BRI. Moreover, because of several geopolitical factors, economic cooperation and 
projects along the BRI have come up against challenges and limitations. In this respect, the 
empowerment feature of China’s facilitative leadership was not as obvious as was expected. 
Third, the thesis concludes that the extent of China’s facilitative leadership in the BRICS is the 
second weakest among the four cases. Inclusiveness is the most prominent component of 
China’s facilitative leadership in the BRICS, since China proposed and approved the inclusion 
of South Africa into this inter-regional emerging power consortium. This expansion helps this 
group to stretch out to the African continent and increases its representativeness among the 
developing countries and emerging powers. In this respect, the political implications of this 
inclusion are greater than its economic implications. The collective feature of China’s 
facilitative leadership is mainly manifested in the process of the establishment and agenda 
setting of the New Development Bank. During the past decade, although economic cooperation 
between the BRICS member states has been strengthened in terms of the increasing levels of 
internal trade and investment of the group, the empowerment of China’s facilitative leadership 
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was not fully practised due to the competitiveness embedded in the members’ economic 
relationships. On the one hand, the five states are at a similar development stage in terms of 
production structure, trade structure, and their location in the international industrial chain; on 
the other hand, each of the BRICS members has stronger economic ties with the established 
powers (the United States and Europe) than with each other. This situation poses a major 
hindrance to the implementation of China’s facilitative leadership. 
Fourth, the thesis demonstrates that the extent of China’s facilitative leadership in the G20 is 
the weakest in comparison to the previous three cases. Since the breakout of the global financial 
crisis in 2009, the collectiveness and inclusiveness of China’s facilitative leadership has been 
observed in China’s promotion of the G20, consisting of major established and emerging 
powers, as the most important platform for international economic cooperation. Chinese 
decision-makers have repeatedly welcomed the collective role of existing and emerging powers 
in the G20 in terms of addressing the financial crisis and reviving the world economy. Moreover, 
China also practised its facilitative leadership by empowering the European major G20 
countries by purchasing their debts. However, the coexistence of emerging and existing powers 
has also challenged the construction and implementation of China’s facilitative leadership in 
the G20. On the one hand, although the emerging countries have gained a certain number of 
speaking rights by being included in this mechanism, the existing powers still play a dominant 
role in terms of agenda-setting and shaping standards; on the other hand, given the gradual 
recovery of their economies and the reduced effects of the financial crisis in recent years, the 
US-led advanced countries began to disregard the significance of the G20 and turn their 
attention back to the traditional financial governance mechanism – the G7/8. Both of these two 
situations have largely restricted China’s role of facilitative leadership in the G20. 
8.1.2.2 Constructive leadership 
By interpreting the three features of China’s constructive leadership – institutional construction, 
vision construction, and interest construction – through the empirical analysis of China’s NRC 
and NRP embedded in the ILCC, in the first place, the thesis argues that China’s constructive 
leadership was most prominently manifested in the BRI. In proposing the BRI, China 
constructed and practised its constructive leadership by establishing formal organizations, 
providing long-term vision, and shaping a community of common interests, etc. As the major 
institutional pillar of the BRI, the China-led AIIB plays a significant role in promoting the 
development of the BRI in terms of providing credit to the participants’ domestic projects and 
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regional development strategies. By 2018, the AIIB has lent a total of over US$4.4 billion by 
approving nearly 30 projects in the relevant areas. Moreover, through the implementation of 
the BRI, China constructed and practised its constructive leadership by proposing an innovative 
vision of “wide consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits” for global governance, 
which is called the “China Plan” by Chinese decision-makers. As a result of China’s proactive 
promotion, this vision has been gradually accepted internationally. For instance, in September 
2016, the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly incorporated this vision into the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution of “United Nations in Global Economic 
Governance”. In addition, in line with the major principles of the BRI, China has actively 
constructed common interests between itself and other participants in terms of improving 
infrastructure connectivity, promoting capacity cooperation, and strengthening people-to-
people exchanges, etc. On the basis of China’s proactive promotion and other participants’ great 
aspirations for taking up development opportunities, a large number of projects and cooperative 
relationships have been established in the last five years. However, more recently, China’s 
constructive leadership in the BRI has faced increasing challenges that are mainly derived from 
the rise of anti-globalization, regime change of some participating countries, geopolitical 
concerns of other regional great powers, and several specific technical issues. 
In the second place, the thesis contends that China’s constructive leadership in the BRICS is 
weaker than in the BRI, ranking as second among the four cases. Institutional construction and 
vision construction are the two major manifestations of China’s constructive leadership in the 
BRICS. On the one hand, being similar to the case of the BRI, China constructed and practised 
its constructive leadership by leading the establishment of the NDB and contributing the largest 
portion (US$ 41/100 billion) to the CRA. The former aims to provide financial support to the 
infrastructure construction and economic development of the BRICS member states, and the 
latter devotes itself to constructing a financial safety net for the BRICS. In addition, under 
China’s constructive leadership, institutional construction within the BRICS can also observed 
in the achievement of a number of policy agreements between the five countries, such as the 
Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership, the BRICS Roadmap for Trade, Economic and 
Investment Cooperation until 2020, the BRICS Trade and Investment Facilitation Plan, the 
BRICS Guidelines for Intellectual Property Cooperation, and the BRICS Framework for Trade 
and Investment Cooperation, etc. On the other hand, since the establishment of the BRICS, 
China has strongly advocated for and shaped the vision of “democratic consultation”, which is 
considered to be the group’s core principle or culture. This vision has been gradually recognized 
 231 
and accepted by the BRICS member states through their interactions on several significant 
issues, such as the inclusion of South Africa into this emerging power consortium and the 
establishment of the NDB and CRA. Moreover, during the Xiamen BRICS summit in 2017, 
China proposed another landmark vision of “BRICS Plus”. This initiative aims to make 
innovative contributions to the new model and new normal of the BRICS mechanism in terms 
of promoting the dialogue mechanism between regional organizations and international 
mechanisms, exploring possible ways to strengthen coordination with the middle powers, and 
safeguarding the outcomes of global governance and strengthening cooperation between the 
BRICS and the G20. Nonetheless, interest construction is weak in the BRICS due to 
competition between its members. 
In the third place, the thesis confirms that China’s constructive leadership in the SCO is the 
second weakest and just stronger than that found in the G20. Vision construction and interest 
construction are two major representations of China’s constructive leadership in the SCO. Since 
the establishment of the SCO, China has proposed the vision of “Shanghai Spirit”, which is 
seen as the core value/culture of this organization. With the development of the SCO, the 
member states have gradually recognized and accepted this vision, which has exerted a huge 
influence on the diversification of the cooperative areas of the SCO, the deepening of mutual 
trust and mutual respect among the member states, and the inclusion of new members, etc. 
Guided by this vision, although there are some potential geopolitical and geoeconomic conflicts 
in this organization, China has, to some extent, integrated the members’ interests by aligning 
China-based regional economic strategy with other members’ development projects. For 
instance, on the basis of the BRI, China has established a number of strategic synergies with 
other members’ development strategies, such as the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy and its “Bright 
Road” Initiative, “Uzbekistan Towards 2030”, Tajikistan’s National Development Strategy, 
and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. However, China’s constructive leadership was 
less visible in the institutional construction of the SCO. For instance, in the long term, China 
has spent a lot to support the operation and development of the Russia-initiated SCO Interbank 
Consortium (IBC). In 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China will set up a 
30 billion Yuan equivalent special lending facility within the framework of the SCO IBC. 
However, although China has proposed the idea of establishing the SCO Development Bank, 
that has made little progress in the past few years. 
In the fourth place, the thesis confirms that China’s constructive leadership in the G20 was the 
weakest among the four cases. As mentioned above, since the G20 is comprised of both major 
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established and emerging powers, the political and economic divergences within this 
mechanism are even greater than in the other three. This situation has led to constraints on 
China’s implementation of its constructive leadership. With respect to the dimension of 
institutional construction, China has contributed far less to the institutionalization of the G20 
than it did in the case of the BRI and the BRICS. China’s most obvious contribution was its 
proposal to establish new working groups, such as the G20 Trade & Investment Working Group 
(TIWG) and the G20 Network Working Group, which supplement the existing groups. In terms 
of the dimension of vision construction, by hosting the 2016 G20 summit, China demonstrated 
its understanding of world development trends, characterized by four major keywords – 
innovative, invigorated, interconnected, and inclusive. These four keywords also convey 
China’s vision of the future of the G20. However, with the rise of anti-globalization and 
protectionism, it is clear that China’s vision for the G20 will inevitably face a great number of 
challenges in the upcoming years. Regarding the dimension of interest construction, in 2016, 
under the G20 framework, China and the United States practised collective leadership by 
successfully concluding the Paris Agreement, which shapes the common interests of the parties 
to combat climate change and adapt to its effects. In addition, during the 2016 Hangzhou G20 
summit, China also practised its constructive leadership by approving the G20 Strategy for 
Global Trade Growth and the G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking, 
which are considered as the milestone documents in the G20. However, the unilateral foreign 
policy adopted by the Trump Administration and the United States’ withdrawal from the 
multilateral cooperation mechanism have since damaged China’s role of constructive 
leadership in the G20. 
8.1.2.3 Exemplary leadership 
By interpreting the three features of China’s exemplary leadership – moral orientation, 
intellectual guidance, and transformative function – through the empirical analysis of China’s 
NRC and NRP embedded in the ILCC, first and foremost, the thesis confirms that China’s 
exemplary leadership was at its strongest in the BRI. Being different from the other three cases, 
China was the exclusive initiator of the BRI and provided the intellectual guidance for other 
potential participants. Through the release of the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk 
Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, China extensively illustrated the 
major targets, principles, and means of constructing the BRI. By doing so, China provided a 
full picture of how the BRI would be implemented and how other participants could be involved 
in this project. Inspired by China’s idea, in the past five years, a large number of countries have 
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showed their great enthusiasm for taking part in this China-led project. China’s intellectual 
guidance not only inspires the countries that adjoin the routes, but also it attracts countries 
outside the traditional region defined by the BRI. The most prominent example is the Nordic 
countries. In recent years (2015-2018), a number of workshops and conferences on the BRI 
were held in Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsinki, and Oslo, during which scholars and politicians 
demonstrated their interest in understanding and interpreting the BRI. Currently, governments 
on both sides are assessing the possibilities and prospects for the cooperation between the 
Northern Europe-based “Amber Road” and the China-initiated Silk Road Economic Belt. 
Unlike the traditional one-size-fits-all pattern of global governance and its logic of 
appropriateness, through its promotion of the BRI, China strongly advocates a new pattern of 
“wide consultation, joint build and shared benefits” that emphasizes the logic of relationality, 
which demonstrates the moral orientation of China’s exemplary leadership. The third 
dimension of China’s exemplary leadership is the transformative function that is demonstrated 
by China and CEE 16+1 Cooperation, a major component of the Silk Road Economic Belt. 
According to the research done by Anastas Vangeli, China has symbolic power over the CEE 
countries as a product of their cooperation, and “a growing number of actors may at least start 
thinking and behaving more like China, or the way China inspires them to think and behave, or 
in a way that legitimizes China and its claims, its values, its economic model and practices” 
(Vangeli, 2018: 686). However, some European countries have also complained that China’s 
symbolic power over the CEE has explicitly and implicitly challenged the unification of the 
EU. This kind of criticism would inevitably exert negative effects on China’s exemplary 
leadership in the BRI. 
Secondly, the thesis contends that China’s exemplary leadership in the SCO was weaker than 
in the BRI and ranks in second position among the four cases. China contributed its intellectual 
guidance by proposing the “Shanghai Spirit”, which played a significant role in the 
establishment and development of the SCO. With the development of the SCO, this idea has 
been absorbed by the member states in terms of dealing with regional issues. More specifically, 
as mentioned above, this idea has exerted great influence on the preservation of regional 
stability, the diversification of cooperative areas of the SCO, and the inclusion of new members 
into this regional organization. Moreover, the idea of “Shanghai Spirit” has also displayed the 
transformative function of China’s exemplary leadership. For instance, two new members, 
India and Pakistan, have promised to comply with the major principles of the “Shanghai Spirit” 
and the code of conduct of the SCO and not to seek to solve their bilateral conflicts through the 
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regional multilateral platform. However, given the deep contradiction embedded in the bilateral 
relationship between India and Pakistan, the thesis supposes that this complicated bilateral 
relationship will add uncertainties in the further development of the SCO and questions the 
persistence of the “Shanghai Spirit” as the core culture of the group. 
Thirdly, the thesis confirms that China’s exemplary leadership in the BRICS was the second 
weakest of all the cases. As with the SCO, in the BRICS, China has provided intellectual 
guidance, which is known as the “democratic consultation” – the core culture of the emerging 
power consortium, and this idea has had a positive influence on the establishment of the NDB 
and the inclusion of a new member (South Africa) into the group. However, given the divergent 
political systems and competitive economic structures of the five member states, the 
transformative function of China’s exemplary leadership was not as strong as in the two 
previous cases.  
Fourthly, the thesis confirms that China’s exemplary leadership in the G20 was the weakest 
compared to the previous three cases. Although the G20 consists of the major emerging powers, 
which have gained increasing speaking rights, its agenda-setting and rules have been 
consistently dominated by the major US-led Western bloc. China, as the second largest 
economy, did not obtain the right to host the G20 until 2016 – the 11th summit after the financial 
crisis. Therefore, China has not had much opportunity to provide intellectual guidance to the 
G20, let alone exert its transformative influence on other G20 members.  
In sum, by assessing the comparative strengths and weaknesses in the various extents to which 
roles were played by each major component – facilitative leadership, constructive leadership, 
and exemplary leadership – of the ILCC in the four selected cases, as shown in Figure 8.2 below, 
the final ranking of the ILCC of the four cases can be stated as “BRI>SCO>BRICS>G20”. This 
ranking verifies the applicability of the conceptual framework of the ILCC in understanding 
and interpreting China’s foreign policy and practices in global governance. 
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Figure 8.2 The assessment of the ILCC in the four selected cases 
(source: the author’s compilation) 
8.2. CONFIRMATION OF THEORETICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
On the basis of verifying the applicability of the ILCC to the interpretation of China’s role in 
global governance in the previous section (8.1), the thesis summarizes that this empirical 
verification of the ILCC confirms the legitimacy of the author’s theory selection and application 
and further confirms an ontological source of reference in the construction of the ILCC. This 
confirmation is considered as another significant component of the conceptual conclusions of 
the ILCC. 
8.2.1. CONFIRMATION OF THE LEGITIMACY OF THEORY 
SELECTION AND APPLICATION 
As discussed in the methodological section (see 2.3), on the one hand, relational theory was 
selected on the basis of the major features of Chinese ontological assumptions of IR that are 
derived from three Chinese IR-related philosophical ideas and streams of political thought – 
Tianxia, Humane Authority, and the State of Equilibrium and Harmony. By reviewing a number 
of literatures on relational theory, the logic of relationality was identified as the core element 
of the theory. The logic of relationality was further applied to defining the concepts of relational 
power, relational interest, and relational vision and conceptualizing the framework of the ILCC, 
which consists of facilitative leadership, constructive leadership, and exemplary leadership. On 
the other hand, role theory, as an empirical theory, was applied to the empirical analysis of 
China’s NRC and NRP under the conceptual framework of the ILCC.  
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By summarizing the empirical analysis of the ILCC in Chapters 4 to 7, it is possible to conclude 
that the empirical analysis has, to various extents, reflected a combination of relational theory 
and role theory. This can also be observed in the assessment and ranking of the extent to which 
ILCC applies in the four cases. Moreover, as shown in the following section (see 8.2.2), the 
confirmation of the legitimacy of theory selection and application further ratify the ILCC’s 
reflection of the major features of Chinese ontological assumptions of IR. 
8.2.2. REFLECTION OF THE MAJOR FEATURES OF CHINESE 
ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF IR 
In this section, the thesis contends that the ILCC reflects the major features of Chinese 
ontological assumptions of IR – relationality, processuality, and inclusiveness. With respect to 
the feature of relationality, (1) in the case of the G20, China helps to promote relational stability 
among the diverse member states and plays an active role in bridging the existing and emerging 
powers. (2) In the case of the BRICS, China focuses on strengthening the internal relational ties 
between the member states in terms of shaping collective identity and increasing the degree of 
economic interdependency; it also proactively maintains the relational circle between the 
emerging powers and the established powers in terms of establishing cooperation between the 
BRICS and other Western-based existing mechanisms. (3) In the case of the SCO, China has 
gradually injected the idea of “Shanghai Spirit”, characterized by mutual respect and mutual 
trust, into this regional organization in order to maintain the relational circle between the 
member states, remedying the geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions and contradictions 
between China and Russia and preserving social and political stability in Central Asia. (4) In 
the case of the BRI, the feature of relationality is clearly observed in the China-proposed 
principles of the BRI – the “five connectivity”. In line with the “five connectivity”, China aims 
to establish a grand open market and inter-regional cooperative system that contains a large 
number of countries and regional mechanisms, such as China-CEEC 16+1 Cooperation, China-
GCC Strategic Dialogue, and China-ASEAN meeting. 
Concerning the feature of inclusiveness, (1) in the case of the BRI, China has explicitly stated 
that there is no limitation on the number of participants under the framework of the BRI and 
China has shown great willingness to embrace any potential participants in the project. In 
addition, China sees the promotion of the BRI as an opportunity to model a bottom-up inclusive 
pattern of global governance that is characterized by the idea of “wide consultation, joint 
contribution and shared benefits”. (2) In the case of the SCO, China’s ratification of the 
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inclusion of India and Pakistan, two regional military and political rivalries, into this China-led 
regional organization is considered to be a prominent example of the feature of inclusiveness. 
Moreover, during the Qingdao SCO summit in 2018, China invited a number of delegates from 
other international organizations, which also displayed the inclusive feature of the ILCC. (3) In 
the case of the G20, China has devoted itself to leading the achievement of the inclusive trade 
and investment mechanism and policy under the G20 framework and it has also repeatedly 
emphasized the significance of inclusive development among the member states over the past 
decade. (4) In the case of the BRICS, given the criticism regarding its divergent political 
systems and competitive economic structures, China’s emphasis on collective identity among 
the member states demonstrated its inclusive attitude towards this representative emerging 
power consortium, and this inclusiveness is conducive to the resilience and stability of the 
BRICS against the background of global economic stagnation. In addition, China’s proposal 
and approval to include South Africa into the BRICS has also clearly displayed the feature of 
inclusiveness. 
Regarding the feature of processuality, (1) in the case of the BRI, by regarding the BRI as a 
long-term inter-regional project that includes a vast range of countries and regions, Chinese 
decision-makers adopted a prudent attitude toward implementing the BRI as a more 
manageable and balanced process by fully taking into consideration other participants’ 
expectations and their national conditions. (2) In the case of the SCO, the organizational 
expansion of the SCO – the inclusion of India and Pakistan – was an achievement obtained by 
China and Russia, two regional powers, in a manageable and negotiated process that gave 
consideration to the interests of all parties. (3) In the case of the G20, through its participation 
in the G20, China has practised its constructive leadership by continuously striving for the 
reform of the international order of financial governance in a relatively moderate and processual 
manner. (4) In the case of the BRICS, the feature of processuality is mainly exhibited in China’s 
contribution to the development of the BRICS from a concept to a group to an institutionalized 
mechanism over the past decade. In the process of its participation in the BRICS, China has 
gradually shaped a club culture of “democratic consultation” which has promoted the 
establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) in a manageable and balanced 
process. 
In sum, the above discussion of the ILCC’s reflection of theoretical and ontological 
considerations has further verified the consistency and coherence of the research design of the 
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thesis. In this respect, it demonstrates the legitimacy and reliability of the choice of theory, the 
choice of research materials, and the choice of research methods. 
8.3. KNOWLEDGE CONTRIBUTION AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS ANSWERED  
Based on the above interpretive and conceptual conclusions, the thesis proposes that the 
conceptualization and empirical analysis of the ILCC have made a number of contributions to 
filling current knowledge gaps. As identified in the introductory chapter, the major knowledge 
gap related to deficiencies of the mainstream IR theories – synchronicity, objectivity, simplicity 
– in interpreting the relationship between the rise of China and the existing U.S.-based 
international order/global governance. 
First and foremost, by identifying the ability-based leadership deriving from the Chinese 
political culture of meritocracy and verifying the ILCC’s reflection of the major features of 
Chinese ontological assumptions of IR – relationality, processuality, and inclusiveness – the 
thesis confirms that the conceptualization of the ILCC is closely associated with Chinese 
traditional culture and political thought. In this respect, the thesis makes a contribution by filling 
the knowledge gap in mainstream IR theories that neglect the role of Chinese history in shaping 
Chinese decision-makers’ perceptions of international relations and China’s foreign policies 
and practices based on those perceptions. In the meanwhile, this kind of ontological reflection 
is a response to the first sub-research questions of how do Chinese IR-related political thought 
and cultural heritage impact Chinese (decision-makers and elites) ontological 
assumptions/worldview of contemporary international relations and how do Chinese decision-
makers and elites, on the basis of their worldview, construct and implement the ILCC through 
China’s involvement in a myriad of issue-areas/mechanisms in global governance.  
Second, by conceptualizing and undertaking an empirical analysis of the ILCC, the thesis 
contributes to the establishment of a paradigm that interprets China’s role in global governance 
by accounting for the respective ontological, methodological, theoretical, and empirical 
considerations. This paradigm fills the knowledge gap of and supplements the existing research 
paradigms – the three mainstream IR theories – on the rise of China in terms of providing a 
more holistic pattern that consists of structure-agency and material-ideational perspectives. 
This paradigm mainly benefits from the application of Breuning’s role theory model to 
analyzing China’s NRC embedded in the ILCC and the four-dimensional (institutional, policy, 
material, ideational) interpretation of China’s NRP embedded in the ILCC. Moreover, the 
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construction and application of the paradigm is a response to the major research question of 
how to conceptualize and interpret the rise of China in global governance through constructing 
and analyzing the conceptual notion of the ILCC. 
Third, for a long time, China’s role in global governance has been criticized as unclear and 
unable to be understood through a clear conceptual framework. Against this background, the 
thesis proposes that the conceptualization of the ILCC, as an analytical framework, fills this 
knowledge gap and makes a contribution in providing a conceptual framework for 
understanding China’s role in different issue-areas of global governance. In other words, the 
conceptualization of the ILCC has, to some extent, enriched the ways of interpreting China’s 
decision-making and behavior in international relations. Applying this framework to 
interpreting China’s NRC and NRP in the four selected cases is also conducive to the answer 
of another sub-research question, which is what are the implications of “international leadership 
with Chinese characteristics” (ILCC) for world politics and global governance, and what 
opportunities and challenges are faced in the construction and implementation of the ILCC. 
8.4. LIMITATIONS OF THE ILCC 
As shown in the previous chapters, since the ILCC is conceptualized through the logic of 
relationality – the core component of relational theory – it demonstrates the flexible and 
negotiable nature of China’s foreign policy and practice as manifested in the empirical analysis 
of the ILCC in the four selected cases (G20, BRICS, SCO, BRI). For instance, with the purpose 
of sustaining a favorable relational circle and maintaining the coherence of the BRICS group, 
at the G20 Seoul summit, China abnegated part of its rightful IMF quota share to India and 
Brazil. This abnegation shows that China strives to shape the sense of collectiveness among 
emerging powers (facilitative leadership), construct common interests and vision (constructive 
leadership), and use its material power in a relational and morality-oriented manner (exemplary 
leadership). Thus, it approves that the conceptualization and empirical analysis have 
contributed to the verification of the ILCC as a conceptual framework.  
However, the thesis contends that the framework of the ILCC is not omnipotent and cannot be 
used to analyze all of Chinese foreign policy-making and external practice. The major limitation 
of the ILCC is manifested in its inability to explain and interpret China’s decision-making and 
behavior that are closely associated with China’s core national interests, since China’s core 
interests represent “the non-negotiable bottom lines of Chinese foreign policy” (Zeng, Xiao, & 
Breslin, 2015: 245). Since the first decade of the twenty-first century, with its increasing 
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material capability and deepening engagement with international society, Chinese decision-
makers and scholars have noted the importance of defining and elaborating on the connotations 
and extensions of China’s core national interests. As Chinese President Xi Jinping argues, “we 
will stick to the road of peaceful development, but will never give up our legitimate rights and 
will never sacrifice our national core interests” (Xi, 2013a). Xi further clarifies China’s core 
interests as China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests. In addition, Shi Yinhong, 
one of the most representative Chinese IR scholars, has also contended that “China should never 
give in while defending its core interests. Only when it comes to non-core interests should it 
make some compromise in order to ease the pressure on other big powers” (Shi, 2010). From 
this perspective, the thesis confirms that the conceptual framework of the ILCC is not 
compatible with the non-negotiable and non-compromising core interests of China. 
As shown in Figure 8.3 below, in 2011, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 
published the white paper entitled China’s Peaceful Development in which China’s core 
interests are clearly defined as “state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and 
national reunification, China’s political system established by the Constitution and overall 
social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social 
development” (Information Office of the State Council, 2011). More specifically, in line with 
the clarification and categorization provided in the white paper, China’s core national interests 
are further identified by Chinese decision-makers as the Taiwan Issue, the political and social 
stability of Xinjiang and Tibet provinces, the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Island Dispute. 
Thus, the thesis is unable to use the conceptual framework of the ILCC in interpreting these 
particular issues. 
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(source: the author’s compilation) 
 
8.5. AGENDA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This final section of the concluding chapter demonstrates how this thesis’ efforts to 
conceptualize and interpret “international leadership with Chinese characteristics” (ILCC) can 
be seen as a part of the ongoing debate and attempt by a group of prominent Chinese scholars 
to construct a Chinese IR theory. For instance, Ren Xiao has interpreted the inevitability of the 
emergence of a Chinese IR theory from five perspectives: (1) as a great power, China has 
greater degree of intellectual and theoretical autonomy; (2) indigenization or sinicization is 
prominently manifested in the rising self-consciousness found in a large number of fields (e.g. 
philosophy, economics, sociology) in Chinese social science; (3) the rise of China and the 
dynamics of China’s relationship with international society calls for theory building of Chinese 
IR; (4) IR theory is indeed emerging in China today; (5) China’s experience is providing IR 
theory with a new empirical foundation (Ren, 2016: 47-50). These facts have created the 
context for Chinese IR scholars to hotly argue for the construction of a Chinese school of IR. 
In reviewing the evolution of the debate, this thesis identified one main bone of contention that 
is observed between “IR theory with Chinese characteristics” and “Chinese IR theory”. 
According to Zhang Yongjin and Chang Teng-chi, “‘Naming’ is indeed central to the debates 
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among Chinese scholars on the construction of a Chinese School of IR” (Zhang & Chang, 2016: 
9).  
On the one hand, one group of Chinese scholars, who support “IR theory with Chinese 
characteristics”, argue that “the ‘Chinese characteristics’ require self-esteem, self-confidence, 
self-accomplishment in the disciplinary construction of IR and give it a Chinese imprint. This 
shall not be an average Chinese imprint but rather distinguished and innovative contributions” 
(Liang & Hong, 2000: 33-34). Moreover, as Li Xing analyzed, at the current stage, the concept 
of “IR theory with Chinese characteristics” is more plausible and applicable than the concept 
of “Chinese IR theory” in consideration of the following features of “uniqueness” applicable to 
the rise of China:  
- China’s cultural-historical legacy and intellectual tradition have an indispensable impact on 
the construction of “IR theory with Chinese characteristics”;  
- China’s economic success has been achieved within the existing capitalist world order 
through a good combination of the internal “embedded” development and the external 
capitalist systems of law of value; 
- China’s Sinicizing does not aim to provide an alternative hegemony with universal norms 
and values;  
- The Chinese economy is simultaneously occupying multiple positions and playing multiple 
roles in all three stratifications of the capitalist world economy;  
- The rise of China is not creating an independent hegemony, rather, it is shaping a world 
order with intertwined/interdependent hegemony (X. Li, 2018). 
On the other hand, another group of Chinese scholars, who favor the construction of “Chinese 
IR theory”, hold different viewpoints than the former group. First, they believe that “IR theory 
with Chinese characteristics” is problematic as it can be regarded as “a replica of the political 
discourse of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’” (Ren, 2016: 36; B. Shi, 2006). This group 
of scholars has reached a consensus that “IR theory should be developed within China, and that 
this should be independent from government ideology and related to wider pursuit of theory in 
IR globally” (Wang & Buzan, 2016: 122). Second, this group insists that “as part of social 
sciences and general theory, IR theory should seek universality, generality, and contents, rather 
than speciality, individuality, and form” (Song, 2001: 68-69). In other words, they argue that 
Chinese IR theory should provide a broad frame of reference for academic and political circles. 
But until now, there has been no concrete IR theoretical framework which presents two sides 
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of same coin, i.e., with Chinese theoretical assumptions/premises at the core on one side and 
theoretical broad reference on the other side.  
Inspired by the above debate between “IR theory with Chinese characteristics” and “Chinese 
IR theory”, a new extension of this thesis, given more time and opportunity, might be developed, 
for which I would like to propose a further research agenda, as follows. 
First of all, by placing the construction of Chinese IR theory within his conceptual framework 
of “interdependent hegemony” (Li, 2014; Li and Agustin, 2014; Xing Li, 2016) , Li Xing has 
largely reduced the political sinicization of “IR theory with Chinese characteristics”. In the 
same vein, the extension of the proposed research agenda should combine the ILCC with the 
concept of “interdependent hegemony” and explore the implications brought about by the ILCC 
on the world order in a broader sense, rather than interpreting the ILCC in the selected four 
cases. In a similar attempt and effort, the thesis might be extended by doing further research 
into whether the norm diffusion of Chinese ideas and practices that have been conceptualized, 
analyzed, and verified by this thesis, can be further developed in to CIL, namely from 
“international leadership with Chinese characteristics” (ILCC) to “Chinese international 
leadership” (CIL). This further development is parallelly related to the debate mentioned above 
between “IR theory with Chinese characteristics” and “Chinese IR theory”. The theoretical 
argument of the CIL relies on the premise of China being able to maintain its economic growth 
and being actively engaged in global governance by shouldering more responsibilities, making 
it plausible for CIL to be accepted as a broadly applicable mode of governance and mode of 
value in the future. 
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